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ABSTRACT
There has been a marked resurgence of academic interest on 
the theory of. finance and growth in Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) over the last two decades. It is currently more widely 
believed among economists that the development of the 
financial and capital markets of a developing country would 
enhance the growth of its real economic activities. 
Meanwhile, with external capital increasingly running short 
of LDCs1 expectations, reliance on domestic sources of 
finance is becoming more critical than ever before.
Sudan, unlike most LDCs, is a country with huge untapped 
natural resources. Yet, its development plans have 
consistently been frustrated by the inadequacy of both 
internal and external sources of finance. This study concerns 
itself with the structure, nature, and performance of 
monetary and financial policies and institutions, and their 
role in development financing in Sudan. As such, it attempts 
to make an empirical contribution to the literature on 
finance and development in LDCs.
It is argued in this study that the extent to which 
financial variables may influence real variables, would 
depend on how well-suited financial institutions and 
instruments are to provide development finance as well as 
non-finance or equity-related services. Serious doubt is cast 
on the ability of liberalized interest rates to bring about 
such a financial structure, and on the capacity of an 
unregulated financial system to allocate resources in an 
economically efficient way.
The financial system of Sudan, which is bank-based, has 
little contribution to term and/or equity financing, 
entrepreneurial development, and enterprise initiatives. But, 
ill-studied monetary and credit policies, associated with 
considerable fiscal imbalances, and accelerating inflation, 
are partly to blame for inadequate development and 
performance of financial intermediaries. In particular, the 
long-term development of financial and capital markets has
been overrode by the quest for short-term economic 
stabilization.
The study is particularly timely and significant 
considering the socio-economic, and legislative developments 
that have occurred in Sudan during the late 1970s and the 
1980s. The most important of these developments is the 
renaissance of Islamic ideals, which is manifested in the 
establishment of various banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries that adhere to Islamic principles of finance. 
The cornerstone of these principles is the abolition of 
predetermined rates of interest. We examine the theory of 
Islamic finance, and provide an empirical assessment of the 
performance of Islamic banks in Sudan, pinpoint their 
limitations and suggest a basis for future policy. It has 
been argued in this study that Islamic banking in particular 
poses a series of problems, which urge fundamental 
restructuring of financial and capital markets, as well as 
the regulatory and supervisory apparatuses.
While the Islamic modes of finance, which call for 
participation and increased involvement of financial firms in 
various aspects of business, may boost the rate of real 
capital formation and the growth of entrepreneurship, they 
have an ambiguous impact on saving accumulation. Moreover, 
the Islamic instruments of finance tend to be less liquid 
than conventional ones, and may entail substantial costs to 
banks. We demonstrate that for Islamic finance to be 
successful there needs to be a well-functioning securities 
market.
Finally, it is shown, in the context of a macroeconomic 
model of the Sudanese economy, that a low and stable rate of 
inflation is critical for monetary or fiscal expansion to 
have predictable effects on real output growth, and that 
policies to stimulate aggregate demand and output should at 
the same time attempt to improve the supply side of the 
economy in order to reduce inflationary repercussions.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction:
Economic development in most less developed countries 
(LDCs) is constrained, primarily, by lack -of real capital. It 
has often been argued that, with inadequate domestic sources 
of finance, this constraint can only be removed through the 
flow of capital from rich to poor countries. However, despite 
huge capital inflows from abroad during the last three 
decades, few LDCs have managed to achieve a reasonable level 
of economic development^) . Notwithstanding the question of 
whether foreign capital substitutes or augments domestic 
saving, external aid, official or private, has recently 
become more difficult to obtain. As a result, reliance on 
domestic sources of finance is becoming more critical than 
ever before.
Efforts to mobilize domestic resources for capital 
formation purposes would require a finance and credit 
mechanism that is capable of effecting the volume and 
composition of national savings as well as their allocation 
to the most productive projects from society's viewpoint. 
There is, however, a considerable controversy over the 
appropriate institutional framework, private or governmental, 
through which potential surplus should be mobilized and 
transmuted to productive investment opportunities. There are 
conceivably many methods of effecting a transfer of 
resources. For instance, potential national savings may be 
mobilized by government monetary and fiscal operations, 
financial institutions or a combination of various 
mechanisms.
In view of inflexibility of tax systems in LDCs, and the 
dangers of inflationary f i n a n c e , where there are already
1
high rates of inflation in these countries, and other 
structural rigidities, it has been strongly argued that a 
well-developed financial system appears to be a more 
efficient mechanism for resource mobilization. This does not 
mean that the financial system should replace other 
mechanisms, but the argument for it runs along the lines of 
the argument for a free-enterprise economy, where perfect 
market conditions and rational behaviour are assumed to 
prevail. The development of the financial system, in terms of 
broadening the range of both financial institutions and 
instruments, is seen as a stimulus for savings and 
investment, and via that, real growth. For example, Shaw 
(1973) argues that "where finance is shallow ...an economy 
depends relatively heavily on its government fiscal budget 
and on its international capital accounts for the flows of 
savings that finance capital growth. Financial deepening 
(development) eases the strain on taxation and moderates 
demand for foreign savings" (P.8) .
The objective of this chapter is to review the general 
theoretical and empirical literature on the relation between 
financial development and economic growth in a growing 
economy, and to state the objectives as well as the issues to 
be examined in the rest of the thesis. Thus, section (1.2) 
discusses the role of monetization in economic growth, 
whereas section (1.3) deals with financial structures and 
instruments in LDCs. In section (1.4), the importance of the 
domestic financial system in economic development is 
examined, while section (1.5) reviews empirical evidence on 
the correlation as well as the causality between financial 
and real development. Section (1.6) considers the limitations 
of financial intermediation in LDCs. Sections (1.7) and (1.8) 
present the purposes, scope, methodology and structure of the 
study.
2
1.2 Monetization and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries:
The use of money is a necessary condition for financial 
development. The term monetization refers to the enlargement, 
through time and space, of the monetary economy via the use 
of money in all its functions as a medium of exchange, a unit 
of account and as a store of value. The degree of 
monetization, as commonly measured by the proportion of total 
output paid for in money by purchasers, varies across LDCs, 
but seems to be considerably low in some of t h e m  (3) # it may 
be appropriate, at this stage, to distinguish monetization 
from two related concepts; commercialization and financial 
intermediation.
While monetization connotes the mere extension of the use 
of money, commercialization signifies the prevalence of 
profit-generation motives regardless of the degree of 
monetization. It involves production largely for sale on the 
market, though production inputs, e.g. family labour, may not 
be paid for in money. The extent of commercialization may be 
measured by the ratio of goods and services sold to total 
o u t p u t  (4) . But, since the use of money facilitates the 
exchange of goods and services, it may be seen as a necessary 
condition for commercialization. Financial intermediation, on 
the other hand, refers to the process of mediation, through 
institutions and instruments, between ultimate lenders and 
ultimate borrowers of funds. Again, monetization is a 
necessary, but obviously insufficient, condition for 
financial intermediation. As we will see in this and in the 
following sections, monetization and intermediation can be 
interdependent and concurrent in a developing economy. But, 
the contribution of financial intermediation to economic 
growth may be substantially greater than that of monetization 
alone.
The use of money as the only form of financial assets in
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the e c o n o m y (5) possesses the potential of generating real 
investible surpluses in several ways. First, replacement of 
barter or commodity exchange by money raises the demand for 
money, as a means of exchange and as a store of value, 
relative to income, and releases real resources of an
equivalent value. The issuer of money, usually the 
government, can appropriate these resources and raise the 
level of investment in the economy (Thirlwall, 1983).
Clearly, this source of investible surplus declines in
importance as the economy moves towards full monetization. 
Second, the use of money also saves time and reduces 
transaction costs by avoiding double coincidence of wants, 
which is a characteristic of commodity exchange. Third,
monetization, by facilitating indirect exchange of goods and 
services, enlarges markets over time and space, and creates a 
scope for division of labour by production type and process.
Nevertheless, the role of monetization in mobilizing, 
particularly private voluntary, savings would be limited in 
the absence of financial intermediaries. In such a situation 
investors can finance their capital outlays either out of 
their own prior-savings or borrow informally from relatives, 
friends or local money-lenders. Because of such market 
imperfections as monopoly, high risk, and high costs of 
administering small loans, interest rates charged, or 
implicit in informal l e n d i n g , are likely to be prohibitive 
relative to expected returns on available investment 
projects. Furthermore, the size of funds transacted in 
unorganized money markets is usually too small to permit 
relatively large scale investments to be undertaken; the 
reason being the lack of a mechanism through which local 
money lenders may pool small individual or household savings. 
In effect, it is normally the needy households and farmers 
who borrow in curb markets, largely for consumption purposes.
Thus, in the absence of formal financial intermediaries,
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those able and risk-taking entrepreneurs who wish to invest 
in excess of their own savings may not be able to do so, and 
relatively large investment projects would not be feasible 
irrespective -of their expected return. The nature of both 
savings and investments in this economy provides no strong 
growth stimulus. As Furness (1975) points out, savings can 
only accumulate in the form of either tangible commodities or 
stocks of money, while the majority of savers do not possess 
the managerial expertise, entrepreneurial ability and 
technical know-how to be able to transform them into 
productive capital assets. In either case the incentive to 
save is likely to be weak. In the case of holding savings in 
the form of tangible goods, there are considerable risk and 
costs involved; risk due to loss, depletion and change in 
value, and costs arising from safekeeping and assets' 
management. In the event of money hoards, the real value of 
savings is subject to fluctuation, assuming a non-zero 
inflation rate, on top of the fact that money has no 
intrinsic value. It may, therefore, be argued that under 
these conditions, the level of savings would depend on, and 
can actually be inhibited by lack of, investment 
opportunities that can be perceived by local 
savers/investors. Conversely, a wide range of promising 
investment projects may not be undertaken as there is no 
mechanism to harness savings. The composition of wealth and 
output will, accordingly, be in such a way as to keep the 
economy within the confinements of traditional technology and 
production methods. Before turning to their importance, we 
examine below the structure of financial markets and 
instruments in LDCs.
1.3 Financial Institutions and Instruments in LDCs:
The extent to which monetary and financial variables may 
influence the real or expenditure sector of the economy may
5
not be invariant to its financial structure. Though there is 
unlikely to be a financial structure identical across 
developing countries, the financial systems of these 
countries can., generally, be characterized in terms of the 
following: (1) composition of financial institutions; (2) the
existence or lack of capital and securities markets; (3) the 
spectrum of assets and liabilities or financial instruments 
available to various sectors in the economy; and (4) 
financial dualism.
The network of financial institutions and markets that form 
the modern payments and assets transformation mechanism in 
LDCs encompasses a variety of institutions. The most 
important of these institutions^) are central banks, 
commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds and 
other specialized financial intermediaries such as 
development banks and agricultural credit co-operatives. But, 
in a typical developing country, the banking sector assumes 
an overwhelming importance in terms of both size and 
strategic functions. Although various financial institutions 
intermediate between savers and ultimate borrowers, 
commercial banks in particular may have some distinctive 
functions that merit attention. As a group commercial banks 
can create money as their deposits are easily transferable by 
cheques, and can, therefore, become a form of money. This has 
two important implications. First, bank lending can create 
additional bank deposits, because when banks extend loans a 
high proportion of the money lent may be redeposited with 
them. The resulting increase in banks’ deposits means that 
bank credits can multiply out of a given amount of initial 
deposits. Second, the banking system, being able to expand or 
contract money supply is crucial for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. However, it needs to be stressed that with 
recent financial innovations and development, especially in 
the West, non-bank financial intermediaries have come to
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perform almost the same role as banks. For instance, building 
societies in the United Kingdom issue chequebooks, which have 
the same purpose as those issued by banks.
The capital and securities markets that exist in LDCs, 
though few, are rarely effective(8) . Securities markets 
normally consist of two segments; a primary market in which 
financial liabilities and claims, such as .bonds, government 
stocks and company shares may be created, and the well- 
functioning of this market requires a secondary securities 
market in which securities already outstanding can be traded. 
Marketable securities and instruments of direct finance are 
relatively less important in private sector portfolios in 
LDCs, and even if primary markets exist, secondary markets 
are narrow and thin.
Accordingly, financial markets in LDCs, which are bank- 
based, are dominated by the creation of indirect liabilities 
and claims such as bank deposits and loan certificates. 
Banking liabilities, in turn, consist largely of checking 
deposits, which may not be adequate for long-term or 
development financing unless substantial maturity 
transformation takes place. The implications of such 
financial structure, and narrow range of financial 
instruments, are that: (1) expenditure financing by deficit
spending units depends primarily on borrowing from banks and 
other financial intermediaries, besides retained earnings; 
(2) there is always a shortage of long-term, and equity, 
finance; and (3) monetary policy works largely via directives 
and direct controls by the authorities, whereas in a 
securities-based financial system indirect methods of 
monetary control such as open market operations are more 
important.
Financial dualism connotes the existence of unorganized 
markets (9) alongside modern financial and capital markets, 
with varying degrees of efficiency and rates of interest. An
7
important repercussion of financial dualism is that it 
restricts the growth of formal financial intermediaries, 
while weakening the impact of monetary policy, as it operates 
outside the domain of monetary authorities.
Finally, in most LDCs, the government plays a leading role 
in the development and regulation of financial institutions. 
Many governments endeavour to widen their .financial markets 
and instruments via the issue and sale of government 
securities and stocks, but government-controlled banks are 
commonplace in LDCs, where the authorities also control such 
important variables as interest rates. These policy issues 
and their probable impact on financial development, that is 
the promotion and availability of both financial institutions 
and instruments that fully accomodate savers-investors needs, 
will be examined in detail in the following chapter. 
Meanwhile, we discuss below how financial development, by 
performing a variety of functions, can influence economic 
growth.
1.4 The Importance of Financial Development in 
Economic Growth:
This section examines those functions of the financial 
system that seem to have a more direct bearing on the dynamic 
process of economic development. The financial system is said 
to affect the saving-investment process, and thereby economic 
development by: (1) increasing the quantity, and improving
the structure, of real savings; (2) improving the structure 
and average productivity of investments; and (3) providing 
entrepreneurial skills and financial guidance to the economy 
as a whole. Although these functions are interrelated, it 
might be illuminating to discuss them separately.
1.4.1 The Level and Structure of Savings:
Financial development may influence the volume and
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composition of savings in several ways. Firstly, the 
evolution of financial instruments, such as bank deposits, 
allows a separation between the act of savings and that of 
investment over both time and space. This would also alter 
the composition of savings, with less savings now being held 
in the form of idle money hoards or unproductive durable 
assets, simply because financial assets -are more divisible, 
liquid, safer and less costly to maintain. Thus, financial 
intermediaries can attract the savings, particularly, of 
those with small amounts or who are unable for a variety of 
reasons to invest. Secondly, the range of services provided, 
in particular by more specialized financial institutions, may 
boost the stimulus to save. For example, insurance firms can 
induce savings by those who wish to protect themselves or 
properties against the consequences of unpleasant and costly 
events, while pension funds help the accumulation of savings 
by those who wish to secure sufficient income after 
retirement. Moreover, as Goodhart (1975) stresses, financial 
intermediaries alleviate market imperfections caused by 
economies of scale in financial transactions, in information 
gathering, and portfolio management. This implies that 
financial institutions may provide the information required 
by potential savers to efficiently allocate their incomes 
between present and future needs. Accordingly, a considerable 
proportion of current income, which would otherwise be 
consumed or even wasted, may be saved in the form of 
financial assets. The extent to which financial 
intermediaries affect savings would depend partly on how 
widespread they are and partly on the range of facilities 
provided. Experience in LDCs, however, shows financial 
services to be concentrated in major urban centres and 
failing to penetrate rural enclaves(^ 0).
Finally, the literature on finance and development has 
traditionally focussed on the role of the rate of interest in
9
generating savings, by inducing a reduction in consumption at 
a given level of income. This is so because the availability 
of interest-bearing financial assets makes present 
consumption more expensive relative to future consumption, 
and, therefore, people might be induced to consume less today 
(substitution effect). But, as the income position of savers 
improves, they might, at the same time, tend to consume more 
(income effect). This is particularly true where savings are 
made for a certain target (H) , which is a common practice in 
LDCs. Therefore, the possibility of an increase in savings 
under these circumstances is theoretically ambiguous as it 
depends on the balance of the income and substitution 
effects. At the empirical level the relation between savings 
and the interest rate is also far from being clear. Mikessel 
and Zinser (1973) have summarized the evidence on this 
relation found by a number of econometric studies and 
concluded that interest rates may be more powerful in 
altering the channels through which savings flow than 
affecting the saving-expenditure decisions of consumers. 
Furthermore, a recent study by Lanyi and Rusdu (1983) 
covering 21 developing countries suggests that positive real 
rates of interest stimulate output growth and this stimulus 
is transmitted mainly through the intermediation of financial 
assets accumulation. This, of course, does not imply a net 
increase in overall savings. It is the change in the 
structure, or more precisely financialization, of savings 
that the recent literature on financial development and 
growth has come to emphasise most.
The discussion above suggests that financial intermediation 
can at least influence the composition of savings, and this 
may help to achieve a more efficient allocation of investible 
resources.
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1.4.2 The Structure and Efficiency of Investment:
The financial system can influence the structure and 
productivity of investment through maturity transformation 
and risk transfer; by widening the array of financial claims 
to fully accomodate the preferences of investors; pooling 
small savings towards relatively large projects; and by 
reducing the cost of finance. In this -way, the financial 
system raises the ratio of capital formation to national 
output provided that the following assumptions hold(12) # 
First, that economic agents differ in their attitudes towards 
risk and uncertainty, and in the value they attach to future 
relative to present utilities; second, there is an unequal 
distribution of entrepreneurial skills, knowledge and 
experience; third, there exist economies of scale within a 
production unit, and of externalities within the economy as a 
whole; and, finally, investment projects are indivisible and 
their expenditure requirements might be far in excess of the 
savings of any individual unit.
Financial intermediation allows those endowed with 
entrepreneurial, risk-taking, and managerial skills to 
undertake investment without a corresponding savings 
decision. Meanwhile, by pooling small savings, financial 
intermediaries can finance lumpier and large scale investment 
projects, which by virtue of their size may embody
technological improvements and yield higher returns . 
Moreover, by accepting deposits, financial institutions 
transfer part of the risk to themselves, and through lending 
they pass part of that risk to investors. And, when operating 
at larger scale and wider space, they can also achieve
economies of scale in pooling the default risk of borrowers
as well as in reducing the cost of both borrowing and 
lending. Again, they can afford recruiting expertise, and 
creating methods to investigate the risk and return
characteristics of various investment proposals. Accordingly,
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they can select investment portfolios that minimize risk and 
maximize returns, and determine the appropriate terms of 
lending. Since they also determine rewards to savers, 
financial institutions can sufficiently narrow the 
differential between deposits and lending rates. The above 
arguments are enhanced by considerations of "financial 
specialization at which each institution- becomes very adept 
and can thereby further reduce the real cost of finance" 
(Patrick, 1966). Hence, by pooling default risk and through 
specialization, financial intermediation can either raise 
returns to savers, lower costs to borrowers, or both; and 
this would improve the structure and efficiency of saving as 
well as investments.
Through maturity transformation, i.e. by accepting short­
term deposits and extending long-term loans, banks can play a 
particularly important developmental role. Maturity 
transformation is possible provided that the number of 
depositors at each institution is sufficiently large and that 
only a fraction of deposits is needed to meet withdrawal 
requirements in the short-run. It is also significant because 
most development projects have long gestation periods and, 
therefore, can only be financed through long-term credits.
The analysis thus far suggests that financial 
intermediation can raise the structure and average 
productivity of investments, provided that credits are 
allocated on productivity basis. This envisaged allocative 
efficiency represents the main rationale for the promotion 
and sometimes regulation of the financial system. However, as 
we will see in chapter 2, the allocative mechanism of 
financial intermediaries, especially in L'DCs, is subject to 
considerable constraints.
1.4.3 Financial and Entrepreneurial Development:
Financial development is said to enhance the growth of
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entrepreneurial talents, and capital formation. "Since 
financial institutions tend to specialise in lending 
activities, and can afford to employ experts, they can give 
valuable financial guidance and technical assistance to 
borrowers" (Furness, 1975). These non-credit services might 
be part of efforts by financial institutions to follow up the 
activities they finance in order to reduce tisk. Furthermore, 
since these institutions have to pay competitive interest 
rates to depositors, they must as profit-maximizers make sure 
that a high proportion of their deposits is productively 
utilized in the form of loans, equity, or a combination of 
the two. In this respect, Cameron (1972) stressed that 
"instead of restricting themselves to a purely intermediary 
function, bankers may actively seek out and exploit 
profitable undertakings in manufacturing, commerce or any 
other activity".
This function, Cameron adds, has been historically of great 
importance in some developed countries such as Germany, where 
a close linkage between corporate and financial firms exists. 
Banks in Germany do not only provide credit to investors, but 
they also take equity in business, and accordingly develop 
interest in various aspects of business such as 
management . (The relevance of the German banking
experience to Islamic banks is elaborated in chapter 5.) In 
developing countries, the need for specialized finance and 
finance-related services is manifested in the establishment 
of specialized financial institutions. Besides providing 
managerial, technical and financial assistance in their areas 
of specialization, these institutions may undertake research 
and identify feasible investment undertakings. Accordingly, 
they may help potential investors to perceive these 
investment opportunities or act as entrepreneurs themselves. 
In either case the outcome would be a more rapid development 
of entrepreneurial talents and a more efficient utilization
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of financial resources.
To sum up, financial development by the separation of 
saving and investment decisions, financialization of savings, 
promotion of,entrepreneurship and efficient allocation of 
resources may boost the process of economic growth. In 
practice, however, though there exists a strong positive 
correlation between financial and real, development the 
direction of causality is ambiguous.
1.5 Financial and Real Development: Evidence and
Causality Test:
In quantitative terms, there is an indisputable positive 
correlation between financial development and real output 
growth. Financial development may be measured(14) by ^he 
ratio of a country's total financial assets to its national 
wealth (net assets plus net claims against the rest of the 
world). This ratio is known as the Financial Interrelations 
Ratio, FIR, (Goldsmith, 1969) , and the greater it is in value 
the higher the country's level of financial development. 
Several other indicators of financial development may be 
found in the literature. For example, the grouping of 
financial assets by type of instrument and by type of holder 
may be used to assess the importance of different types of 
financial intermediaries in the economic development of a 
particular country.
Goldsmith (ibid) studied the financial history of many 
nations over 150-200 years, and concluded that, with 
exception to centrally planned economies, there is a fairly 
common path of financial progress characterized by a uniform 
behaviour of the FIR, and by the importance of the banking 
system. The ratio rises with economic development, but the 
importance of banks, which first head the process of 
financial development, declines as both financial and real 
growth proceed. Subsequent as well as early studies (15) have
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almost all arrived at the same conclusion that financial 
development, however defined, has been always and everywhere 
associated with real development. Thus, the correlation 
between financial and real variables appears to pose no 
question, and may partly provide an explanation for the 
concern of LDCs with the promotion of their financial 
systems.
But, the question of which sector leads remains unsettled. 
For example, Gurley and Shaw (1955) argue that there can be 
two-way causation between real and financial growth in the 
sense that the financial sector develops in response, but 
then contributes, to real growth. Yet, later Gurley (1967) 
wrote that recent experience suggests that banking systems as 
intermediaries are not highly essential to the growth 
process. This implies that it is real growth that causes 
financial growth.
However, Patrick's (1966) analysis provided a conceptual 
framework, stimulating a number of empirical studies to be 
conducted on the causality issue. His model distinguishes 
between two phenomena; demand-following and supply-leading 
financial development. The former phenomenon denotes the
situation where the creation of financial institutions occurs 
in response to demand for their assets and services by
businesses, households and individuals. This demand is
contingent upon real income growth, and so the financial 
sector responds passively to it. In contrast, supply-leading 
finance represents a situation in which the creation of 
financial assets and liabilities precedes demand for them. 
Thus, supply-leading finance gives an impetus to real 
development. Patrick stresses that the direction of
causality changes over the process of economic development; 
the supply-leading aspect dominates until this process 
reaches a state of sustained growth. As this state begins, 
demand-following financial response assumes greater
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importance. He shows that the financial history of the USA 
and Japan over the last century or so is strongly consistent 
with his analysis.
Econometric investigations of causality are facilitated by 
the availability of strong causality tests(16)f such as the 
one developed by Granger (1969). This most commonly applied 
test is based on the incremental forecasting power of the 
past (or past plus present) values of one variable on 
another. The test can be used to detect the presence of not 
only uni-directional causality, but also instantaneous 
causation and independence between the variables considered. 
Mathematically, the Granger's causality test can be 
represented as follows.
Let be a certain information set, containing all past 
and present information, and consisting of (X,Y) the 
bivariate process under study. .This process is assumed to be 
jointly covariance stationary. Then, let U* = (U^ ; T<t)
represent the set U, but excluding present information. 
Similarly, define X* and Y*. Accordingly, Granger provides 
the following definitions of causality:
1. Variable X causes Y if G2 (Y/U*) < G2 (Y/U* - X*); where 
G (Y/U ) is the minimum prediction error of Y given the
information set U. This means that X causes Y if the
prediction of Y based on all past information has a smaller 
error than the prediction of Y using all past information 
excluding X*.
2. There is two-way causation or feedback between X and Y if 
G2(Y/U*) < G2 (Y/U* - X*) and G2(X/U*) < G2(X/U* - Y*), and
3. There is no relation between X and Y if G (Y/U ) =
G2 (Y/U*-X*) and G2 (X/U*) = G2 (X/U*-Y*). That is if the
inclusion of the past values of one variable does not lower 
the minimum prediction error variance of the other variable, 
the two variables are said to be independent.
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On the assumption that U = (X,Y) and that X and Y are a 
pair of linear covariance-stationary process, we can write:
n
(1.1) X^ - = X ^_^aiX^-_j_ + X j_^bjY^-_j + e^
(1.2) Yt = £mi=1CiYt_i + Xnj=1djXt_j +Vt
Where e^ and vt are the error terms and a-j/s, bj's, c-j/s 
and dj's are parameter estimates. The' above equations 
represent the optimum prediction model, which is confined to 
a linear(17) one. The hypotheses on causality between X and Y 
are tested by estimating these equations and performing the 
conventional F-test as to whether bj and dj are significantly 
different from zero. X causes Y if only the hypothesis that 
dj = 0 is rejected, and vice versa. Feedback occurs if both 
bj and dj are significantly different from zero. Conversely X 
and y are independent if bj = dj = 0.
Available econometric tests seem to suggest that financial 
development in real terms is a requisite of modern economic 
growth, although some critics, for example Stammer (1972), 
would argue that financial intermediation has been less 
important than self-finance in the economic development of 
many countries.
Gupta (1984) studied the relationship between financial 
development, proxied by various measures , and real 
development, as indicated by the index of industrial growth, 
using time series data for 14 LDCs. He obtained three basic 
results. First, in the case of eight countries only the 
supply-leading phenomenon existed, second, there was no 
evidence of strictly demand-following finance in any case, 
and third, only two countries exhibited a simultaneous 
dependence between financial and real development. Similar 
evidence was also found by Jung (1986) with respect to 41 
developing and 5 developed countries. In his study, there was 
evidence that both types of supply-leading and demand- 
following finance exist. But, generally, the causation runs
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from financial to real development in LDCs, and vice versa in 
developed countries. Mixed results were also found by 
Odedokun (1989) with respect to Nigeria. Using data on M2 
domestic credit to the private sector and gross domestic 
product for the period 1960-88, we find a strict causality 
running from financial to real development in Sudan (see 
chapter 4) . .
The evidence discussed above suggests that financial 
development may engineer real development. However, the 
conclusion of this evidence is tentative, and the econometric 
results must be interpreted with caution. Firstly, because 
the test, being applied to a highly aggregated data, does not 
tell us about the structural changes and channels through 
which financial growth can affect real variables in the 
economy. Secondly, as the bivariate causality test does not 
allow for the inclusion of other important variables in the 
information set, it may result in specification error. Thus, 
one can cast doubt, at least, on the relative importance of 
the financial factor compared to the omitted variables in 
explaining growth in real output.
1.6 Limitations of Financial Intermediation in LDCs:
The discussion- of the importance of financial institutions 
and instruments indicates that they can play an instrumental 
role in the process of economic development. The literature, 
however, abstracts from a set of assumptions, which may not 
hold in the context of a developing economy. For example, for 
financial intermediaries to fulfill their functions, it is 
assumed that there exist reasonably perfect markets and 
profit-maximizing behaviour. While distortions and controls, 
notably over prices, foreign trade and exchange rates, are 
commonplace in LDCs, unrestrained profit-maximizing behaviour 
may undermine the social and economic priorities of the 
nation. Quick return and risk considerations may lead to an
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allocation of resources that is excessively geared towards 
short-term projects, normally in the sphere of trade. Thus, 
financial institutions may, in practice, provide little or no 
stimulus to real capital formation through equity and long­
term finance. Additionally, financial intermediaries in LDCs, 
though mostly promoted by deliberate government policy, are 
usually rendered less effective by its- own monetary and 
financial policies. For instance, interest rate controls have 
been widely blamed for discouraging the growth of financial 
intermediation and the pace of resource transformation. This 
is so because nominal interest rate controls, coupled with 
high rates of inflation in most countries, may inhibit the 
growth of bank deposits and reverse the process of 
monetization by making real assets more attractive.
There are, therefore, conceivably many endogenous as well 
as exogenous factors that might put limits on the role of 
financial intermediaries viz-a-viz real development. 
"Financial institutions, being poorly equipped with expertise 
and necessary information, together with distortions 
elsewhere in the economic system, may not promote economic 
development, even when government policy towards them is 
liberal" (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985) . These institutional factors, 
together with the obvious shortcomings of the causality 
tests, make it difficult to draw any sound conclusion 
concerning the relationship between financial and real 
development.
The impact of monetary and financial policies on financial 
development, and the effect of these and other endogenous 
constraints on the role of the latter in economic development 
will be examined in detail in the following chapter.
1.7 Purpose and Scope of the Study:
It is our contention in this study that in LDCs in 
general, and in Sudan in particular, there is a pressing
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need, as well as a room, for real capital formation by means 
of more efficient mobilization and application of domestic 
resources. While considering the adequacy, or otherwise 
inadequacy, of public finance, the main objective of the 
study is to examine and assess the role of financial and 
capital institutions in economic transformation in Sudan, in 
terms of the saving-investment process, and provision of 
equity or equity-related services. The thesis contends that 
the present financial system is inept to play a leading role 
in economic development and that direction and control by 
monetary authorities may not be the prime detriment to its 
well-functioning. Justifications for this contention require 
an analysis of monetary and credit policies, their impact on 
the behaviour of financial intermediaries and how the latter 
reacted when these policies were relaxed in the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s.
It has been claimed that Islamic banks, which do not deal 
in predetermined rates of interest and which provide 
primarily equity-based finance, are bound to be more growth- 
promoting than conventional banking institutions. Banks of 
the Islamic type have been in operation in Sudan since 1978, 
and the entire financial system was required^^) in 1984 to 
conform to Islamic modes of finance. It is our hypothesis in 
this context that the basic economic characteristics of an 
Islamic financial system accord with those of a securities 
market. But, while the incorporation of Islamic financial and 
capital institutions may swell the development of a primary 
securities market, albeit in a crude sense, the presence of a 
secondary securities market is a requisite for the advantages 
envisaged in Islamic finance to be fully realized. It is, 
therefore, also our objective to evaluate in particular the 
practice of Islamic banks in Sudan, and to focus on their 
implications on both savings and investment, and on wider 
monetary aspects of development. A good deal of attention
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will also be given to the operations of non-bank financial 
intermediaries and how they responded to the introduction of 
Islamic legislation.
Finally, in addition to arguing that the transformation of 
the conventional financial system into an Islamic one should 
be accompanied by an equal commitment to devise a market for 
securities, we also advance the case for-this market taking 
into account limitations of debt-finance by commercial banks.
The scope of any economic study is necessarily limited 
since economics is a multidisciplinary subject. Thus, the 
scope of our study, which is concerned with the role of 
financial and capital markets in the economic development of 
Sudan in particular, is restricted to;
1. A discussion and assessment of the general literature on, 
and recent models of, finance and development in LDCs in 
particular.
2. A study of the economic structure, potential, performance, 
and development strategies in Sudan, and the adequacy of 
private and public savings.
3. An examination of financial and capital institutions and 
instruments; their structure, regulations, relevance and 
contribution to the financing of the development priorities 
of the country.
4. An evaluation of the Islamic theory of finance, and the 
developmental content of Islamic banking as applied in Sudan.
5. A quantitative investigation of the relationship between 
the financial and expenditure sectors in a macroeconometric 
model of the Sudanese economy, and an analysis of the policy 
implications of the nature of this relationship.
6. Suggestions for improvement, especially in the financial 
and capital system, as a step towards future economic 
progress.
The study covers the period 1960-88, but emphasis will be 
placed on the sub-period 1978-88, which witnessed the
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liberalization of the Sudanese economy as well as the socio­
economic and legislative changes mentioned earlier.
1.8 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis:
The analysis in this study is, largely, based on data 
provided by official and institutional sources. But, to gain 
an in depth knowledge of the issues considered, use though 
limited, will be made of information obtained through 
interviews conducted with a number of senior Bankers in 
Sudan, as well as case studies covering a sample of 
commercial banks. The case studies relied on an examination 
of individual bank’s accounts, policies and strategies, 
whereas the main objective of the interviews was to highlight 
certain institutional aspects of finance. Statistical or 
econometric estimations, where appropriate, are used to study 
relationships amongst the variables considered, and a 
structural model of finance and development will be 
constructed and estimated. The complete model will then be 
simulated and major policy options analysed.
The study will be divided into 7 chapters, excluding the 
present one. The contents of these chapters are briefly 
described below.
Chapter 2 examines and assesses models of finance and 
development, that deal, particularly, with monetary and 
financial institutions in LDCs and how they relate to real 
economic activity.
Chapter 3 is intended to serve as a background against 
which the empirical work in subsequent chapters is carried 
out. It deals with the economic structure, economic potential 
and performance of Sudan. Particular attention is given to 
the magnitude and determinants of both public and private 
consumption, saving, and investment. This chapter also 
examines the limitations of public finance, the inadequacy of 
domestic sources of finance in general and their implication
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for development planning and performance.
Chapter 4 discusses the financial structure, the operations 
of the banking sector in general, and related aspects of 
monetary and credit policy.
Chapter 5 examines and evaluates the theory of finance in 
an Islamic context. This chapter also provides a comparative 
assessment of the nature, instruments 'and operations of 
Islamic banks in Sudan.
Chapter 6 evaluates the performance of non-bank financial 
intermediaries in general, and the Islamic investment and 
holding companies in specific. Then a case for a securities 
market in Sudan is developed, while the Sudanese experience 
in this respect is investigated.
Chapter 7 constructs an empirical model to investigate 
quantitatively the behaviour of key monetary variables and 
their interaction with real economic variables. The full 
model is, then, simulated, and the implications of various 
policy exercises analysed.
Finally, chapter 8 gives a summary of the major findings of 
the previous chapters, discusses their implications, and 
provides suggestions concerning the direction of future 
monetary and credit policy in the light of Sudan’s 
development prospects. It also gives suggestion for future 
research in this area.
Notes:
1. For a survey of foreign aid and economic development in LDCs see 
Killick, T. (1984) .
2. Tax systems may fail to efficiently mobilize surpluses, let alone 
encouraging increased voluntary savings, while the already high 
inflation rates in LDCs make inflationary finance a less desired option 
(Baker and Falero (1971).
3. Chandavarkar (1983), P.228
4. Neale, W. quoted by Chandavarkar (Ibid)
5. Gurley and Shaw (1960) described such an economy as "rudimentary"
6. See chapter 6 for a discussion of rural money markets in Sudan.
7. For further details on the structure of financial markets in LDCs see 
Ghatak (1983) and Kitchen (1986)
8. Securities markets are examined in detail in chapter 6.
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9. See note 6 above.
10. About 50% of credit facilities in Sudan in 1986 were limited to the 
capital Khartoum (Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 198 6,P.57)
11. With improved return on savings the target saver is encouraged to 
save relatively less, and to consume more...at the limit he 
w i l l .... consume the full increase in his income resulting from 
opportunities of. financial intermediation (Patrick, 1966, P. 48)
12. See Goldsmith (1^69), PP.391-2.
13. See Karl Erich Born (1984).
14. The issue of measurement is as controversial as the role of 
financial institutions, and, as Drake (1980) illustrates, the choice of 
a particular measure may well depend on the purpose, of the study.
15. e.g. Gurley and Shaw (1955, and 1960), Porter (1966), 
Townsend(1983), and Fry (1988)
16. Harvey, A. (1990) illustrates and compares these tests.
17. Granger (1969), P.429.
18. These measures are: Currency plus demand deposits (M^); plus 
quasi-money(M2 ), total domestic credit, total private credit, and total 
domestic finance, which includes M 2 , bonds and capital accounts.
19. Banks' Islamization Act (1984), Bank of Sudan, Khartoum.
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CHAPTER 2
A REVIEW AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT MODELS FOR LDCs: LIBERALIZATION VERSUS
REGULATION
2.1 Introduction:
The development of financial intermediaries and instruments 
in developing ^ countries is not only an important target of 
monetary policy, but also a crucial condition for its 
effectiveness, as well as a means of dealing with the 
fundamental problems of growth and development, as the recent 
literature suggests. And financial development is said to be 
impeded by the prevalence of interventionism, and best 
promoted via the free interplay of market forces.
The major concern of this chapter is to examine the 
theoretical underpinning of the* impact of monetary and 
financial policy on the development of financial and capital 
markets, and via that on economic growth. Thus, in discussing 
available policy instruments, real economic growth may be 
regarded as the ultimate policy target, and financial 
development as an intermediate target. The discussion is 
based on a review and critical assessment of recent models of 
financial development for LDCs, which provide a case for 
financial liberalization as against financial regulation.
The scheme of the rest of the chapter is as follows. 
Section (2.2) considers the nature of monetary policy in 
general, and interest rate policy in particular, in LDCS. In 
sections (2.3) and (2.4) models of financial development, 
namely Mckinnon and Shaw models and their extensions, are 
examined. Alternative models are dealt with in section (2.5), 
whereas section (2.6) provides a critical assessment of the 
financial development models. Finally, section (2.7) gives a 
summary and concluding remarks.
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2.2 The Nature of Monetary and Financial Policy in 
LDCs:
It was implied in the previous chapter that a substantial 
proportion of., income and consumption in LDCs originates from 
non-monetary transactions. Though, this may not be true 
across LDCs, the monetization ratio in these countries in 
general is considerably low relative to deyeloped countries. 
Moreover, developing countries have the common feature of 
financial dualism. The implication of these aspects to 
monetary policy are that the relevant concept of income is, 
perhaps, the monetized proportion of it, and not national 
income, and that the domain of monetary policy is rather 
limited. For example, changes in money supply may affect 
interest rates, but only in organized money markets.
Meanwhile, the array of instruments of monetary policy 
available to the authorities is also narrow. In well- 
organized money and capital markets these instruments would 
include: open market operations, interest rates, required
reserve ratios, the discount rate and directives. Open market 
operations are rarely effective in LDCs owing to lack of 
sufficient suitable securities for the central bank to deal 
in and absence of depth in secondary financial markets. Among 
the remaining instruments, interest rates(1) and credit 
controls and directives appear to be the most important and 
commonly used instruments.
The literature on finance and development, however, focuses 
mainly on the policy of interest rate fixing and regard it to 
have the most pervasive effect on the growth of financial 
intermediation, savings and capital accumulation. Fixed 
nominal rates of interest, coupled with normally high rates 
of inflation in LDCs, render real rates of interest negative 
in most cases (Ayre, 1983) . The economic impact of such 
policy may be particularly significant when associated with 
distortions elsewhere in the economy. In fact, almost all
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markets in LDCs are subject to government intervention, and 
rarely left to the free interplay of market forces. Before 
examining the implications of government intervention in the 
financial market, it may be necessary to understand the 
general economic reasons behind interventionism. The reasons 
contemplated in the literature^) may be summarized in the 
following: • .
1. Interventionism may result as a response to an initial 
disturbance such as unfavourable changes in the terms of 
international trade. This may generate shortages in savings 
and foreign exchanges, raise inflation and consequently 
induce/ the government to manipulate such variables as the 
rate of exchange.
2. Intervention may simply be provoked by mistrust of the 
ability of market forces to allocate resources among 
alternative uses in the most desirable way from a social and 
economic point of view.
3. Historically, interventionism may have been in many LDCs a 
means of ending political and economic colonialism. The 
economies of most colonies were structurally linked to those 
of the centres, and key economic activities were dominated by 
foreigners. Therefore, national governments tended to 
exercise control over domestic markets in the hope of 
restructuring their economies and achieving post colonial 
economic independence.
4. Interventionist policies may be influenced by the interest 
of particular groups; for instance, those who can benefit 
from import licenses, and cheap credits.
5. Finally, as Shaw (1973) suggests, economic myopia may be 
partly to blame. For example, it might be overlooked that low 
nominal rates of interest, which lower the cost of 
investment, may also make savings less attractive.
By far the first two reasons seem to be the most convincing 
and powerful in explaining the presence and prevalence of
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interventionism. In almost all developing countries there are 
plans for social and economic change and development. As 
markets are generally poorly organized, relative prices are, 
for projection purpose, usually set by the authorities. Since 
disturbances in one market tend to transmit themselves to 
others, the authorities may have to continuously intervene in 
markets in order to control the implied changes, and for the 
original plan to be carried out. Furthermore, in view of
acute shortages of, especially financial resources, the 
authorities ought to identify priority sectors, and 
accordingly manipulate funds for those that rank high in
their plans.
Thus, interventionist strategy may be self-generating. But, 
if the government cannot identify the correct relative 
prices, and as a consequence, fail to efficiently coordinate 
economic activities, this strategy will also be self- 
defeating. The outcome of all this will be a fragmented 
economic system. "Firms and households will be so isolated 
that they face different effective prices for land, labour, 
capital and produced commodities, and do not have access to 
the same technology" (Mckinnon, 1973, P. 5). Therefore, modern 
and old technologies will coexist, with substantially 
different degrees of efficiency, entailing wide variations in 
investment productivity across sectors.
The Mckinnon-Shaw models of financial development and their 
extensions to be discussed below maintain that fixing 
interest rates below their market clearing levels leads to
financial repression. This in turn reduces the real size of
the financial sector relative to other sectors, with adverse 
effects on the process of economic development.
2.3 The Mckinnon-Shaw Models of Financial Development:
These models stress the role of financial intermediation in 
the process of capital accumulation and growth, and challenge
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the standard economic hypothesis of a negative correlation 
between interest rate and investment in the context of LDCs. 
High rates of interest relative to the marginal efficiency of 
investment in.. existing technology, would release funds from 
low yield investments to investment in improved technology 
and increased scale in enterprises. In addition to effecting 
increased financialization of savings, it has been argued 
that high rates of interest would raise net savings. For 
example, Mckinnon (1973) stresses that:
"Where loans are plentiful high rates of interest for 
both lenders and borrowers introduce the dynamism that 
one wants in development, calling forth new net savings, 
and diverting investment from inferior uses so as to 
encourage technical improvement" (P. 15).
This argument clearly assumes that aggregate saving in LDCs 
is interest-elastic, and overlooks- both the theoretical and 
empirical ambiguities surrounding the relationship between 
the two, as we have pointed out in chapter 1. Likewise, Shaw 
(1973) has argued that financial liberalization, i.e. 
allowing interest rates to be determined by market forces, is 
a condition for financial growth, as it helps expanding 
organized capital markets, reduces fragmentation in the 
economy and boosts output via capital accumulation.
The underlying assumption of the -Mckinnon-Shaw models is 
that capital accumulation in developing countries is 
restricted by the availability of investible funds; 
investment opportunities abound. Therefore, high real rates 
of interest, which stimulate savings, will also raise the 
rate of investment^) . The basic common elements of these 
models may be illustrated diagrammatically as in figure (2.1) 
below.
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Figure (2.1)
Saving and Investment Under a Financial Constraint
Real
Interest
Rate s9q
I
Saving and Investment
In this figure, C is the financial constraint in the 
economy, taken as an administratively-determined nominal rate 
of interest, which holds the real rate of interest, r, below 
its equilibrium level. Actual investment is limited to Iq/ 
the amount of savings, Sg^ , forthcoming at the real rate of
interest, rQ • The effect of financial liberalization and 
deepening will show up, first, in a more relaxed financial 
restraint, say C’. As savings, thus, increase, the volume of 
investment will also rise from Iq to 1^ . In addition to this, 
investment productivity would improve. First, because high 
rates of interest would stimulate demand for financial 
assets, and hence, the financial sector expands. Second,
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removal of interest rate ceilings may make financial 
intermediaries less risk-averse, and in turn finance 
investments that promise higher rates of return. Accordingly, 
low yielding investments, indicated by the shadowed area, 
that were financed before will be rationed out. Third, since 
financial liberalization, in the form of higher deposit and 
lending rates, raises the cost of borrowing, entrepreneurs 
are likely to switch to less capital-intensive production 
techniques. Such techniques may not only raise the average 
productivity of capital, but also represent the appropriate 
technique, provided the relative availability and cost of 
labour and capital in LDCs. Fourth, letting interest rates be 
determined by the market mechanism would reduce or even 
eliminate the costs involved in credit rationing 
arrangements, and thereby enhance- the efficiency of the 
economy as a whole.
Though both the Mckinnon and Shaw models advocate the 
policy of interest rate liberalization, they differ 
considerably in their attitude towards the transmission 
mechanism via which positive real rates of interest may 
influence savings, investment and growth. Mckinnon's model 
makes the following major assumptions. First, there is no or 
limited access to external finance for the majority of 
investors in the fragmented economy. Second, indivisibilities 
in investment are of considerable importance, that is, 
investment projects are lumpier. Therefore, investors^) in 
this economy may find it easier to gather funds in monetary 
assets until they have enough to invest in real capital 
assets. Thus, money and capital are complementary in the 
sense that the former serves as a conduit for accumulation of 
the latter. This implies that aggregate demand for money will 
be greater the larger the proportion of investment in total 
expenditure, i.e. if the desired rate of real capital 
formation rises, at a given income level, then the average
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ratio of real cash balances will also rise. This relationship 
is characterized in the following money demand function (5)f 
F, which incorporates the ratio of real investment, I, to 
real income, Y:
2.1 M/P = F (Y, I/Y, d-Il)
Where M is the money stock, broadly defined to include 
plus time and saving deposits, P is the consumer price level, 
d is the nominal deposit rate of interest, and II is the 
expected inflation rate. All the partial derivatives are 
positive, with I/Y>0 reflecting the complementarity 
hypothesis. This and the positive coefficient for the real 
rate of interest need further explanation. The 
complementarity argument is in contrast with the established 
portfolio approach and prevailing monetary theory in general. 
For example, as in Patinkin and Levhari (1967), real money 
balances are considered as a form of wealth that competes 
with other assets (real assets) in private portfolios. But, 
for this to hold there need to be perfect markets for both 
financial and real assets so that interest rate changes, for 
instance, may be transmitted. In developing economies where 
financial markets are poorly organized and related to 
expenditure sectors, interest rate policy affects investment 
primarily via changes in savings in the form of financial 
assets. Thus, the real rate of interest has a positive 
coefficient with M/P and imposes no limit on investment.
Shaw’s model, on the other hand, stresses external or debt 
finance, rather than self-finance, possibilities as the 
binding constraint on real capital formation. But, he also 
rejects as inadequate the traditional monetary theory in 
favour of what he calls the debt-intermediation view. In this 
view, emphasis is placed on the development of financial 
intermediaries to efficiently fulfill their functions, and 
thereby influence real economic activity. Finance, here, is
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optimal or deep when interest rates are free to find their 
equilibrium levels. And the interest rate mechanism is also 
optimal because, as a reward to savers it mobilizes 
resources, and as a rationing device it -leads to a more 
productive allocation of these resources. Shaw's analysis 
produces a demand for real cash balances function, which can 
be represented as follows:
2.2 M/P = F (Y, V, d-II)
Where V is a vector of real opportunity costs of holding 
money. It includes, among others, the consumer rate of time 
preference. Other variables remain the same as defined in 
equation (2.1) above. Both real income and the real deposit 
rate are expected to be positively related to M/P, while the 
coefficient of V would carry a negative sign.
Due to their important policy implications, and non­
orthodox approach, the above models provoked substantial work 
on monetary theory as it applies to LDCs. We discuss, below, 
extensions to these models before considering alternative 
models and providing a critical assessment of them in the 
following sections.
2.4 Extensions to Mckinnon-Shaw Models:
We consider, here, the basic financial models for LDCs in 
the repressionist tradition, which have been constructed by a 
number of writers^) .
Galbis (1977) analyses a two sector economy: roughly,
modern and traditional. Because of relatively advanced 
technology, investment in the modern sector is assumed to be 
more productive. But, both sectors enjoy constant return to
scale techniques of production. It is further assumed that
investors in the traditional sector are confined enirely to 
self-finance, and can invest either in low-yield projects, 
bank deposits or both depending on returns on deposits and 
real investment. Since savings can either be held in the form
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of bank deposits or invested, the volume of investment in 
this sector will be smaller than that of savings. In 
contrast, investors in the modern sector are assumed to have 
access to bank credit, besides self-finance. Moreover, 
investment opportunities in this sector are plentiful, and 
their real rates of return can be exceedingly high. These 
rates are unlikely to be substantially reduced, except in the 
very long-run when the economy becomes more mature.
The effects of financial repression on development can now 
be analysed in terms of the above framework. A rise in the 
deposits rate of interest will raise both the volume and 
productivity of investment, as the demand for financial 
assets by the traditional sector rises, and credit and 
investment in the modern sector increase. The intermediation 
process, which may thus enhance the average efficiency of 
intersectoral investment can also raise intrasectoral 
investment productivity, through appropriate project 
selection.
Kapur's (1983) and Mathieson's (1980) models allow 
financial liberalization to influence only the volume of 
investment through bank financing of working capital. It is 
assumed that there is unused fixed capital in the developing 
economy, and that working capital availability is the binding 
constraint on output growth. Therefore, increased 
availability of the latter which allows the utilization of 
the former will promote output. But, Fry's (1988) model 
elaborates the basic liberalization argument and permits high 
interest rates to influence economic growth via both 
quantitative and qualitative changes in savings and 
investment. Additionally, he sees legal reserves requirements 
to be a constraint on bank lending, the solution to which 
lies in the authorities paying competitive interest rates on 
them. This is justified simply because it is at the central 
bank's disposal to use required reserves of commercial banks.
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The overall conclusion of financial development models is 
that the growth-maximizing rate of interest is the 
competitive free market rate. The basic assumptions of these 
models are, however, open to question. The assumption that 
investment opportunities are plentiful implicitly implies 
that there exists an able class of entrepreneurs in LDCs, or 
that financial institutions would enhance the growth of 
entrepreneurship, irrespective of their structure and nature 
of operations. Moreover, these models seem to underrate the 
importance of such structural factors as financial dualism in 
the course of financial and real development. We examine, 
first, how financial dualism may weaken the liberalization 
argument in the context of the alternative, neo-structuralist 
models.
2.5 Alternative Models: The Neo-Structuralist
Hypothesis:
Alternative models^) Qf finance and development underline 
the role of structural factors such as financial dualism in 
the economic development of LDCs. In particular, they attach 
greater importance to curb markets, which, they maintain, 
should be an integral part of any monetary model of a less 
developed country. The neo-structuralists cast doubt on the 
repressionist view that high deposit rates of interest may 
promote savings and investment. The repressionist argument 
hinges crucially on the assumption that portfolio adjustments 
lead to shifts into bank deposits at the expense of a s s e t s ^ )  
providing less intermediation than those of the banking 
system. The neo-structuralists refute this argument on the 
basis of links between the organized and curb money markets 
on the one hand, and between the two markets and the business 
sector on the other. It has been assumed that funds flow 
freely between the curb market and the banking system, and 
that firms rely on credit from both of them. Moreover, the
35
unorganized money market, in contrast to the organized one, 
is supposed to be competitive because of absence of reserve 
requirements, and interest rate and credit restrictions. It 
follows that^ the curb market's assets may provide more 
intermediation than those of the banking sector. As a result, 
an increase in the deposit rate necessary to shift resources 
away from the curb market would be contractionary in the 
short-run because it: (1) raises the lending rate in the curb
market; (2) leads to a net reduction in overall credits, 
since the organized money market is subject to legal reserve 
requirements; and (3) from (1) and (2) it follows that the 
overall cost of working capital increases, and output 
decreases via reduced investment.
Contrasting the repressionist and new structuralist views, 
it appears that interest rate effects depend on the 
assumptions made about the relative efficiency of the 
organized and unorganized money markets. However, although 
appealing, the neo-structuralist argument is unconvincing. 
Above all the importance attached to the curb market is not 
amenable to empirical verification, because it is extremely 
difficult to gather reliable information on its operations. 
Apart from van Wijnbergen (1982) empirical estimates for 
South Korea(9), there seems to be no econometric application 
of these models. Aside from that, the effect of reserve 
requirements on the availability of bank credit can be, and 
usually is, minimized by channelling these reserves to 
specialized public finance agencies for lending that might 
not be undertaken by commercial banks. Moreover, curb markets 
have been found in most cases to be fragmented, and operating 
independently from the banking system. This is particularly 
true in Africa, where indigenous money markets are used 
largely to finance household consumption and very small scale 
family farms. Curb markets, being small in size, generally 
lack specialization and division of labour. Therefore, it is
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not clear how curb markets can be more efficient than banks 
in mobilizing and allocating resources. With regard to the 
link between the two segments of the money market, Ghatak's 
(1983) study of several LDCs concludes that "the evidence 
suggests that the links between the organized and unorganized 
financial sectors are rather weak in most LDCs, that the size 
of the latter is declining very slowly, and that the flow of 
funds between the two is not great"(P.4 6).
In conclusion, the neo-structuralist view does not only 
provide no strong case to counter the repressionist 
hypothesis, but it also cannot assist in determining policy 
actions that are consistent with the special characteristics 
of developing countries.
2.6 An Assessment of Financial Development Models:
The literature advocating financial liberalization and 
development as a step towards real growth, as seen above, has 
no strong theoretical foundations, the general argument for 
free markets aside. Therefore, in assessing this literature, 
use should also be made of existing empirical evidence.
For a variety of reasons, some of which have already been 
highlighted in section (2.2) above, most LDCs governments 
have not responded to the call for financial liberalization. 
Accordingly, fixed interest rates, or financial repression, 
policy continued. Nevertheless, during the 1970s and early 
1980s, different forms of financial reform were implemented 
in several developing countries, notably Argentina, Chile, 
El-Salvador, Mexico, and South Korea. Financial liberation 
policy took two forms(10) : (1) improved management of
intervention policy, and supporting regulations aiming at 
guiding the market towards a more competitive behaviour; and 
(2) full deregulation of financial markets, which permits 
financial variables, particularly interest rates, to find 
their equilibrium levels.
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In short, attempts at financial liberalization in LDCs, 
particularly through deregulation, have been 
unsuccessful ( .  A variety of difficulties, which led in 
some cases to., financial crises, were encountered. According 
to Diaz-Alejandro (1985), the results of financial liberation 
in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were a boom in financial 
savings and intermediation, but with no sign of an increase 
in total domestic savings, or of domestic investment either 
increasing or becoming more efficient. In summing up the 
overall performance of financial liberation programmes in the 
South American experiment after the lapse of six years or so, 
Diaz-Alejandro wrote:
"The combination of pre-announced or fixed nominal 
exchange rates, relatively free capital movements, and 
domestic and external financial systems characterized by 
moral hazard^ 12) ...set the stage not only for 
significant microeconomic misallocation of credit, but 
also for macroeconomic instability, including explosive 
growth of foreign debt, most of which incurred by 
private Chilean banks, followed by abrupt cessation of 
capital flows" (P.15).
There is now a broad consensus, even among those who 
previously advocated it that financial sector liberation may 
not be more fruitful than repression. For example, Galbis, 
who argued strongly for the benefits from financial 
liberalization in 1977, has come to argue for what he terms 
"market-creating" intervention in 1986. In his words:
"..a prolonged disequilibrium state such as the 
prevalence of negative real interest rates is better 
explained as a product of market imperfections than of 
the authorities policy "mistakes" and policy "mistakes" 
themselves can be explained as part of these market 
imperfections" (P. 138).
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The apparent failure of financial liberalization programmes 
may be explained in terms of three factors that do not relate 
to a specific experience, but to the fundamental grounds of 
the models of financial development. Firstly, there are 
likely to be strong endogenous constraints in the financial 
sector, such as imperfect information, which may lead to 
inefficient credit allocation, even under' free interest rate 
regimes. Secondly, the presence of an adverse macroeconomic 
environment, and in particular, lack of harmony among 
exchange rate, interest rate, wage and fiscal policies(13) 
during the reform period. Finally, the existence of 
uncompetitive banking systems or oligopolistic financial 
sector behaviour.
All these issues relate, in one way or another, to the 
interplay of market forces. The question then is, can 
financial markets in LDCs efficiently allocate resources when 
they are free from exogenous, legal or institutional, 
constraints?.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 and 1983) suggest that credit 
markets (14) in which interest rates are set according to 
borrowers' characteristics, are subject to a possibly binding 
endogenous constraint. This constraint, which arises as a 
result of, especially information, costs of differentiating 
between the risk characteristics of various borrowers, can be 
modelled to explain the existence of credit rationing in 
competitive markets. In their analysis, even under conditions 
of excess demand for loans at a given rate of interest, 
liberal credit institutions tend to ration credits and not to 
raise the rate of interest. This happens because it is 
possible that, provided certain groups of observatinally 
distinguishable borrowers, information imperfection results 
in those whose projects promise higher returns being shut out 
of the loan market; risk and return being positively 
correlated. Accordingly, the allocative efficiency of the
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market would be impaired as : (1) banks would find it more
profitable to lend to those who are not able to borrow at 
high lending rates, because they are safe borrowers (the 
adverse selection effect); and (2) with high rates of 
interest, and if they have the choice of projects, borrowers 
would prefer projects, with higher probability of default 
(the incentive effect). • .
As mentioned above, a riskier project would yield higher 
returns if successful, and vice versa. If the project is 
successful the borrower gets the entire return over the cost 
of the loan, while the bank simply gets the principal plus 
the amount of the predetermined rate of interest, 
irrespective of how high the actual investment return is. 6n 
the other hand, if the project fails, the borrower loses the 
specific amount of his collateral, whereas the bank bears the 
entire loss less the borrower’s collateral. Thus, the
borrower's expected return, as opposed to that of the bank, 
may be an increasing function of the riskiness of his
project, and higher loan rates may discourage the safe 
borrower whom banks prefer. The adverse selection and 
incentive effects may induce banks to keep the lending, and 
consequently the deposit, rate below its market-clearing 
level; the lending rate will be determined at the level at 
which banks' expected returns reach a maximum.
The economic dimension of such behaviour is that banks may 
tend to concentrate their credits on a small number of firms 
that have established relations with them, and meanwhile 
ration-out new ones, which might be innovative, and highly 
productive. The dynamic effect of inflexibilities in bank 
lending on economic growth will be serious since, as Cho
(1986) notes, it can diminish the opportunities to innovate 
and make adjustment in the industrial structure difficult in 
developing economies where comparative advantages shift from 
one sector to another. Moreover, financial intermediaries
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being inhibited from having adequate information on various 
borrowers and projects may not be in the position to enhance 
entrepreneurial development via non-credit services.
It has been s u g g e s t e d (^ 5) that the existence of equity 
markets will help avoid such shortcomings, and boost capital 
efficiency. Assuming that risk-neutral lenders and potential 
shareholders have the same information on' firms as banks do, 
then the riskier category of entrepreneurs will be able to 
obtain finance for two reasons. Firstly, equity finance, in 
contrast to debt finance, is free from the adverse selection 
and incentive effects. Secondly, expected returns to equity 
investors will exactly match those of the project itself, 
i.e. there would be no clash between lenders1 and borrowers' 
interests. The argument for equity markets gains added 
importance, because, in their absence, equity capital has to 
be generated through retained business earnings. And as 
Snowden (1987) notes, debt-equity ratios are typically high 
in LDCs, indicating that increases in interest rates will 
lower business profits.
Hence, it seems that even if financial liberation raises 
savings, it may not engineer real growth and that equity 
m a r k e t s ^5) might be of critical importance in the process of 
economic development in LDCs.
Another possibly significant impediment to a successful 
financial reform in LDCs lies in the structure of the 
financial sector and its links with the corporate sector. It 
has been observed (17) j.n many LDCs that there exist multi­
company, or group of, firms, that under common 
entrepreneurial control, operate in both the corporate and 
the financial sectors. Such setting results in what is 
generally known as bank-holding company structure, and may 
arise as a byproduct of the expansion of the group: "large
groups have also established banks and other financial 
intermediaries to tap capital from outside the immediate
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members of the group (Leff, 197 6)". The bank holding company 
structure is likely to unduly restrict the flow of credit to 
firms within the group, especially when banks are not 
regulated. As Diaz-Alejandro (ibid) remarks the close 
association between financial institutions and non-financial 
corporations ...can indeed lead to distortions in the 
allocation of credit, as shown by the Argentine and Chilean 
experiences... and was responsible for the high use of debt by 
private firms.
The possible adverse consequences of bank-holding company 
structures on credit allocation and financial sector 
liberalization are further exacerbated by the prevalence of a 
high degree of market concentration in a few financial firms 
in some LDCs. This concentration results normally from 
historical factors, besides economies of scale and horizontal 
expansion of financial firms. It is usually the case that, in 
the absence of regulations, financial institutions exhibit a 
tendency towards horizontal consolidation by mergers, 
takeovers, and other forms of participation by some financial 
companies in other companies. The outcome of a bank-holding 
company structure and a high degree of concentration would be 
an oligopolistic financial sector behaviour. This, in turn, 
can result in one of two undesirable solutions: one
inefficient, collusion; and the other unstable, oligopolistic 
pricing war.
Having achieved a degree of power in financial markets, 
bank-holding companies may tend to influence banks into a 
collusion solution, which minimizes lending, and in effect 
deposit, rates. This may occur in spite of the fact that 
banks alone, under oligopolistic conditions, would prefer 
widening the interest rate spread by increasing lending rates 
and lowering deposit rates in order to maximize profits. The 
collusion solution, however, may be preferred by both 
corporate and financial firms, members of the group. The main
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reason being that since banks are generally subject to closer 
scrutiny by monetary authorities, it may be in the interest 
of the group to receive profits from financial operations 
vis-a-vis nonr-financial activities (18) # to do so banks would 
provide subsidized credits to corporate firms, members of the 
group, and,therefore, keep interest rates below their market- 
clearing levels. On the empirical importance of bank-holding 
company structuresj Galbis (1986) points out that in few 
countries collusion has been enforced by direct understanding 
among financial and corporate firms, but in many countries 
interest rates have been fixed by understanding among 
financial institutions themselves, despite the absence of 
controls.
Oligopolistic pricing war occurs when some institutions try 
to gain more market share at the expense of others. Even 
under conditions of low and stable inflation, Galbis (ibid) 
finds financial deregulation and unrestrained competition 
among few financial firms to result in abnormally high rates 
of interest, declined business profits and accumulation of 
bad debts by banks. However, it should be stressed, at this 
junction, that a close relation between financial and 
corporate enterprises is not necessarily undesirable. As we 
mentioned previously in the case of Germany such association 
was behind economic boom, rapid expansion of industry and 
entrepreneurial skills. What is important in the context of 
LDCs, where market structures are less competitive, is that 
financial liberalization may further deter competition 
through excessive concentration and bank-holding company 
structures.
The discussion, again, suggests that financial sector 
liberation is less likely to succeed in the absence of 
regulations. This leads us to a further consideration of 
financial markets and their behaviour under different policy 
regimes, i.e. free markets as opposed to regulated markets.
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The recent financial history of most developed countries 
seems to suggest that government intervention and regulation 
of financial markets is inevitable. "No industrial country 
has come close to the laissez-faire vision at least since the 
1930s. The government control over cash has been maintained, 
while banks have been regulated and subjected to fractional 
reserve requirements. In the United States, an explicit 
federal deposit insurance was introduced during the 1930s, 
and maintained since then...like any other insurance scheme 
this scheme is vulnerable to moral hazard, i.e., it induces 
depositors to believe that one bank is as good as another, 
and leads bank managers to undertake riskier loans. To avoid 
such insurance induced risk-taking supervision over banks 
portfolio accompanied deposit insurance. Indeed, the federal 
reserve holds impressive discretionary powers regarding the 
lending policies of commercial banks, and over their 
liquidation or merger (19)". This clearly signifies that banks 
need to be regulated not necessarily for manipulation of 
their credits, but also for their own safety, that is, for 
them to avoid destructive behaviour which may undermine 
public confidence. It is common practice, almost in all 
countries, that the authorities control such financial 
variables as interest rates or exchange rates. Whether the 
objective of such policy is to influence banks’ behaviour or, 
as often is the case, for stabilization purposes it 
necessitates government intervention. And if this holds in 
the context of developed countries, there is a stronger case 
for financial regulation in LDCs. The activities of profit- 
minded financial intermediaries, which may endanger their own 
survival, is less likely to adequately account for employment 
creation, food security, and social and economic equity. 
These aspects are of utmost importance in LDCs, though they 
may be less attractive on profitability basis.
Accepting this externality argument, together with
44
widespread market imperfections, financial liberation may not 
be as fruitful as Mckinnon and Shaw and others have 
suggested. There is, however, no dispute that real interest 
rates should .not be kept negative, but our discussion above 
suggests that this should be ascertained by realistic 
monetary policy, rather than the free interplay of market 
forces.
To close this section, some additional deficiencies in 
financial development models may be worth noting. These 
models place major emphasis on the role of the interest rate 
and ignore other determinants of savings, income aside. 
Moreover, in assuming that good quality investments 
opportunities exist in LDCs, and only finance (saving) is 
lacking, these models implicitly assume that entrepreneurial 
talents are plentiful in these countries. But, our discussion 
in chapter 1 indicated that these talents are scarce in LDCs, 
and it is one of the envisaged functions of finacial 
institutions to promote them.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions:
The main aim of this chapter was to review and critically 
assess the literature on financial development in LDCs, with 
a view of how the financial system can be optimally developed 
to play a prominent role in the economic progress of these 
countries. In the models of financial development for LDCs, 
it is said that this can be accomplished by letting financial 
markets operate freely. In particular, market-determined 
rates of interest are regarded as a means of achieving 
financial development, which would, through efficient 
resource mobilization and application, enhance the rate of 
economic growth.
But, the financial liberalization or repression strategy is 
limited in many ways. It explains only private investment and 
only that part of it financed through domestic credit.
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Government investment, which is mainly financed via taxation 
and foreign aid, forms a significant proportion of total 
investment in LDCs. And in the absence of well-functioning 
equity markets, interest rate changes may have little impact 
on public investments, meanwhile, as Kitchen (1986) notes, 
foreign direct investment and private investment financed 
from abroad may be sensitive to interest .rates in foreign, 
rather than domestic, markets. Again much of private 
investment in LDCs may be financed through retained earnings 
or investors own resources. More important, due to 
significant market imperfections, financial liberation may 
not be growth-promoting. Even if financial markets are free, 
credit-rationing may still take place on non-price basis, 
discouraging new and more productive investments. There is 
also no guarantee that substantial maturity transformation 
would occur; banks might continue to lend short excessively 
more than lending long. Subsequently, an increase in deposits 
in response to higher interest rates would not have the 
desired effects on capital accumulation and growth. Moreover, 
the literature on financial liberalization fails to explain 
how it can enhance entrepreneurial development in the modern 
sector, let alone the traditional one. (The development of 
entrepreneurship may not be invariant to the structure of 
financial and capital markets.) Similarly, the literature is 
yet to reconcile potential conflicts between the interests of 
purely profit-minded institutions, and the social and 
economic priorities of the nation, provided the scarcity of 
financial resources in LDCs. This, together with the fact 
that banks normally confine themselves to the modern sectors 
only, may continue to justify government inspired 
concessional credit schemes for small farmers, small scale 
indigenous enterprises, or certain underprivileged borrowers.
The conclusion of this chapter is that government 
regulation of financial markets is necessary, but it should
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be well-guided in order not to inhibit the growth of 
financial, or any other, market. Unfortunately it is highly 
implausible to characterize a direction of financial policy 
applicable across all LDCs.
Notes:
1. In most developing countries principal rates of interest are 
determined by the authorities, with credit ceilings (Lanyi and Rusdu, 
1983).
2. For further discussion of interventionism in general see Mckinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973).
3. This hypothesis was given added importance in that it has been 
subsequently adopted by international financial agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund as a crucial, and in most cases a 
precondition, policy prescription for member countries seeking their 
financial support.
4. Mckinnon assumes that no important distinction can be made between 
savers (households) and investors (Firms).
5. See Mckinnon (Ibid), P.59.
6. Notably Galbis (1977, and 1979), Kapur (1976, and 1983), Mathieson 
(1980), and Fry (1988).
7. Formal models of this type have been developed by Van-Wijnbergen 
(1982, and 1983), and Lance Taylor (1983).
8. e.g. Gold and other similar inflation hedges.
9. Van Wijnbergen finds that an increase in the deposit rate produces 
greater substitution from curb market loans than from the currency 
component of money stock into time deposits.
10. Galbis (1982 and 1986) provides an extensive survey of financial 
reform programmes.
11. See Diaz-Alejandro (1985), and Galbis (1986).
12. Moral hazard, here, is perhaps induced by deposit insurance schemes.
13. Mckinnon and Shaw acknowledged the difficulties that may arise from 
lack of policy coordination, but still argue that financial market 
reform can stimulate economic progress, far from intensifying 
distortions originating in other markets.
14. The Stiglitz and Weiss analysis were conducted in terms of a 
developed economy such as that of USA, but' they can more than equally 
apply to developing economies.
15. See Cho (1986), and Snowden (1987).
16. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the relevance of equity markets to 
LDCs.
17. Diaz-Alejandro (Ibid), Galbis (1986), and Snowden (Ibid).
18. According to Galbis (1986), higher bank profits may also result in 
higher wages, bonuses,...., and special advantages to shareholders, 
which may not be in the interest of the group.
19. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) provides further details, PP.4-5.
47
CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
AND FINANCING STRATEGIES
3.1 Introduction:
The objective of this chapter is to examine the structure 
and performance of The Sudanese economy over the period 
1970/71-1987/88. This period represents an era of both 
impressive economic growth and speedy retrogression. The 
chapter provides a brief account of the economic potential 
and structure of Sudan, and deals with the allocation of 
domestic resources among various competing uses. It also 
examines the Sudanese planning experience, with particular 
emphasis on the limitations inflicted on capital formation by 
inadequate financing. Furthermore, the chapter considers the 
role of the domestic financial system in financing public 
deficits, and the effect of this on different types of 
private expenditure. The chapter as a whole is intended to 
serve as a background against which the detailed analyses of 
the operations of the financial system, as they relate to 
economic development strategies, are carried out in 
subsequent chapters.
This chapter demonstrates that: development financing has 
relied excessively on foreign resources, the nature of which 
has adversely affected the structure of the economy; that the 
myopic behaviour on the part of the government has led to 
misallocation of the resources made available through the 
domestic financial system; and that the fiscal and monetary 
policies adopted by the government in pursuit of managing 
budgetary imbalances induced a private behaviour that is 
detrimental to growth.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. 
Section (3.2) deals with the economic potential and economic
48
structure of Sudan. In section (3.3), the development 
performance of the economy over the period under review is 
assessed, in connection with the overall use of resources. 
Section (3.4) examines the composition and methods of 
financing public expenditures. In section (3.5), the 
planning experience of Sudan, particularly over the last two 
decades, and the financing strategy of planned expenditure on 
capital formation are analysed. Section (3.6) considers the 
size, trend and determinants of the resource gap. In 
addition, this section discusses the poor private savings 
performance vis-a-vis factors affecting the private 
consumption behaviour. Finally, section (3.7) gives some 
concluding remarks
3.2 Economic Potential and Economic Structure;
3.2.1 The Economic Potential of Sudan:
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the ninth 
biggest in the world, with an area of about one million 
square miles. The country has enormous economic potential, 
particularly in the sphere of agriculture. This potential may 
be looked at in terms of arable land, water resources, 
minerals and livestock and human resources*1* .
Out of the total area of the country of approximately 620 
million acres, 88.6 million acres are classified as arable 
land, of which only 20% is currently under cultivation. It is 
also estimated that 40% of the total area of the country is 
suitable for grazing, but, only part of this area is utilized 
to support a relatively large livestock population : 20.2 
million cattle; 19.7 million sheep; 14.5 million goat; and 
2.7 million camel. In addition to these, there is a possible 
huge population of wild animals, whose exact size is unknown.
According to specialists, the land potential of the country 
is supported by adequate water resources^* . Water sources
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include run-off water, surface water, and ground water flow. 
However, only 50% of the potential water is presently being 
used.
Sudan is relatively sparsely populated, with a total 
population of just over 23 million^. The population is 
estimated to be growing at the rate of 2.9 per cent annually. 
Of the total population, 69.1% live in rural areas, where the 
principal economic activities are agriculture and animal 
husbandry.
The country is believed to have a number of unknown 
minerals. Oil has been discovered in several parts of it in 
quantities that are supposed to be commercially feasible*5^ . 
Developments in the area of oil explorations and utilization 
have been halted primarily by civil war in the South and 
South-west parts of the country where the major oil fields 
were discovered.
Thus, the country is well endowed with economic resources 
to support a relatively small population. But, these 
resources are yet to be optimally utilized, and Sudan remains 
to be one of the World's 25 poorest underdeveloped nations 
The underdeveloped state of the economy is patently revealed 
by its static structure.
3.2.2 Structure of the Sudanese Economy:
Table (3.1) reveals the relative shares of the main 
economic sectors in Sudan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
selected years. It is evident from this table that between 
1969/70 and 1988/89, the structure of the economy has 
remained substantially unchanged. This structure is 
characterized by dominance of the agricultural sector, which 
comprises three distinct subsectors: the traditional rainfed 
agriculture; the mechanized subsector; and the irrigated 
subsector.
The traditional subsector, with an area of over 6.5 million
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acres, produces most of food grain cereals, in addition to 
forestry fishing and livestock products. The mechanized 
subsector, with an area of about 4.8 million acres produces 
mainly sorghum and sesame by means of heavy mechanization, 
and is rainfed. The third subsector covering an area of 3.9 
million acres supplies cotton, groundnut, sorghum, wheat and 
sugar. It is fully irrigated and relatively mechanized. Being 
the prime foreign exchange^ earner, this subsector is the 
most privileged among the three in terms of supply of seeds, 
fertilizers, insecticide and other necessary inputs.
Table (3.1)
GDP By Economic Activity in Selected Years (%, at currentv j .  i *_v
prices).
—i.,u /_r*,V■ ■
S ect o r 1969/70 1974/75 1979/80 1984/85 1988/8^
Agriculture 3 7 . 6 3 8 . 5 3 2 . 0 2 9 . 3 4 1 . 1
Industry and Mining 
Transport and
9 . 5 9 . 1 6 . 9 9 . 0 6 . 9
Communicat ions 7 . 3 6 . 2 8 . 5 8 . 6 1 0 . 3
Construction 3 . 5 3 . 8 3 . 9 5 . 8 5 . 2
Electricity and water 
Commerce, Finance
2 . 4 2 . 2 1 . 7 1 . 9 2 . 0
and Services 3 6 . 0 4 0 . 1 3 6 . 9 4 5 . 8 3
Total 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
GDP (Is mn) 7 0 1 . 5 1 5 1 0 . 8 " 4 1 2 2 . 8 1 4 3 3 8 6 6 0 2 6
Source: The Economic survey 1977/78, 1983/84 and 1988/89 
editions, Ministry of finance.
Notes: (1) Provisional estimates.
By and large, the traditional subsector is the major one as 
far as domestic income and consumption are concerned. It 
provides jobs to over 5 0 % of the total population, and uses 
domestic inputs and technology to produce foodstuffs for the 
vast majority of both urban and rural population.
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Nevertheless, the methods and conditions of production in 
this subsector have remained virtually out of the domain of 
government policy.
Though about 69% of the population are engaged mainly in 
agriculture, the contribution of agricultural output to GDP 
has been both unstable and proportionately low; it ranged 
between a minimum of 29.3% in 1984/85 and' a maximum of 41.1% 
in 1988/89. These facts indicate the low productivity of the 
methods and techniques used, and reflect the wide changes in 
conditions of production in the traditional subsector, due to 
factors such as the amount and duration of rainfall. 
Moreover, variations in agricultural output are also 
attributable to the highly unstable prices of agricultural 
produce, both internationally, and domestically where they 
are manipulated by a few traders.
The underdeveloped feature of the economy is well depicted 
by the relative growth of the industrial sector. This sector, 
including the manufacturing subsector, which is supposed to 
be the most dynamic of all sectors in terms of effecting the 
process of growth, has maintained a share of GDP of less than 
10%. Notwithstanding, the manufacturing subsector is 
predominantly a light consumer goods producer, with processed 
foods claiming more than half of its total output, and 
virtually no capital goods production^  . Table (3.1) above 
also suggests another reason for slow growth and backwardness 
of the economy in terms of the underdeveloped state of 
infrastructure. For example, the share of the transport and 
communications sector in GDP increased from 7% in 1969/70 to 
just over 10% in 1988/89.
In contrast, the services sector encompassing commerce and 
finance displayed the most pronounced gain in GDP, which 
ranged between 36% and 45.8% over the period considered. 
Developments in this sector have been associated with a 
marked expansion in the financial network (see chapter 4). It
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might be constructive to compare the economic structure of 
Sudan with that of some developing countries which are in 
comparable stages of economic development.
Table... (3.2).
Economic Structure of Some Developing Countries in 1987 
(% of GDP at current prices-)
Country Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Total^
Egypt 14 .7 34 .2 12.1 50.1 100
Ethiopia 43.5 18.0 12.6 38.5 100
Kenya 32.0 20.9 13.4 47.1 100
Morroco2 16.8 30.6 16.6 57.7 100
Nigeria 27.9 34.4 10.6 37.7 100
Ghana2 52.9 10.5 7.1 37 .5 100
Source: World Bank, World Tables 1988/1989 edition.
Notes: (1) Total does not include manufacturing which is a
subsector of industry. (2) GNP rather than GDP is used.
The data in table (3.2) above illustrate-/; that the 
dominating position of agriculture is a feature of most of 
the countries considered. Apart from Ghana, both the 
industrial sector and the manufacturing subsector of Sudan 
have the lowest relative shares in GDP formation. The 
percentage share of the services sector in GDP is notably 
high in Egypt, Morroco, Kenya, and Sudan. However, this is 
not surprising as regards the first three countries, since 
each of them derives a considerable proportion of its 
national income from tourism^), which is included in the 
services sector. As for Sudan, the income originating from 
the tourist subsector is negligible. However, the apparently 
disproportionate expansion of the services sector, be it 
productive or not, has been at the expense of the most 
productive sectors, especially industry. This suggests that,
53
in terms of structural transformation, the growth that has 
been achieved in Sudan, has been a distorted one.
To sum up, Sudan has a malformed economic structure, which 
is dominated by the services sector. Given the fact that this 
sector tends to have weak backward and forward linkages with 
other sectors, future development in Sudan would require 
substantial sectoral shifts. • .
3.3 Performance of the Economy During the Period 
1970/71-1986/87
3.1 An Overview:
This section deals with growth of the economy's productive 
and importing capacity in relation to expansion in aggregate 
demand. Table (3.3) contains data*10* on GDP and its major 
expenditure components as well as per capita income for the 
period 1970/71-1986/87; all variables being measured at the 
constant 1980 prices. The data suggest that over the entire 
period, output has increased by an average of 2.6% per annum, 
and that on per capita basis there has been a consistent 
retrogression. The period under review witnessed the two oil 
price hikes of 1973 and 1979, and it is worthwhile to divide 
it into two sub-periods. First, the sub-period prior to 
1977/7 8 represents one of rapid growth at an annual average 
rate of 7.6%. But, this impressive economic performance at 
ever high rates of growth was achieved mainly through huge 
inflows of foreign capital in the first half of the 1970s. 
Since then, these inflows were becoming gradually 
unavailable, making it difficult for the government to bridge 
the gap between actual and desired inflows of foreign 
resources in the second sub-period, 1978-1987. Towards the 
end of 1977, budgetary imbalances became unmanageable, and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was called in to help 
contain mounting balance of payments problems and mobilize
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foreign resources*11* . Nevertheless, judged by output 
performance, this was merely the beginning of an era of 
crises, started by a series of devaluations and escalating 
inflation. During the sub-period 1978-1987, the rate of real 
GDP growth was negative, averaging 0.83% per annum.
This fall in real output was coupled with a conspicuous 
contraction in the country's importing capacity as determined 
by export earnings and the terms of international trade. 
Measured at the constant 1980 prices, the growth of exports 
of goods and services (table 3.3) was almost sluggish over 
the entire period, and the terms of international trade were 
consistently and rapidly abating; from 100% in 1980 to the 
lowest level of 82% in 1986 (table 3.4). The declining trend 
of export earnings reflects the composition of Sudan's 
commodity exports, which is heavily weighted by primary 
products. For instance, primary agricultural output accounted 
for 82% to 92% of total exports between 1982 and 1987*12*. In 
addition to variations in their output, these products have 
very thin international markets, with widely fluctuating 
prices.
In contrast to the falling productive and importing 
capacity of Sudan, aggregate demand for goods and services 
maintained an annual rate of growth of 3.1% over the whole 
period under review. The bulk of this was due to expansion in 
private as well public consumption expenditure. The relative 
importance of various types of expenditure has shifted over 
time, but changes in current public expenditure seem to have 
been matched by counter changes in private consumption. As a 
result, aggregate consumption remained very high relative to 
GDP, and exhibited only a slightly rising trend. Gross 
domestic investment showed a tendency to fluctuate, but this 
associated mainly with private investment, whereas public 
fixed investment and changes in stocks were falling over most 
of the period considered.
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Table -I3.il
Price Indices for Sudan (1980=100)
Year Wholesale Consumer Exports Imports
1974 42.9 43.5 71.2 58.4
1975 46.2 46.8 60.3 64.5
1976 47.7 49.1 78.0 63.4
1977 52.5 52.1 76.2 ' 68.4
1978 65.7 65.3 7 9.6 77.4
1979 82.7 81.6 87 .5 88.3
1980 100 100 100 100
1981 122.8 118.7 97.1 101.3
1982 154.1 150.1 83.6 94.7
1983 200.3 197 .0 92 .4 93.3
1984 253.0 244.8 88.8 92.3
1985 382.0 365.7 83.9 81.3
1986 506.5 502.3 71.3 86.1
1987 647.7 646.9 77.1 83.1
Source: World Bank, World Tables *1988/89, and The I.M.F.’s 
International Financial Statistics 1989.
Expenditure on foreign goods and services has revealed the 
most obvious trend. This is due to the structure of Sudan’s 
imports, which is dominated by noncompetitive goods such as 
fuel, capital goods, transport equipment, and chemicals. 
These goods cannot be produced domestically, and the country 
cannot afford, at least in the short-run, doing without them 
if the process of development is to proceed.
In chapter 7, we find that Sudan's imports are closely and 
positively related to income. But, the regression equation 
below suggests that Sudanese imports (M) , in real terms may 
not only be necessary for investment (I), but also for total 
Consumption (C) . However, for the country to be able to meet 
its imports bill, import requirements should be kept at pace 
with the growth of exports (X) . Estimating an import function 
for Sudan, using data for 1967-1987, the following results 
were obtained:
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M = -18.8 + 0.245 C + 0.33 I + 0.635 X
(-0.77) (3.18) (1.78) (2.71)
R2= 0.63 D.W= 1.47
(t-ratios in parenthesis)
The above regression results suggest that real investment 
has a high import-content, which is greater.than that of real 
consumption. But, the consumption coefficient is 
statistically more important than that of investment. This is 
not unexpected, because in the absence of capital goods 
industry in Sudan, and with the industrial sector share in 
GDP of less than 10%, the import-content of both investment 
and consumption is likely to remain high. The above 
regression results show a strong and positive relationship 
between imports and exports, which is theoretically 
consistent.
With foreign goods being highly needed for both consumption
and investment purposes, it is not surprising that imports
have been continuously rising, outstripping export earnings 
throughout the period considered. Consequently, the balance 
of payments maintained a high and increasing current account 
deficit, which jumped from 77 million Sudanese Pounds (Ls) in 
1971 to the highest level of Ls 914 million in 1982, and 
declined to Ls 205 in 1987 (table 3.3, above.)
As we will see below, these persistent imbalances were 
reflections of the poor productive base of the economy and 
the uses to which resources were committed.
3.3.2 Factors Affecting the Productivity of the
Economy:
It has already been indicated that during the 1970s and 
1980s, there were many external factors that have contributed 
to the unsatisfactory performance of the Sudanese economy 
vis-a-vis foreign trade. These included massive rises in oil
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prices, and the world recession which affected the market for 
primary exports very substantially.
Apart from external factors, there is also a host of 
internal factors, the combined effect of which provides the 
main explanation for the performance of the Sudanese economy 
over the period 1971-1987. These include gross misallocation 
of investible resources, low rates of capacity utilization in 
existing projects, rapid and large-scale out-migration, and 
fast deterioration and degradation of the economy's natural 
resources base.
As may be seen from table (3.5) bow, gross domestic 
investment, including changes in stocks, averaged 15% of GDP 
per annum between 1974 and 1987. This rate appears to be on 
the average when compared to 15.3% for the poor nations of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but quite low when contrasted with the 
investment-GDP rate of 24.6% for the developing countries of 
South Asia over the same period. The low investment rate is 
partly due to government policies which favour current 
consumption as against future consumption - see section 
(3.4). But, also as the discussion in section (3.5) points 
out the distribution of investment by sectors was 
inappropriate. An examination of the sectoral expansion of 
GDP reveals that the primary sectors, agriculture and 
industry, had contributed to its growth at the average annual 
rates of 1.4% and 0.4% respectively during the period 1971-
1987; while^that of the services sector was as high as 1.7%
/
over the same period (World Tables 1988/89). The implication 
of this disproportionate expansion of the services(13) sector 
was an increasing divergence between the commodity 
composition of aggregate supply and that of aggregate demand; 
the latter being dominated by demand for material output 
owing to the low levels of per capita income. This also 
implies a change in the composition of investment in favour 
of less productive or service activities. Besides its weak
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linkages with other sectors, the services sector has little 
contribution to exports and foreign exchange earnings, which 
are quite important in the financing of capital imports.
Meanwhile, the rate of capacity utilization was, probably, 
below the break-even point across the whole economy. For 
example, over the period 1981-1988, it ranged between 36% and 
72% for the five sugar industries, remained firmly below 25% 
for public textiles, and never exceeded 50% for public 
tanneries(14) e
Low capacity utilization rates are thought to be, 
principally, the result of inadequate energy inputs - the 
energy sector has received little attention in the 
development plans discussed in section 3.5 - and intermittent 
supplies of other essential intermediate inputs such as 
chemicals, fertilizers etc for agriculture and industry. In 
addition, services and maintenance for manufacturing were 
inappropriate due to lack of spare parts and increased 
emigration of skilled labour; out-migration seemed to have 
pervasive effects on the economy in recent years.
Table (3.5) above demonstrates that the overall resource 
use, inclusive of current consumption and domestic 
investment, sustained an annual average percentage of GDP of 
110 over the period 1971-1988, perhaps due to net income 
transfers from abroad. Total consumption expenditure ranged 
between 93.4% in 1976 and 103% in 1988, while the domestic 
saving rate was, on the average, as low as 7% of annual GDP. 
However, both savings and investment declined considerably 
during the 1980s. Apart from current income, the Sudanese 
consumption behaviour has, probably, been strongly influenced 
by the flow of foreign resources and remittances by Sudanese 
nationals working abroad. As we shall see in section (3.4) 
below, foreign capital has met a substantial proportion of 
expenditure by the public sector. The use of these resources 
was not limited to capital expenditure alone, but also
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extended to cover part of current public expenditure. This 
was clearly revealed by the fact that net foreign capital 
received by the government in some years was in excess of its 
capital expenditure in these years.
Out-migration began to assume importance immediately after 
the huge rises in crude oil prices in the 1970s, when oil- 
exporting Arab countries embarked upon enormous development 
programmes. Because of limited supplies of, particularly 
skilled, labour in these countries and the size of the 
programmes they undertook, there was a high demand for 
foreign labour, backed by generous incentives. For cultural 
and language similarities, Sudan is one of the main countries 
for Arab employers to consider.
Provided the multi-faceted nature of out-migration and the 
existence of unofficial channels through which migrants as 
well as their remittances may pass, it is difficult to give 
an accurate assessment of its impact on the Sudanese economy 
and society. It, however, began to assume importance in the 
late 1970s. It has been estimated that an average of about 
half million Sudanese nationals have been registered as 
migrants in oil-producing Arab countries over the period 
1977-1988 (The Economic Survey, 1977/78, 1986/87, and
1988/89). Though this number is small relative to the total 
population of the country, the majority of migrants are 
skilled and professional manpower. About 4 9% of emigrants 
were medical Doctors, Engineers, Surveyors, and university 
Teachers, and this was also half the number of those 
professionals and academics working in the country at that 
time (Galal’eldin, 1988) .
This undoubtedly has considerable adverse impacts on the 
economy, but it also means high earning ability on the part 
of Sudanese migrants. Although over more than 50% of 
migrants' remittances are transferred through unofficial 
channels, those sent through the banking system ranged
62
between 2% and 6.4% of GDP over the period 1976-1987 (World 
Tables 1988/89). As to the use of migrants' resources, 
Galaleldin (1984) reported that about 90% of savings is spent 
on weddings, consumer durables and housing, and only 10% is 
devoted to capital goods.
This suggests that the Sudanese nationals working abroad 
are contributing directly to increased consumption 
expenditure by their families at home. At the same time, 
returning migrants tend to behave in a way that manifests 
strong external demonstration effects in the sense that they 
attempt to keep up with the living standards they have 
observed or enjoyed in the rich oil-exporting countries. This 
behaviour could also lead to a consumption orientation among 
non-migrant families through internal demonstration effects. 
Thus out-migration may have influenced consumer behaviour in 
direct and indirect ways.
In brief, workers' remittances are likely to have 
encouraged conspicuous private consumption, and together with 
the inflow of foreign resources, raised the share of total 
consumption in GDP. Such consumption behaviour can hardly be 
conducive to output growth in view of the low rate of 
investment that accompanied it. In a country like Sudan, with 
low stocks of capital, extravagant consumption should clearly 
be curbed in order to release resources for investment, which 
is necessary if high future standards of living are to be 
attained. This requires a set of fiscal and monetary policies 
that are carefully designed to keep consumption within 
reasonable limits.
On top of the weak investment rate, and striking structural 
imbalances, the Sudanese economy was subjected to the 
unchecked actions of such natural forces as droughts, desert 
creep and soil erosion, which resulted in a spectacular 
deterioration in its natural resource base, besides climatic 
changes. (This had resulted in a tragic famine in 1984.)
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Other factors relating to human action like the prevalence 
and expansion of traditional agriculture - shifting 
cultivation and unorganized animal husbandry in particular - 
as well as the unplanned spread of mechanized farming, were 
also to blame for deforestation and desertification.
3.4 Composition of Government Expenditure and Public 
Finance:
Public expenditure consists of central government recurrent 
expenditure and investment expenditure plus net public 
entities position. It has been indicated in the previous 
section that public consumption expenditure was increasing, 
particularly over the period 1980-1987. The major factors 
contributing to this expansion were,, expenditure to finance 
the civil war in the South, expanding transfers to the then 
newly created regional governments, and increases in extra 
budgetary operations*15*. Indeed, the bulk of the rapidly 
expanding public expenditure had been on such unproductive, 
but politically necessary items, as security, and 
overexpanding public administration*16* .
As table (3.6.1) may attest, current public expenditure 
accounted for about 80% of the total government budget over 
the period 1971-1987. Meanwhile, capital formation by the 
public sector fluctuated around an average of 4.4% of GDP per 
annum. The composition of current expenditure is made up 
mainly of local governments, and defense and security 
expenditure, as well as unclassified items. The latter is 
unduly high, claiming about 6% of GDP on the annual average. 
Adding current and capital expenditures by the public sector, 
we find that the activities of this sector constituted about 
19.5% of the whole economy, in terms of GDP, over the period 
1971-1987.
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However, contrasting tables (3.6.1) and (3.6.2), it is 
clear that increases in current public expenditure were out 
of tune with current tax and non-tax government revenues. The 
former averaged 19.5% of GDP per annum, while the latter 
averaged 14.2%. This gives rise to an overall average public 
deficit of about 5.3% of annual GDP between 1971 and 1987. 
Thus, the actual size of the public sector relative to the 
entire economy is, perhaps, much less than that indicated by 
its spending. It is alarming that tax revenue has been out of 
proportion with both GDP growth and expansion of public 
expenditure. Both direct and indirect tax revenues were 
falling as percentages of GDP, while non-tax revenue was 
stagnant. Yet, public expenditure remained at almost the same 
percentage of GDP. The low rate of increase of tax revenue, 
as the figures suggest, exemplifies the inefficiency and 
inflexibility of the tax system, a characteristic feature of 
LDCs. Non-tax revenue depends chiefly on public entities, but 
these have been in the red for almost the entire period 1978- 
1988. This happened not only because of the inherent 
inefficiency of public enterprises as such, but also and 
foremost because of wrong policies relating to prices, 
employment, and investment imposed on them by the political 
system*17* .
In view of the above discussion one is inclined to believe 
that current public expenditure is unproductive, because had 
it been productive in any sense, it would have been possible 
for the public sector to generate comparatively high 
revenues in subsequent periods.
It is clear that the public sector was in need of 
alternative sources of finance to meet its current budget 
deficit, let alone the investment expenditure. The combined 
deficit of current and development budgets varied between 
4.2% and 10.6% of GDP in 1980 and 1987 respectively. This 
raises the question of how the public sector managed to make
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up for these huge financing gaps on a sustained basis?. The 
figures in table (3.6.2) above suggest that with respect to 
public expenditure cuts were possible only in the sphere of 
development expenditure, which exhibited a declining trend, 
whereas current expenditure showed no downward trends. This 
implies that, as far as the public sector is concerned, 
consumption has crowding-out effects on investment.
The aforementioned table also reveals that the financing of 
the overall deficit depended heavily on borrowing, both 
internally and externally. Despite the availability of soft 
long-term foreign loans to finance development expenditure at 
least partly, this source was inadequate relative to the 
amounts of investment undertaken. In effect, the public 
sector relied mainly on the domestic financial system which 
financed about two-thirds of the overall deficit in the 
period 1978-83. As capital markets are virtually non­
existent, domestic sources of lending to the public sector 
consisted mainly of the central bank.
The central bank, by virtue of its Act, provides funds to 
the government in various manners. To avoid high inflationary 
consequences, the central bank attempts, first, to provide 
funds to the government by borrowing from other sources, or 
by utilizing funds the government helped to raise by such 
means as securities. Be that as it may, these sources were 
inadequate, and the central bank, under mounting pressures 
from the government, was compelled to increase its issue of 
currency (high-powered money) at phenomenal rates. The 
quantity pf new money issued by the central bank rose from Ls 
-392 million in 1979 to Ls 5, 844 million in 1988 (Bank of 
Sudan Report, 1988) . And this was closely related to net 
domestic banking claims on the government, which increased 
from Ls 164 mn in 1978 to Ls 3,163 mn in 1988. This resulted 
in an unrestrained growth of money supply, which could have 
severe inflationary consequences and other adverse effects on
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the economy as a whole, unless accompanied by similar 
expansion in real output. However, this has not been the 
case, and the growth of money supply may provide another 
explanation for the high inflationary pressures experienced 
by Sudan in the 1980s.
The discussion in this section indicates that conventional 
sources of government finance are inadequate and that the 
domestic financial system played a considerable role in the 
financing of public deficits.
3.5 The Sudanese Planning Experience: Policy
Objectives and Obstacles:
This section analyses the planning experience of Sudan, 
with particular attention to the Six-Year Plan of economic 
and social development 1978-1983. It assesses plans' 
achievements against planned targets and objectives, and 
attempts to identify the obstacles encountered in the 
process of development in Sudan. To start with, these lie 
mainly in the structural bottlenecks, inadequacy of foreign 
finance and inappropriate allocation of resources in general 
and domestic resources in particular.
3.5.1 Development Planning During 1960-1977:
Development planning in Sudan was initiated by the government 
with the first development programme set up in 1946. This 
programme was followed by formation of a committee for the 
Five-Year Development Programme (1951-56) . These pre­
independence programmes comprised lists of investment 
proposals rather than detailed analyses of the country's 
needs and resources. After independence in 1956 and up to 
1960, there continued to be no plans in the real sense/ 
instead there were annual development programmes. The focus 
of these programmes was the expansion of the public sector, 
sometimes at the expense of the private sector, and they
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allocated most of their budgets to public administration and 
social services. Nevertheless, considerable efforts were 
devoted to the construction of a macroeconomic framework, and 
projections of income, investment, sources of finance and the 
balance of payments' position. As a result of these efforts, 
modern planning started in 1960, with the Ten-Year Plan (TYP) 
of social and economic development, covering the period 1960- 
1970.
This plan aimed at increasing real output by an average 
annual rate of 5.2%; broadening the structure of the economy; 
increasing exports, with strategies for import substitution; 
improving social conditions and creation of employment 
opportunities. Planned investment expenditure during the Ten- 
Year Plan is summarized in table (3.7) . Total envisaged 
investment expenditure amounted to Ls 472 million, of which 
60% was to be made by the public sector and the remainder by 
the private sector. The plan gave top priority to social 
services (32%) and a minimum attention to the transport and 
communication sector. The plan, however, achieved moderate 
success in that real GDP increased at just above half the 
targeted rate, whereas per capita income remained unchanged, 
and the envisaged financial balance was not maintained. The 
reasons being escalation of the civil war in the 1960s which 
claimed a high proportion of public spending; political 
instability; inadequate feasibility studies for projects; and 
weak financial c o n t r o l . But the plan did raise the share 
of the industrial sector in GDP, and diversified agricultural 
output, with some notable improvements in productivity.
The Ten-Year Plan was followed by The Five-Year Plan, 
1970/71-1974/75, of social and economic development, which 
was designed in a socialist spirit under the then acclaimed 
scientific socialist government. This plan aimed at securing 
a 7.6% annual increases in GDP, and an increase in per capita 
income of 6.2% annually. To achieve these targets, a total
70
investment expenditure of Ls 385 was envisaged over the 5- 
year period - table (3.7) . The plan placed emphasis on the 
most productive sectors of the economy; giving agriculture 
the largest share of 38.1% of total investment budget in the 
public sector, followed by industry which received 24%, while 
allocation for the services sector was 22%. The 
infrastructural sector, with only 14%' of total public 
expenditure remained to be the most underallocated one. The 
public sector was given a leading role, assuming 55.8% of 
total investment, with the rest expected to be undertaken by 
the private sector. While 52% of public investment was 
allocated to the directly productive sectors, agriculture and 
industry, the bulk of private investment went to services, 
particularly housing.
Table (3.7)
rj.annea investment uurina me t :Ir ana rne (in ls Minion).
Sector The Ten-Year Plan The Five-Year Plan1
Public Private Public
o
Private %
Agri culture 90 30 25 81 27 29
Industry, Mining 
and Power 42 65 23 49 24 20
Transport and 
Communication 63 32 20 “ 30 30 16
Services 90 60 32 45 88 36
Other - - - - 1 0.3
Total 285 187 100 205 170 100
Source: Ministry of Culture and Information (1977) uThe Six 
Year Plan of social and economic development, 1978-83", P.4. 
Notes: (1) Figures pertain to the original FYP, 1970/71—
1974/75; (2) Percentage of total planned investment, both
public and private.
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Domestic sources of finance were expected to provide for 
48.8% of total public investment. The main source of domestic 
finance for the public sector was named to be government 
surpluses (public savings), with no resort to deficit 
financing. The remaining 51.2% was to be financed from 
foreign resources, mainly from socialist countries.
To strengthen the financial power needed to execute the 
plan, and in the course of socialism, the government 
nationalized all foreign banks, and foreign companies, as 
well as some domestically owned private businesses. In the 
first two years of the plan, the government made modest 
public savings and concluded a number of loan agreements 
totalling Ls 32 millions with a group of socialist countries, 
which financed most of the public investment projects 
undertaken. However, the plan was interrupted in the second 
year because of an aborted Military Coup in July 1971, which 
was tacitly supported by the Sudanese Communist Party. As a 
consequence, the Sudanese Communist Party was banned, and the 
country's development philosophy changed. And financial aid 
from socialist countries ceased. The only alternative sources 
of foreign finance were Western governments and institutions, 
and pro-western Arab countries. To create an environment 
attractive to foreign capital from these sources, the 
government amended the nationalization Act and embarked on a 
series of denationalizations.
Following this, foreign aid began to flow mainly from USA, 
West Germany, and UK, totalling Ls 24.2 million in the first 
year. In 1972 Sudan concluded agreements with the World Bank, 
USA, Kuwait and Lonhro group,, to build the Rahad Agricultural 
Scheme, the second largest in the country, and Kenana Sugar 
Factory, the largest in the country. In addition, Sudan 
contracted loans to construct The Kassala-Port Sudan motorway 
and to improve the railway capacity. The types of loans Sudan 
received since 1972 were, however, either tied to the
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purchase of certain goods or tied to projects initiated by 
lending sources*201 .
As a result, many of the projects embodied in the FYP 
became impossible to implement, and the plan was soon 
supplemented in 1972 with a 5-year interim programme of 
action to cover the period 1970-1977. The extension of the 
original FYP to a 7-Year Plan (7YP) implied- a new development 
strategy. The focus of the 7YP shifted to infrastructure 
largely because of the types of loans received and in the 
hope of stimulating foreign direct investment.
The inflow of foreign capital continued, reaching a peak of 
Ls 123 million in 1975. Despite, these huge inflows of 
foreign resources, the average utilization of planned public 
investment was 52.4%, while actual expenditure was 16% higher 
than planned expenditure. The Sudanese authorities attributed 
this to escalation of project costs, oil price hikes and a 
20% devaluation of the Sudanese currency in 1972/73.
The plan, nevertheless, achieved some success in that the 
actual real rate of GDP growth was 7.6 % per annum between 
1970 and 1977. But, this impressive growth rate was coupled 
with escalating balance of payments deficits and substantial 
increases in Sudan's foreign debt. For instance, external 
long-term public debt*211 outstanding at the end of year 
increased from US$ 327 million in 1971 to US$ 2 billion in 
1977. This is nearly three times Sudan's export in that year. 
And even worse, with the majority of loans Sudan contracted 
to finance the 7 YP being tied either to the purchase of 
certain commodities or to specific projects, there had been a 
marked imbalance in the distribution of investment 
expenditure among the different sectors of the economy. For 
example, the original 5YP allocated 38.1% to agriculture and 
14% to transport and communications, while the amended one 
gave 32% to the transport sector and only 27% to 
agriculture. Furthermore, the amended plan made no allowance
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for investment in the energy sector.
These shifts in emphasis were to a large extent responsible 
for the structural imbalances underlying the poor performance 
of the Sudanese economy, particularly in the post-plan 
period. Though the transport sector is vital, an integrated 
development plan should consider not only the availability of 
foreign loans to finance projects, but. also how these 
projects would generate foreign exchanges for loan 
repayments. Added to this, the relative neglect of the energy 
sector resulted in acute power shortages, which in turn 
reduced the operating capacity of new as well as on-going 
projects across the economy.
In short, the availability and nature of foreign capital 
did not only determine the amount of investment, but also the 
type of projects executed. And this, together with 
intractable problems of political instability and civil war, 
adversely affected the structure and performance of the 
economy, with cumbersome debt-servicing problems.
3.5.2 The Six-Year Plan: Financing Crises and the End
of Long-term Development Strategies:
The FYP was followed by an ever ambitious plan, the Six- 
Year-Plan (SYP) , 1977/78-1982/83. This plan was set up as
part of a perspective plan (1977/78-1994/95), whose 
fundamental objective was to push the economy into the stage 
of self-sustained growth by means of balanced and accelerated 
growth. This, the plan document states, requires well-studied 
long-run changes in the social and economic structure of the 
country; and the full mobilization of corporate and human 
resources, which should then be optimally used. Use should 
also be made of resources available from oil-producing Arab 
countries, and other advanced countries; Sudan was designated 
the "Breadbasket" of the Arab world, who liked to reduce its 
dependence on food imports from the West.
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The prime quantitative objective of the SYP was to raise 
real GDP by an average annual rate of 7.5% over the plan 
period. Other objectives included: (1) conservation of the
natural resource base of the economy; (2) development and 
transformation of the traditional agricultural subsector; (3) 
industrial expansion, particularly in the sphere of 
agriculturally-based industries; (4)- promotion of 
infrastructure, including transport, communications and 
energy; (5) improvement of the balance of payments situation 
through increased exports and production of import 
substitutes; and (6) embetterment of social services and a 
more equal distribution of income.
Table (3.8.1)
Allocations of Planned Investment Of The SYP (in Ls million)
sector Public Sector Private Sector* Total
Amount o'o Amount % a'o
Agriculture 425 32 290 26 29
Industry, Mining,
and Energy 335 25 200 18 22
Transport and
Communications 320 24 180 16 20
Services 265** 19 430 39 28
Reserve 225*** 14 - - 8.4
Total 1570 100 1100 100 100
Source: As in table (3.7), above, PP.39-41.
Notes: * Includes the semi-private sector which comprises
projects financed jointly by the government of Sudan, Arab 
Agricultural Authority for Development and Investment, and 
the Sudanese private sector; ** Includes social services and 
public administration; *** Not included in the calculation of 
percentage sectoral shares.
The plan, for the first time, recognized rural development 
as a base for the development of the national economy as a
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whole. It had laid special emphasis on regional planning and 
co-operative movements. It had also sought to increase public 
as well as private savings, and suggested measures to 
encourage the ..private sector, both foreign and domestic.
To achieve its targets, the SYP contemplated a total 
investment expenditure of Ls 2,67 0 million, of which Ls 1,57 0 
million was to be made by the public sector and the balance 
(i.e Ls 1100 million) by the private sector. The sectoral 
allocation of both public and private planned investment 
expenditure is shown in table (3.8.1) above. Of total public 
investment 32% was allocated to agriculture, 25% to 
industry, mining, and energy; 24% to transport and 
communications; and 19% to social services. This allocation 
seems to be a sound step towards eradicating the structural 
imbalances, which characterized the FYP1s period. But, 
private investment was, expectedly, concentrated in the 
services sector, especially housing, which claimed 39% of 
total private investment.
An examination of the planned scheme of the financing of 
the six-year-plan indicates that, it was rather 
overoptimistic with regard to the availability of resources, 
both domestic and foreign. This is, particularly, the case 
considering the financing of public investment. The plan 
stipulated that 53% of total public investment would be 
financed from external resources; namely foreign loans and 
grants, and 47% from domestic resources - table (3.8.2) 
below. Of the latter, 61% was planned to be financed from 
public savings at trends in recent years, and additional 
fiscal efforts. The balance (39%) would be financed through 
borrowing from the domestic financial system. It has been 
assumed that over the plan period real GDP would grow at an 
annual average rate of 7.5%, and assuming a modest income- 
elasticity of 1, real public revenue would increase at the 
same rate. The plan also proposed measures to contain the
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rate of growth of public expenditure, in real terms, within 
the limit of 6.6% per annum.
The SYP has, for the first time, recognized borrowing from 
the domestic banking system as a source of -financing public 
investment. A recourse to this source was stipulated at 18% 
of proposed public investment expenditure. To achieve the 
desired increases in public revenue, the plan suggested the 
formation of a fiscal commission to study and devise measures 
to widen tax bases, and to review the rate and structure of 
both direct and indirect taxes. Also, to reduce current 
public expenditure, the plan indicated that a revision of 
public administration, accounting and employment is 
necessary. Be that as it may, the plan document was very 
vague considering the practical measures that should be taken 
if the plan were to be successfully carried out. For 
instance, the only measure indicated by the plan for 
improving the position of public enterprises was to propose 
the establishment of a public enterprise inspection and audit 
agency, which never materialized.
Table (3.8.2)
Sources of Finance for the SYP (public investment)
Source Amount Percentage
(A) Domestic Resources:
1. public savings at recent trends 100 6
2.Borrowing from the financial system 285 18
3. Additional Fiscal efforts 350 23
Total 735 47
(B) Foreign Resources 835 53
Source: Ministry of Finance: The SYP of economic and social 
development 1977/78-1982/83, vol.l, P56.
As for the financing of private investment, foreign 
resources were expected to make up for 50% of total
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investment expenditure, and the rest to be financed from 
private domestic savings. However, the plan suggested that 
the private sector has played a vital role in economic 
activity in . recent years, and should, therefore, be 
encouraged. To mobilize private savings, the plan pointed out 
that the financial system, particularly the insurance 
industry, needs to be promoted. Among other policy 
suggestions, interest rates were proposed to increase to 
reasonable levels. Yet, real interest rates remained 
substantially below zero throughout the plan period.
The imprecision of the plan documents is an indication that 
the plan failed to identify the firm measures by which 
domestic resources may be mobilized, let alone the 
uncertainties surrounding foreign capital inflow. And it was 
precisely for the inadequacy of the financing strategies that 
the plan was declared dead*22) effectively in June 1979.
The plan's policy assumptions regarding public savings 
proved to be impossible to realize because of large increases 
in recurrent public expenditure. In the first two years of 
the plan current public expenditure rose by 28.4% and 29.8% 
respectively, while current revenue growth was quite 
sluggish, with a resultant current budget deficit over a 
number of years. Failure to realize the planned public 
savings entailed an increased borrowing from the banking 
system. Net banking claims on the public sector were Ls 517 
million at the inception of the plan. These claims rose to Ls 
962 million in 1979/80, i.e. increased by Ls 455 million 
against the ceiling of Ls 285 for the entire period of the 
plan.
On top of this, the inflow of foreign resources was below 
the plan estimates (Bank of Sudan Report 1983) . Total 
foreign resources received were Ls 68 million in 1978 and Ls 
230 million in 1979. Yet, these inflows consisted mainly of 
loans granted to Sudan to meet its previous debt servicing
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(i.e. for debt recycling), with the result that gross 
external resources for development purposes*24* were as low as 
Ls 2.5 million and Ls 1.3 million in 1978 and 1979 
respectively... Aid from Arab countries was completely halted 
in 1978 when Sudan became the first member of the Arab League 
to condone the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.
As we have seen in section (3.3.1), the external balance 
was deteriorating largely because of sluggish growth of 
exports. This, together with unforthcoming foreign aid, 
caused delays in the supply of fuels, spare parts and 
machineries and equipment needed for development purposes.
With the major investment projects incorporated in the plan 
proved impossible to undertake, the implementation of the 
plan as a whole, within the limits of available finance, was 
halted by infrastructural bottlenecks*25*, the very obstacles 
the plan had intended to overcome. The existing 
infrastructure, in particular transport, storage facilities, 
irrigation and power supply, proved to be inadequate. And 
even worse, the problem of development was further aggravated 
by local administrative and manpower constraints resulting 
from the rapid out-migration of skilled and semi-skilled 
manpower to the rich oil-exporting countries.
The apparent failure of the SYP to manifest itself in any 
proportion has not only led to an abrupt termination of the 
perspective plan, but also marked the collapse of any form of 
long-sighted development strategy.
As from 197 9 the government embarked on loose three-year 
rolling public investment programmes, which could hardly form 
an integrated development strategy. These programmes which 
covered the period 1978/7 9-1986/87 were based on realized 
financial resources*26*, and eventually made little or no 
effort to mobilize resources for future needs. The planned 
and actual investment expenditures of these programmes are 
summarized in table (3.9). Like those of pre-1960, the three-
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year rolling public investment programmes have neglected the 
private sector altogether. One possible implication of this 
is the lack of coordination between public and private 
economic activities. This suggests a reason for the fact that 
fiscal and monetary policies, interest rates policy notably, 
adopted since then have made no consideration to the healthy 
operations of the private sector, be it real or financial.
These programmes were initiated under the policy advice 
of the IMF and the World Bank (WB) and have, generally, been 
oriented towards reforming the economy, with the specific 
objective of achieving internal and external balances. As 
such they paid special attention to the rehabilitation and 
modernization of the existing schemes. It was claimed that 
the three-year-rolling public investment programmes would 
form a new development strategy; a one of stimulating and 
improving economic performance by enhancing the productive 
capacity of existing projects through vertical rather than 
horizontal integration. As part of the IMF-WB-inspired 
programme of reform, the new strategy was supported by a 
number of measures which included several exchange rate 
adjustments, foreign trade reform, adjustment of production 
relations in the irrigated agricultural subsector, and 
tightening of credit, perhaps, except for the government.
It is difficult to provide a quantitative evaluation of the 
performance of these programmes on their own grounds as there 
were no specific development targets over the period 197 9-
1987. However, a comparison of planned and actual investment 
expenditure on a year-to-year basis indicates that less than 
70% of the moderate total investment allocations were 
realized. And in the light of the SYP’s objectives, the 
envisaged real annual rate of growth of 7.5% turned to a 
negative rate of 0.83%.
Moreover, the public investment programmes failed to 
address the problem of structural imbalances. Infrastructure
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bottlenecks, especially with respect to energy and transport 
and communications, have actually worsened. These are among 
the factors behind the poor performance of the economy as 
discussed in ..section (3.3). As we have pointed out in the 
previous section, the financial constraint was increasingly 
tightening over the period of the public investment 
programmes, and that the deteriorating budget deficit appears 
to have been accommodated mainly through borrowing from the 
domestic banking system.
This could have adversely affected private investment, 
which nevertheless maintained nearly the same percentage rate 
of GDP. However, the composition of private investment was 
geared excessively towards less productive projects, in 
particular services activities, for reasons we have already 
elaborated in section (3.3.2).
To conclude, development planning in Sudan relied 
excessively on foreign sources of finance and failed, at 
least at the level of policy making, to adequately recognize 
the importance of domestic sources for the financing of both 
public and private investments. Nevertheless, the domestic 
financial system, though poorly structured, has made 
substantial contributions to the financing of public 
consumption and development expenditure. But, it seems that 
the resources made available to the government internally as 
well as externally were grossly misallocated, as the 
persistence of structural imbalances and the low rate of 
capital formation may indicate.
3.6. The Domestic Resource Gap and Foreign Capital 
Inflow:
It has been mentioned previously that the SYP and the 
three-year rolling programmes of public investment were 
rather unsuccessful, mainly because they underestimated the 
real magnitude of the resource gap. Both the internal and
82
external resource gaps were higher than their expected 
levels. For the purpose of this study it might be 
constructive to examine the magnitude and trends of the 
domestic resource.gap and attempt to explain the tendency of 
the gap to widen over time.
Over the period 1974-1988, though domestic resources 
contributed substantially to the financing of total 
investment executed, a sizeable proportion of this total was 
left to be met by foreign resources. The relationship between 
the domestic financing gap and the continuing resort to 
foreign resources may be demonstrated in the context of 
national income accounting, where:
3.1 Income = Consumption + Investment + Exports - Imports
Since domestic saving is measured by the difference between 
income and consumption, we obtain:
3.2 Saving = Investment + Exports - Imports
It follows from the above equation that:
3.3 Investment - Savings = Imports - Exports
The difference between investment and saving is known, in 
the literature , as the domestic resource gap, and the
excess of imports over exports as the foreign resource gap.
In the context of planning, the foreign exchange gap measures 
the amount by which the imports required for a given level of 
output exceed the amount of exports that is expected to be 
available at that level of output. Similarly, the domestic 
resource gap is the difference between the volume of required 
investment for a target rate of growth and the amount of 
domestic savings expected to be associated with that growth 
rate.
One of the major objectives of development planning is to 
reconcile the difference between the two gaps. The savings
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gap may be reduced by means of reducing consumption and/or 
promoting savings. Alternatively, it may be possible to lower 
the total investment required per unit of output. This can be 
done by affecting the capital-output ratio through changes in 
the composition of investment projects or by raising the 
productivity of capital inputs. The foreign exchange gap 
could be reduced through exports promotion, reduction of 
imports, or by increased absorption of additional amounts of 
foreign resources.
While there is no reason that the two gaps be equal ex- 
ante, they are necessarily equal ex-post. Growth is said to 
be constrained by the dominant gap. For example, if the 
foreign resource gap is larger than the domestic resource 
gap, then growth would proceed at the highest rate permitted 
by the inflow of foreign resources, and vice versa. But, the 
magnitude of the two gaps is wider the smaller the proportion 
of domestic investment that is financed from domestic 
resources.
Table (3.10) below gives the size of the investment-saving 
gap and the concomitant inflow of foreign resources over the 
period 1977-1987; all variables are measured as percentage of 
GDP. It can be easily seen from the table that the domestic 
resource gap has been increasing, although the investment 
rate was dropping. This indicates the inadequacy of domestic 
savings, which encompass private (household and corporate) 
savings and public savings.
Public savings, as we have seen in section (3.4), have been 
negative almost throughout the period under review. Thus, it 
follows that the private saving rate was much higher than the 
overall rate of savings shown in the aforementioned table. 
The rate of gross domestic saving in Sudan, which maintained 
an annual average of 5.3% of GDP during 1977-1987, is very 
low compared with that of 13.9% for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
18.5% for East Asia for the same period (World
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Tables, 1988/89) . Yet, this very low rate of gross domestic 
savings is not surprising, because of the stupendous 
expansion of private consumption, which means that very 
meagre resources were left for saving formation.
The
TablSL
Domestic Resource Gao and
1..Q) 
Inflow of Foreian Resources (%
of GDP)
Year Foreign Savings* G.D.Savings G.D.Investment
1971--77 5.7 10.8 16.8
1978 5.7 6.3 14.4
1979 4.7 6.6 13.2
1980 8.4 3.4 15.1
1981 10.6 1.0 14.1
1982 14.8 1.2 19.0
1983 4.0 17.4 5.8
1984 6.4 i 6. 5 * 6.7
1985 7.9 16.2 5.0
1986 4.5 13.1 6.0
1987 6.1 1.2 5.0
Source: World Bank, World Tables 1988/89.
Notes: *Foreign savings approximated by the current account
balance. It is worth mentioning that the current account 
balance reported here does not include exports and imports of 
factor services.
During the period under investigation, 94.8% of real annual 
GDP was absorbed by current consumption, leaving on average 
only 5.2% as savings. The literature on consumption (e.g 
Rowan 1983) suggests that high income groups save more, 
proportionately as well as absolutely, than low income 
groups. Private consumption is expected to decrease (or 
increase) relative to wealth, and rise, decline or remain the 
same with interest rate changes. But, it seems that these 
factors have, on the balance, contributed to increased
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consumption in Sudan. This signifies either that the high 
income group is very small relative to the rest, or that 
various income groups have similar and high consumption 
propensities, ..which is more likely to be the case.
It is generally acknowledged that due to soaring inflation, 
there has been a marked skewness in the distribution of 
income in Sudan, but this was associated with comparable 
increases in the consumption propensities of the beneficiary 
classes. For example, M. Diab (1985) demonstrated that the 
1978 devaluation-induced inflation has resulted in an 
increase in income from profits of 6%, while real income from 
wages has declined by 4.5%. And in the same post-devaluation 
period, consumption from wages slipped by 4.2%, whereas that 
from profits rose by 6.2%.
There are, therefore, reasons for the poor private savings 
performance vis-a-vis the consumption behaviour of various 
income groups. The poor classes of the population, with too 
little income, both in absolute and relative terms, can 
hardly afford the basic necessities of living. On the other 
hand, the relatively rich classes opting for bushy styles of 
living, perhaps as a result of international demonstration 
effects, have also maintained a high propensity to consume.
Apart from that, the negative real rates of interest, 
characteristics of a substantial part of the period 
considered, have possibly fostered consumption as against 
savings, particularly on part of the rich groups. Negative 
real rates of interest would discourage accumulation of 
savings both on the part of households and businesses. 
Households would be less inclined to save, at least in the 
form of financial assets, because the real value of their 
savings will decline as long as real interest rates are below 
zero. Meanwhile, cheap bank loans with easy access signal a 
strong incentive for businessmen not to save. The outcome of 
all these factors(29) would be an accentuated consumption
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behaviour, poor domestic savings rate, and excessive reliance 
on foreign savings; external debt of Sudan was US$ 8 billion 
in 1984, and soon reached $ 11.9 by 1988 (Bank of Sudan
Report, 1988, -P. 45) .
By way of conclusion, the public sector has a tendency to 
dissave while the private sector has a low propensity to 
save; and that the level of domestic savings continued to 
fall short of desired investment. Fiscal policies failed to 
restrain private consumtion, but fostered that of the public 
sector, while monetary policy may have actually favoured 
consumption via negative real rates of interest.
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks:
The main objective of this chapter was to evaluate the 
performance of the Sudanese economy over the last two 
decades, and discuss development policies and problems.
Starting with.the economic potential and structure, it is 
obvious that the country is well endowed with various types 
of resources. However, most of these resources are still 
idle, or underutilized; and the economy was, thus, unable to 
transform its underdeveloped structure, which continued to 
present a challenge to development action. The structure is 
characterized by poor infrastructure, and marked sectoral 
imbalances in favour of less productive sectors.
The performance of the economy, measured by real GDP 
growth, was unsatisfactory over most of the period studied, 
and has been in the decline throughout the 1980s period. 
Despite the presence of huge unemployed resources, aggregate 
demand continued to exceed output, causing severe 
inflationary pressures in the economy. This was accompanied 
with sizeable external and internal imbalances.
The discussion in this chapter showed that the public 
sector maintained high and rising deficits, and that the tax 
system failed to raise enough revenues for the government to
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curtail these deficits. Hence, the government relied heavily 
on internal as well as external borrowing to finance its 
deficits.
Although foreign resources were easily available in the 
early and mid 1970s, this merely helped to generate a 
malformed economic structure. Foreign resources, together 
with those made available domestically, were grossly 
misallocated, either because of the nature of foreign 
capital, or failure on part of the government to contain its 
current expenditure. The former adversely affected the 
composition of investment projects undertaken, while the 
latter reduced the volume of investment.
With marked decline in the availability of foreign capital 
on the one hand, and investible resources in general, on the 
other, long-term development planning became impractical. 
Since the premature termination of the Six-Year Plan in 1979, 
there has been no well-studied integrated development 
strategy.
Though domestic absorption was increasing relative to GDP, 
it has been falling in real terms. But domestic capital 
formation was declining in both absolute and relative terms. 
For the country to move towards self-reliance, which is 
inevitable in the future, the government ought to take 
effective measures to tap resources for investment, and to 
allocate these resources as productively as possible.
It seems that the private sector has come to play an 
increasingly important role in the process of development. 
Private savings were much higher than public savings over the 
entire period considered. Moreover, the domestic financial 
system, besides accommodating the needs of the private 
sector, has been the main provider of funds for the financing 
of public deficits. This was true in spite of the fact that 
the financial sector is not well structured, and that 
government policies have failed to recognize the strategic
88
role" of this sector, and consider ways of promoting it.
It therefore seems that the development of the domestic 
financial system is necessary if the country is to reduce its 
dependence on foreign resources, and progre-ss towards self- 
reliance and self-sustained growth. Meanwhile, it might be of 
strategic significance that public sector investment efforts 
be oriented towards elevating the infratructural bottlenecks, 
which cannot be catered for by private investors. Provided 
that an adequate infrastructure, particularly in the sphere 
of transport and energy, exists the private sector may play a 
more profound role in real capital formation.
Notes:
1. Several studies have stressed the richness of Sudan in terms of its 
natural resources- see e.g. Ali (1984), PP.6-8.
2. The economic Survey 1988/89, P.29.
3. In A. Ali (ibid).
4. Recent estimates by the department of statistics, in the Economic 
Survey 1988/89, P.1.
5. Gurdon (1985) analysed the efforts done in the area of oil 
explorations, and concluded that the country has substantial oil 
resources, PP.76-86.
6. Sudan has been classified as a low income developing country by the 
World Bank in World Debt Tables: external debt of developing countries. 
1988/89 edition, Washington D.C.
7. According to the Economic Survey 1988/89, P.90.
8. A detailed study by Abu Affan (1985) also indicates that the 
manufacturing subsector has remained virtually a light consumer goods 
producer.
9. See e.g The World in figures (1984), editorial Information compiled 
by the Economist Magazine, England, pp.64-96.
10. It should be mentioned here that Sudan is lacking comprehensive data 
gathering by the government and semi-official agencies. This creates 
some data gaps, which are more serious with regard to the private 
sector's statistics. Different sources may provide, somehow, different 
figures. To achieve some uniformity of data, we have tried to rely as 
far as possible on one source of data.
11. The government, with the help of the I.M.F., embarked on a programme 
for stabilization and economic recovery. This included a package of 
measures for economic adjustment carried out over the period 1978-1984. 
For details of the programme see Ali (1985).
12. The economic survey 1986/87, P.206.
13. Investment in the services sector is highly attractive because of 
its relatively small capital requirements, short production cycles which 
mean quick pay back, as well as ease to enter, leave or move within the 
sector.
14. The Economic purvey 1983/84, PP.30-38; 1986/87, P P . 30-43; and 
1988/89, PP.41-46.
15. Ministry of Finance (1987): Macroeconomic Task Force, P.8.
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16. Current public expenditure is made up mainly of wages and salaries 
due to overstaffing of government departments, which are very 
inefficient (El-Jack,1986).
17. I.M.F diagnosis in Ali (1985), P. 18.
18. Lees and Brooks (1977) survey the factors behind the failure of the 
TYP, PP.127-130.
19. For a- further discussion of the nationalization and d e ­
nationalization measures see Hussein (1983).
20. Hussein (ibid).
21. Figures on Sudan foreign debt are taken from World Tables,1988/89, 
PP.538-539.
22. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1983, PP.101-106, gives a summary of the 
reasons behind the failure of the SYP.
23. Figures calculated by Bank of Sudan in its Annual Report 1980, 
PP.55.
24. Ministry of Finance (1981): The Three year public investment 
programme, P.40.
25. The same source as in 24 above.
26. As in note 24 above.
27. As in note number 11 above.
28. See e.g Thirlwall (1983), P.289.
29. The importance of these, and other, factors influencing Sudanese 
consumption propensities is quantitatively examined in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 4
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONS
OF THE BANKING SECTOR
4.1. Introduction:
It has been shown in the previous chapter, that the Sudanese 
economy suffered from alarming internal and external 
imbalances over the last decade, though the domestic 
financial system has contributed substantially to the 
financing of public deficits. The analysis there, however, 
dealt mainly with the public sector, whereas the focus of 
this chapter will be on the private sector.
The prime objective of this chapter is to examine the 
evolution and structure of the Sudanese financial system, and 
its contribution to monetary growth as well as real economic 
development. In particular, the chapter attempts to evaluate 
the function of the central bank in promoting and regulating 
financial markets, and the role of commercial and development 
banks in the mobilization and application of investible 
resources. The chapter, then, discusses and assesses the 
efficiency of monetary and credit policies implemented over 
the period of this study. The theory and practice of Islamic 
banks, which form a distinct category of commercial banks, is 
investigated in chapter 5, whereas the operations of non-bank 
financial intermediaries will be discussed in chapter 6.
The chapter demonstrates that commercial banks have 
contributed to a remarkable financialization of savings. But, 
it is also argued that commercial banks tend to behave in the 
same manner of concentrating excessively on short-term 
lending, whether they are regulated or free from interest 
rate and other restrictions. Moreover, recent monetary and 
credit policies in Sudan, far from encouraging development 
finance, have impaired the growth of financial
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intermediation, and induced banks to focus more exclusively 
on short-term activities, which might be more inflationary. 
It is argued, therefore, that there is a need for banking 
regulation, which ought to be genuine.
The rest of the chapter is divided into 6 sections. Section 
(4.2), examines the historical development and the present 
structure of the financial system. Section (4.3), considers 
the character and performance of the central bank, while 
section (4.4), deals with the deposit and credit operations 
of commercial banks. The analysis, here, also draws on the 
findings of interviews conducted with senior research 
Officials in these banks. Section (4.5), evaluates the 
experience of specialized banks, and the Post Office Savings 
Deposit Bank. In section (4.6), the monetary and credit 
policies adopted, particularly over the last decade are 
discussed, and critically evaluated. Finally, section (4.7) 
gives a summary and concluding remarks.
4.2 Evolution and Structure of the Financial System 
and its Impact on Liquidity
4.2.1 Evolution and Structure:
Since the fall of Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian rule in
1898, and up to independence in 1956, the currencies in
circulation were the Egyptian Pound and British notes and
coins(1). This currency system was accompanied by a banking 
system consisted of six commercial banks, all of which were 
of foreign origin.
Immediately after independence, the Sudanese Currency Board 
was set up to issue the first new Sudanese Currency in 1957. 
Foreign currencies were, then, gradually replaced by Sudanese 
notes and coins, and completely disappeared from circulation 
the following year. But, the banking system continued to be 
dominated by foreign banks. An important feature of this
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banking system was that banks were not regulated, and as such
they were free to carry on providing services in connection
with colonial objectives. For these banks, national economic 
interest was- of little importance, and they remained 
exclusively within the boundaries of the modern sector in 
general, and foreign trade in particular.
To bring the banking system under control-, and in line with 
national interest, the central bank of Sudan Act*2* was passed 
in 1959 and the bank (Bank of Sudan) commenced operations in 
1960. The main function of the bank, then, was to free 
domestic money and banks from foreign domination, and to help
developing a sound monetary and credit system.
The central bank, however, managed to free the Sudanese 
currency, which was directly linked to the Pound Sterling. 
With respect to the development of the banking industry, the 
central bank, besides a number of branches it has inherited 
from the national bank of Egypt, has, by 1964, opened 7 
branches in provincial capitals, and another branch and a 
clearing house in Khartoum. Moreover, by 1966, the central 
bank helped establishing three specialized banks and two 
national commercial banks. Nevertheless, up until 1970 
commercial banks were dominated by foreign capital and 
expertise.
In 1970, all commercial banks and some other deposit-taking 
institutions were nationalized^) . This development was part 
of the then pro-socialist government strategy to tap 4'/ 
financial resources, and allocate them in a more efficient 
pattern from a national economic point of view. The size of 
the banking sector was limited to 5 commercial banks, and 3 
development banks, which were all under the ownership and 
control of the central bank.
However, the nationalization Act was abandoned in 1972 and 
replaced by a series of de-nationalization strategies, which 
encouraged the establishment of private banks, both foreign
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and domestic. The period 1973-1979 witnessed a relaxation of 
banking control as the central bank's Act was amended twice 
to give extra legislative power to the Minister of Finance 
regarding credit control and licensing of new banks and 
banks' branches. As a result, the number of banks increased
from 8 in 1973 to 14 by 1979.
But, a considerable boost to the expansion of the banking 
network was yet to come. Throughout the period from its 
incorporation and up to 1979, the central bank, in
coordination with the Ministry of Finance assumed full 
control and regulation of the exchange rate as well as
foreign exchange transactions. Commercial banks were required 
to refer to a foreign exchanges Committee, set up by the 
bank, each and every transaction involving foreign exchanges 
over a certain m a x i m u m ^ )  . Accordingly, commercial banks whose 
lending was dominated by the financing of foreign trade were 
restricted.
In 1979 a foreign exchanges deregulation A c t (5) was passed, 
and banks as well as individuals were allowed to freely 
transact in foreign currencies. The Act also permitted the 
establishment of private foreign exchange bureaus, which were 
to operate in a free foreign exchange market. This inspired 
banks, business groups, and even individuals to set up their 
own bureaus, provided the unlimited profits which could be 
reaped merely from the buying and selling of foreign 
currencies, let alone the thrust this may give to foreign 
trade, which was also liberalized to a greater extent. 
Following these developments, the number of banks had nearly 
doubled by 1986, while the increase in banks' branches over 
the same period was much less impressive.
Another and equally important reason for the rapid 
expansion of banks was the increasing resurgence of Islamic 
ideals, which was manifested in the establishment of banks 
that operate according to Islamic principles of finance. The
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first Islamic bank was opened in 1978, and was soon followed 
by another 5 Islamic banks, which all consider fixed interest 
rates as illegal.
The discussion, so far, has been confined to banking 
institutions. But, in addition to banks, the present 
financial system of Sudan comprises 5 investment and holding 
companies, 16 insurance companies, and a .pension fund. The 
banking sector, however, accounts for over 80% of the total 
assets of the financial system and, therefore, dominates its 
entire structure. The central bank is on the top of the 
banking structure, which consists of 23 commercial banks; 4 
specialized banks; and a post office savings deposit bank. 
Five of the commercial banks are government-controlled; 12 
jointly owned by the private and public sectors, but 
dominated by private capital; and 6 are branches of foreign 
banks. Six of the joint banks were established on strict 
Islamic principles. One implication of this large number of 
banks could be increased competition among them, but 
considerable diseconomies of scale may exist, entailing a 
less efficient banking system.
Be that as it may, this large number of banks is supported 
by just 315 branches in 1988, with a marked concentration in 
a few urban centres. As table (4.1) above indicates, the 
geographical dispersal of banks makes their services highly 
inaccessible to citizens in some provinces. The number of 
population per bank’s branch ranged between 20,000 in 
Khartoum to 353,000 in the Southern Region. This suggests 
that banks can only play a limited role in the spread of 
banking habits and economic transformation via monetization 
and financialization of savings in remote provinces.
4.2.2 The Financial Sector and Liquidity Growth:
In general, however, the formal financial sector has 
contributed substantially to the growth of liquidity over the
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last three decades, as depicted in table (4.2) above. This 
table contains data on money supply and its components, GDP, 
and price level changes. Money supply is both narrowly 
defined as (currency and demand deposits) and more broadly 
defined as M2 (M^  plus time and saving deposits).
As we have seen previously, there are many indicators of 
the degree of a country's financial development, and that the 
focus of the literature has been on the ratio of M^ or M2 to 
GDP. The level of financial development in Sudan, and in many 
other LDC's, may be closely approximated by the ratio of real 
M2 to GDP. The use of M2 is justified on the grounds of its 
overwhelming proportion in the volume of outstanding 
financial assets of the non-bank private sector.
In addition to the ratio of real M2 to GDP, or the 
Financial Interrelations Ratio, FIR, table (4.2) presents the 
ratio of quasi-money to M2, FI2, as an indicator of financial 
deepening. This ratio has a particular importance in the 
context of economic development because it reflects the 
ability of the banking sector to create, especially? medium 
and long-term credit (Vogel and Buser, 1976) . That is, 
financial development is more likely to be growth-promoting, 
if it is accompanied by an increasing share of relatively 
stable financial assets such as time and saving deposits in 
total money stock.
It can be, easily, seen from the aforementioned table that 
FIR was, generally, increasing over time, starting from the 
minimum of 12% in 1960 to the maximum of 52% in 1985. 
Similarly, FI2 varied between 5% in 1960 and 32% in 1985. The 
temporal behaviour of the two ratios is depicted in figure 
(4.1), in which FIR exhibits three identifiable trends. These 
patterns of behaviour correspond roughly to the sub-periods 
1960-70, 1971-77, and 1978-88.
In the first sub-period, FIR was generally rising at a 
steady and low rate. The 1960s era represents the early
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stages of monetization of the Sudanese economy, during which 
the rate of monetary expansion was slightly ahead of that of 
real GDP. FIR was relatively stable over the.sub-period 1971- 
1977, which was characterized by a moderate and stable rate 
of price change as well as a low, but declining rate of 
growth. Moreover, it is understandable that the assets of the 
financial sector were not growing relative to GDP, since it 
was subjected to nationalization and a host of destabilizing 
economic policies. In contrast during 1978-1988, FIR had been 
steeply increasing, reaching 52% in 1985. However, though the 
Sudanese economy became more fully monetized or financially 
developed during this period, the overall real rate of 
economic growth was negative, averaging 0.82% per annum. It 
is , therefore, not straightforward to draw any conclusion 
concerning the economic impact of such development.
Figure (4.1)
Some Indicators of Financial Development
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It may be interesting to compare the periodic behaviour of 
FIR and FI2. The latter, though increasing, was generally 
stable over the entire period under review. But, it was 
remarkably high in 1963, 1968 and in the sub-period 1983-86. 
The increases in FI2 in the first two years were attributed^) 
to relatively high real interest rates brought about by an 
upward adjustment of nominal .rates. Conversely, FI2 remained 
stable between 1978 and 1982 due to rigid nominal interest 
structure and relatively high inflation rates. There is a 
tendency for the two ratios to vary in the same direction 
over a number of years, i.e. changes in the ratio of time and 
saving deposits to M2 seem to coincide with similar changes 
in M2 relative to GDP. This suggests that the degree of 
substitution between income-earning and non-interest-bearing 
financial assets is rather weak.
To examine the causal link between money and credit on the 
one hand, and output on the other, we have applied the 
Granger's causality test, which was introduced in chapter 1. 
Money is measured as above by M£/ which shows the real size 
of the financial sector, credit, C, represents total bank 
advances to the private sector, and output is measured by 
GDP; all variables being measured in 1980 constant prices and 
in log-form. The data cover the period 1960-88, and the test 
was applied with a maximum of 3 periods lag. The regression 
equations are not reported here, but the summary statistics 
form of the causality test is shown in table (4.3) below.
The results of the test suggest that there is only one 
significant causal link running from M2 to GDP. This supply- 
leading finance implied by the test, however, has little 
support from the behaviour of the FIR, which was generally 
rising though real output was falling over a considerable 
period of time. An in depth investigation of the economic 
impact of the growth of financial intermediation would 
require an examination of the size and nature of deposit and
100
credit facilities of financial institutions. But, first, we 
discuss below the part played by the central bank in 
promoting monetary growth and stability.
Table (4.3)
Causal Relations Between Money, Credit and Output
Regression equation_________________________ F~test_—
GDP on M2 4.37*
M2 on GDP 0.31
GDP on C 2.09
C on GDP__________________________________ 0. 66
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, with (3,19) 
degrees of freedom
4.3 The Central Bank: Objectives, Power, and
Operations;
4.3.1 Objectives and Power:
The central bank commenced operations in 1960, as a 
corporate body, with an authorized capital of Ls 1.5 mn, 
fully paid by the government. This, together with reserves, 
increased to Ls 59 mn by 1987. The main objectives of the 
bank of Sudan, in common with central banks in general, are: 
(1) to regulate the issue of notes and coins; (2) to help 
developing and maintaining a sound monetary, credit and 
banking system, with a view to orderly and balanced economic 
development of the country; (3) to sustain the external 
balance, and stability of the currency; and (4) to serve as a 
banker and financial advisor to the government^).
To carry out its functions, the central bank is entrusted 
with the sole right of currency issue, and empowered, first, 
to formulate and implement, in connection with the Ministry 
of Finance, monetary and credit policy. Second, to promote 
and develop domestic money and capital markets. The bank may 
subscribe to, buy, hold or sell shares, of any enterprise,
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the participation in or the initiation of which is generally 
in the interest of the national economy (Article, 64). Third, 
to regulate and supervise the activities of commercial banks. 
The bank has the power to issue and enforce instructions to 
commercial banks or any person who carries out banking 
business. In addition, the central bank controls the issue of 
licenses for new banks and banks' branches, and acts as 
lender of last resort. Fourth, to act as a depository and 
manager of the official foreign reserves of the country. 
Finally, to participate in the management of the balance of 
payments, and foreign exchanges of the country. Here, the 
central bank determines the exchange rate for the Sudanese 
pound, administers allocation of import licenses as well as 
foreign exchanges, and monitors capital transactions and 
official debt-servicing.
The internal concern of the bank of Sudan, in recent years, 
has, largely, been the control of money supply in general and 
credit in particular in the interest of stabilization and 
development. In this respect, the bank of Sudan Act, besides 
enabling it to restrain lending by commercial banks, sets 
statutory limits on its lending to the government. However, 
the bank is vulnerable to pressures by the government, which 
has, frequently, bypassed its Act. The effective control of 
the bank's activities by the government is ensured by section 
20 of the Act, which reads:
"The President of the Republic, after consultation 
with the Board, may from time to time give the Board 
directives of a general character as to the exercise by 
the Board of its functions provided for in this Act or 
in any other Act in matters, which appear to the 
President to affect the national interest; and the Board 
shall carry out such instructions" (P.12).
This clearly enables the government to undermine the bank's
102
position as a corporate independent entity, and as we shall 
see below, this has considerably influenced its ability to 
meet its policy objectives.
4.3.2 Banking Operations of the Central Bank:
Besides its role in the design and execution of monetary 
and credit policy, and promotion of the financial system, the 
central bank is engaged in various banking activities. The 
most important of these are issue of currency, and financial 
relations with the government, public agencies and commercial 
banks and the management of external reserves. The operations 
of the bank of Sudan in selected years over the period 1970- 
1988 are summarized in tables (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) below. The 
liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet - table (4.4.1) 
- reveals that: (1) there are huge increases in currency
issue, which maintained an average annual rate of growth of 
43% over the period 1978-1988. (2) Local banks’ deposits
have, substantially, risen particularly between 1981 and
1988. This reflects increases in reserve requirements, and 
recent procedures which require commercial banks to redeposit 
their liabilities to foreign suppliers in frozen accounts 
with the central bank, until the latter is able to transfer 
them in foreign currencies. (3) In contrast, government 
deposits in the 1980s are sinking deep in the red. These 
increased by 73% in 1987, and recorded a total overdraft of 
nearly six billion Sudanese pounds; because these overdrafts
are supposed to be of a very short-term nature, they appear
■ _j
on the liabilities side of the central bank balance sheet. 
(4) The bank' capital and reserves also increased to Ls 73 mn 
in 1988, but they represented just 0.6% of its budget. Other 
liabilities have also been rising considerably.
On the assets side, the figures in table (4.4.2) suggest 
that: (1) Net foreign assets have been sharply declining, 
reflecting the recurring balance of payments deficits, and
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cancellation of payments agreement in 1987, which added to 
meagre holdings of foreign currencies and reserves by 
commercial banks and the central bank as well. Net foreign 
assets held by the Bank of Sudan in 1988 stood at 0.7% of its
budget. (2) lending to the private sector, however, remained
low and relatively stable over the 1980s. 3. While currency 
issue dominates the liabilities side, long-term and temporary 
advances to the government overshadow the assets side, 
increasing from Ls 25 million in 1970 to Ls 757 million in 
1978, and Ls 5.5 billion in 1988. (4) other accounts also
increased in line with other liabilities. It deserves noting 
that the central bank has substantial participations in the 
capitals of banks, and other financial institutions, besides 
large holdings of non-transferable treasury bills, which 
amounted to Ls 3,122 mn in 1988.
The figures reported in the two tables indicate that 
advances and overdraft facilities to the government were Ls 
11 billion at 1988, reflecting the weak financial position of 
the country, where currency issue, and borrowing from the 
banking sector are the major sources of financial support to 
the public sector. This, coupled with net foreign assets 
holdings of 0.6% of the central bank's budget as at 1988, and 
sizeable external deficits, signals the seriousness of the 
economic difficulties faced by the country, for which urgent 
solutions should be sought.
In assessing the role of the central bank, it is the 
success or failure in the bank's pursual of monetary and 
credit policy to consider. Writing on this issue, Ali (1975) 
stresses that one faces the bank's own confession of having 
being passive in the period 1960-70, because it had confined 
itself to the simple task of expanding or restricting credit 
depending on whether the economy was booming or troughing 
(P.149). Be that as it may, the bank's passiveness in policy
making and implementation increased since then, and little
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accomplishments were made.
The basic functions of the bank, as repeatedly outlined in 
its policy agenda in recent years, are the control of money 
supply in order to curb inflation, and assure balance of 
payments equilibrium, and direction of banking facilities to 
the most productive economic activities. To approach these 
ends, the bank relies largely on two instruments: credit
control and interest rate policy. Be they effective or not, 
these instruments were mainly intended to circumvent, and 
rationalize the use of, credit to the private sector, whereas 
the bulk of increases in money supply was accounted for by 
the public sector's borrowing from the banking system. And 
irrespective of the debate over the economic impact of public 
borrowing, this was associated with a high and escalating 
rate of inflation, deteriorating balance of payment position, 
and falling rates of real output growth, particularly between 
1978 and 1988- see chapter 3.
The original Bank of Sudan's Act pledges that temporary 
advances to the government should not exceed 10% of its 
estimated current revenue and that these loans are repayable 
within the first sixth months of the following fiscal year 
(section 57) . However, the Act was amended several times to 
allow increased borrowing by the public sector in order to 
bridge its current and development budget deficits. In 1975, 
section 57 was amended, allowing temporary loans to the 
government to be transferable to long-term debt repayable 
within ten years. Moreover, advances to finance public 
projects that have a direct bearing on production, may, after 
the direction of the President of the Republic, be granted 
under section (57b). Initially, advances under section 57, to 
the government and public agencies were not to exceed 15% of 
estimated current government revenue. In subsequent 
amendments of the Act, advances to public entities under 
section 57b are not deductible from the government ceiling.
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The Bank of Sudan's Act, as amended up to 1983, renders the 
statutory limits on lending to the government and public 
entities indefinable, and the distinction between temporary 
and long-term-advances rather vague. This is the case because 
long-term loans are not tied to a well-defined category of 
projects, but subject to the Minister of Finance discretion, 
while short-term loans, by the virtue" of the Act, are 
transferable into long-term advances. As a result, the net. 
position of the public sector with the central bank 
deteriorated from an indebtedness of Ls 704 mn in 1978 to Ls 
5.6 billion in 1988. In relation to estimated government 
revenue, this maintained an average of 116% over the same 
period.
Table (4.5)
Sources of change in Money Supply (MS) : 1978-1988 (in Ls mn).
-
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Change in MS 
Net Foreign
141 214 182 387 440 975 412 1447 1967 2267 2680
Assets
Domestic Assets: 
l.Net Claims on
-26 17 -78 -119 -495--1350 -44 -282 16.1 -1097 -5098
public sector 
2.Net Claims on
141 191 113 278 126 322 -164 264 2411 2555 2625
private sector 54 89 119 173 238 494 259 292 504 519 465
Net other claims -28 -82 28 56 566 1508 361 -1204 -965 -290 -150
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various volumes.
Notes: Money supply is broadly defined as M2/ and its 
components may not add to total because of rounding.
Being unable to control its own lending to the public 
sector, the central bank was not in the position to restrain 
borrowing by public entities from the financial sector as a 
whole, and this added considerably to total domestic 
borrowing by the public sector. The impact of this on money
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supply is patently evident in table (4.5) above, which 
reveals that public borrowing from the banking sector was the 
largest source of expansion in liquidity, while net private 
borrowing was much lower, both in absolute and relative 
terms. This was particularly the case between 1985 and 1988. 
However, the persistent rise in liquidity seems to be 
mitigated by continuous fall in the banking system's net 
foreign assets.
Aside from the controllability of money supply, the central 
bank had been marginalized in exchange rate and balance of 
payments policy-formulation. Exchange rate policy has, often, 
been drawn by the Minister of Finance without prior studies, 
or consultation with the Bank of Sudan (Habib, 1984, P.21). 
Moreover, regarding control over commercial banks, the 
central bank role as postulated in its Act, has been 
overruled not only by direct presidential or ministerial 
intervention, but also by the size, structure and recent 
legislative developments in the banking system. There are 
more than 27 banks operating in the country, and these 
include, commercial banks, development banks, and joint and 
foreign banks. The supervision of such varied type of banks 
requires huge human and non-human resources on the part of 
the central bank, which even if provided may lack the 
required skills. Again, and most important, the application 
of the provisions of the central bank's Act, which was drawn 
on the principles of conventional banking, to Islamic banks 
was made redundant in several respects. For example, interest 
rate policy does not apply to Islamic banks, which are not 
subject to any restriction in their policy toward returns on 
deposits and loans. Thus, the central bank can exercise 
effective control over just part of the banking system. 
Inspite of the Islamization of the entire financial system in 
1984, the central bank Act remained untouched. This clearly 
indicates that the central bank is out of tune with the
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developments taking place in the system it is supposed to 
head.
As a consequence of all these, the central bank's monetary 
and credit policy over the last decade was either ambiguous 
in several respects or contradictory with regard to the two 
sides of the dual banking system; Islamic and conventional 
banks.
4 . 4 Commercial Banks:
Inspite of their alleged inaccessibility, commercial banks 
are the major mobilizers of financial savings in developing 
countries (Kitchen, 1986, P. 120). Sudan is no exception in 
that commercial banks account for over 80% of total financial 
savings, and represent the main source of credit to the 
private sector, and that other financial intermediaries are 
yet to be well developed. This section studies the activities 
of commercial banks in Sudan over the period under review. 
Besides considerations of the impact of monetary and credit 
policy on banking performance, and examining their sources 
and uses of funds, we supplement our analysis of the role 
played by banks with the findings of interviews(8) conducted 
with senior Officials in a sample of commercial banks.
It might be instructive, first, to note the contribution of 
commercial banks in the process of financial widening and 
deepening in the country. The former concept refers to the 
accessibility of financial services and the spread of banking 
habits among the public, which depend, largely, on the 
geographical dispersal of banks. As we have indicated 
earlier, commercial banks, among other banks, are 
concentrated in a few urban centres and hardly penetrated 
rural enclaves; this gives added importance to informal 
finance in most parts of the country, and for a wide segment 
of the population. Meanwhile, non-bank financial institutions 
are much less organized, and hardly known by average
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citizens. Financial deepening is concerned with the nature, 
range and sophistication of financial instruments used and 
innovations made in the course of attracting funds and 
extending credit. This will be highlighted throughout the 
rest of the present section, and in chapter 5.
4.4.1 Deposit Activities of Commercial. Banks:
The growth and origin of commercial banks’ deposits in 
selected years over the period 1960-1988 is shown in table 
(4.6) below. From the time of independence and up to 1966, 
commercial banks deposits consisted largely of government 
deposits and deposits made by expatriate and local business 
firms. After the incorporation of the central bank, 
government deposits were, gradually, shifted away from 
commercial banks, to decline from 45% of their total deposits 
in 1960 to 3.5% in 1966. Since then, the deposit liabilities 
of commercial banks have been dominated by private deposits, 
which varied between 83% and 97% of total deposits. Moreover 
private deposits were also rising, in absolute terms, 
throughout the period considered, but they recorded 
exceptionally high rates of growth in some years.
Although the authorities in the central bank tend to 
attribute deposit changes in relevant years to interest rates 
adjustment, the relative importance of the interest rate is 
not straightforward as it also tends to influence banks’ 
credit (see chapter 7). Moreover, although the real rate of 
interest was positive during the period 1960-75, deposits 
grew more rapidly in later years when it was either negative 
or closer to zero. In addition to the rate of interest, 
changes in deposits may be brought about by variations in 
output and income, and inflation in particular. The rate of 
growth of total deposits was notably high in 1985, reaching 
75%. In this year, agricultural output, in particular, 
recovered remarkably after acute drought and widespread crop
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Table 14.. 6).
Growth, and Origin of Commercial Banks Deposits in Selected
Years: 1960-1988 (in Ls mn)
Year Government Deposits Private Deposits Total
Amount 1 Amount % Amount %chancre
1960 13.6 44.7 16.9 55.3 30.5
1965 2.2 6.2 32.7 93.8 . 34.9 14.4
1970 2.2 3.9 54.9 96.1 57.1 63.6
1975 6.0 3.5 166.0 96.5 171.9 201.1
1978 23.1 5.4 405.3 94.6 428.4 149.2
1979 19.3 3.5 528.8 96.5 548.1 27.9
1980 25.2 3.5 694.8 96.5 720.0 31.4
1981 34 .1 3.6 908.5 96.4 942.6 30.9
1982 34.5 2.6 1306.0 97.4 1339.6 42.5
1983 72.3 4.1 1709.0 95. 9 1781.3 32.9
1984 99.5 4.8 1964.1 95.2 2063.6 14.5
1985 341.8 9.8 3280.1 90.2 3622.6 75.5
1986 688.7 17.4 4 4 4 8.0 82.6 5136.7 41.8
1987 1120.5 15.6 6047 .3 84.4 7167.8 39.5
1988 1099.2 12.8 7500.1 87 .2 8599.3 20.0
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1978, PP.128-129, and 
1988, PP.106-107.
failure in 1984. Besides interest rate increases, the rise in 
deposits in 1985 was attributed to "marked-spread in 
commercial banks’ branches, slackening of business activities 
in the private sector, and increases in salaries and wages of 
the public sector employees in that year" (Bank of Sudan 
Report, 1985, P.61). The slowdown in business activities, 
together with binding credit ceilings, meant that the 
increase in deposits was not reflected in the assets side of 
banks' balance sheet in the form of higher credits, but 
rather in the form of increased total reserves; total banks' 
advances stood at just 49% of their total deposits in 1985. 
On another outlook, it appears that the overall trend of 
deposits is not significantly influenced by the advent of 
Islamic banks, and abolition of interest rates. Total
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deposits rose by an annual average of 116% between 1970 and 
1980, and by 109% during 1980-1988.
Table (4.7)
A na lys is  o f Commerci a l -Banks Depos i ts  in  , Se lected  Year.s.i
1960-1988
Year Current Deposits Time and Savina Deposits
Amount % Amount g.'o
1960 26.1 85.6 4.4 14.4
1965 28.4 81.4 6.5 18.6
1970 43.5 76.2 13.6 23.8
1975 124.3 72.3 47 . 6 27.7
1978 301.3 70.3 127 . 4 29.7
1979 402.4 73.4 145.7 26.6
1980 553.3 76.8 166.7 23.2
1981 673.5 71.5 269.0 28.5
1982 909.3 67.9 430.3 32.1
1983 1157 .0 64.9 624.4 35.1
1984 1383.0 67.0 680. 6 33.0
1985 2754 .7 76.0 867.8 24.0
1986 3299.8 64.2 1837 .1 35.8
1987 4753.4 66.3 2414 .3 33.7
1988 5843.1 67.9 2756.2 32.1
Source: As in table (4.6) above..
The consideration of interest-elasticity of deposits, and 
their appropriateness for development financing begs their 
breakdown by type, as displayed in table (4.7) above. This 
table shows the dominance of checking deposits over time and 
saving deposits. Nevertheless, time and saving deposits have 
been rising relative to total deposits; they increased from 
14% in 1960 to 24% in 1970 and to 35% in 1983. In.contrast,
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the share of current deposits was generally falling, but 
tended to remain stationary over the 1980s, and this was 
attributable to the strict credit ceiling policy, which 
discourages commercial banks from accepting interest-bearing 
deposits. According to interviews with bankers, since the 
1983 credit Act, the very acceptance of such deposits was 
generally based on whether or not the individual bank credit 
ceiling permits their utilization.
Aside from the composition of their deposits, commercial 
banks have contributed to a remarkable financialization of 
savings, which rose from 7.5% of GDP in 1970 to 14.5% in 
1980, and 23,3% in 1986. This means that even if banks have 
not influenced the overall rate of savings in the country, 
they have helped to transform their structure in a manner 
that could allow a more productive use of them to be made.
4.4.2 Credit Performance of Commercial Banks:
Table (4.8) below contains data on total advances by 
commercial banks in selected years over the period 1960-1988, 
and their nature and allocation among various economic 
sectors. In line with their deposits, commercial banks' 
advances maintained a consistent upward trend. But, bank 
lending is, heavily, geared towards short-term credit, which 
represented over 80% of total loans between 1960 and 1977, 
and about 80% over the period 1978-88. This provides an 
orthodox example of risk-averting, profit-maximizing 
behaviour of commercial banks in general. Be that as it may, 
the overwhelming supremacy of short-term loans is expected to 
be even more pronounced in the context of a country like 
Sudan, where investment outlets are usually characterized by 
a good deal of uncertainty (Ali, 1975, P. 147) .
Medium and long-term loans remained firmly below 15% of 
total advances granted between 1960 and 1977, but increased 
considerably over the period 1978-88. This may, partly, be
114
Ta
bl
e 
(4
.8
)
An
al
ys
is
 
of
 
Co
mm
er
ci
al
 
B
a
n
k
s
’ 
Ad
va
nc
es
: 
19
78
-8
8 
(i
n
d
G
cd
po
CO
cd0 
G 
cd 
>  
d  
<
£
p
cd
•P1
tn
GO
PI
CO
CD0 
G 
cd 
>  
d  
<
£
P
<D
-P1
-P
POr!
co
p
cd
cd
-
rH  r~t ■it rH uo cn CM VO VO cn<d a * * CO CM <n cn m . • • . . • ■p R cn ft • • • • • CM VO cn vo C" CM «3*O p) • • o 00 o CM f" ■vr e'­ o t-' 00 cn oVO OO in VO cn r- rH en VO O' VO e'­ m'S* VO i—i 00 in O' I—f rH rH rH CM en *3*
I—1<d
po o rH m CM CO cn 00 CM CM CM rH rH cn CO
pjQ *3< *3* rH uo o rH rH i—1 C" CO CM o o
0 1—1 T—i rH (—i CM CM CM CM CM CM 00 CM CM CM
CO
coM0) *3* rH VO rH O O' CM£ • o t—1 00 rH VO LO O • • • • • •4J rH  ■ ■ • • • • • • • OO rH *3* CO 00 CM
O i—i cn VO 00 00 CM 00 in CM CM CM 1—1 I—1 rH
p
H  ccd 2 
p  6
- r | Paw cn r- oo 00 CMCD VO rH • • • • • rH VO O rH CM VO
o > • « • rH O ' cn O' VO • • • • • •^  c, CO VO m i—1 rH i—i rH rH VO 00 VO r" CO
H
•H<d
PO CD CTl VO CO CM rH VO t" CO oo cn cn i—i CM
P& VO lO r - cn CO CO" CO tM rH r'- m cn cn
0 CO CO co 00 O' r- r- r^- r- C'- VO C" C"
CO
COM
CD C'- cn m m oo uo CM cn CO e-' <M00 rH • • • <M • • • • • • « •4J • • m in • CM rH CM oo 00 <3* rH VO
o (Tt <n rH rH rH cn rH rH rH rH rH CM rH rH
MPW O 00 e" CM r~- CM m rH t" VO rH VO r-
073 oo 00 c" rH cn co cn oo O C" rH VO 00 m
0 t—i rH CM oo CM CM CM CM CM rH CM rH rH i—i
H
co
pPo o r- 00 1—( cn VO uo OCM • • rH • • • • • • • • o in O'g o CM • rH o o VO r - C" 'CO 00 • • •
H CM rH cn rH 1—1 rH rH t—i rH t—1 rH VO oo 0 0
CO
ppO o OO rH oo rH CO 00 i—i VO CM 0 0 rH 00 VOa><; ■3* m m t" cn O m CM CM cn cn o 00
W *3* oo CM CM CM CM CM CM CM rH CM uo
IT) o O '
VO C'- C"
1 1 1 CO cn o i—1 CM 00 m VO e'­ CO
O VO rH e'­ e'­ 00 CO CO OO 00 CO CO en CO
VO VO en en <n cn cn cn cn cn cn cn cncn OV cr> rH rH t—i rH i—i rH rH rH rH rH rHrH rH rH
cn
o
rH
I
00o
e— I
cuCM
00 d00 o
cn •H
<— i p
CD
d a,
G
<d •p
G
cd
CO >
00 cd
t— 1 <— i
1 a>
CM p
00
!—1 cd
• j p
Oh -P
CP
p
V <u00 >
e'­ o
en
r-H CD
cm
• • <d
CO p
4-> CD
P >
O cd
a
CD <H
(X cd
P
•— 1 G
td G
P cd
c
G p
< O
G
(d d
d G
p cd
CO -p
CO
ip
o CD
P
P
G Cm
cd •H
CQ tn
.. He
CD
O • •
P CD
P -P
O 0
115
ascribed to the incorporation of Islamic banks, which, by 
virtue of the nature of their deposits, are supposed to be 
investment-oriented, and, partly, to credit policy, which, 
since 1983, has become more specific about the nature and 
sectoral distribution of banks' advances.
A classification of short-term loans shows that the main 
activity financed by commercial banks’ is export, whose 
percentage share in total credit has been increasing over 
time. This reflects the central bank's credit policy, which 
encourages the financing of exports and related activities, 
and, meanwhile, disfavours credit for imports, which showed a 
continuous downward trend. Moreover, and, perhaps, as a 
result of the central directives by the central bank, the 
financing of working capital in industry has also been rising 
over most of the period, but started to decline since the mid 
1980s. This reflects the deteriorating investment environment 
and marked slowdown in economic activity in general, over 
that period, as a consequence of high and accelerating rates 
of inflation, political instability, and acute shortages of 
foreign exchange:. Advances to agriculture are a negligible 
average of 1% over the whole period, and this is hardly 
justifiable, provided the predominance of the agricultural 
sector in Sudan's economy.
The percentage share of medium and long-term loans, though 
increased considerably in the early 1980s, started to decline 
since then. Moreover, only about 20% of these loans granted 
over the period 1978-88 went to the sphere of fixed capital 
formation, which also sharply declined between 1983-88. Again 
this, probably, expresses the worsening investment 
environment. Nevertheless, the contribution of banks to real 
capital formation is less than expected, given their 
financial expertise and investment knowledge.
Thus, it seems that banks have rigidly adhered to the 
golden rule of banking, i.e. short-term deposits should only
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be used to finance short-term loans. Meanwhile, it is exactly 
long-term lending, equity investment, and close involvement 
in all activities of client-companies that appear to fulfill 
functions that are desperately required by private firms in 
developing countries (Kitchen, 1986, P. 121) . As kitchen adds, 
firms often have difficulty in raising equity, and cannot 
hire skills in the market because of managerial incompetence.
To further assess the performance of commercial banks in 
Sudan, we examine below their efficiency in mobilizing 
resources, in conjunction with the constraints inflicted on 
them by monetary and credit policy.
Table (4.9) below summarizes the average resource-cost, and 
the loan-deposit ratio of commercial banks as well as average 
annual returns paid by them on profit-sharing deposits during 
1983-88. Over this period, banks were liberalized in the 
sense that they were free to determine both the deposit and 
lending rates. But, they were restrained by qualitative and 
quantitative credit controls. It is apparent from the table 
that the average total cost of banks per unit of saving 
mobilized is very low and stable. However, the corresponding 
loan-deposit ratio, as influenced considerably by credit 
ceilings, is also low, averaging 58%. This means that only 
about two-thirds of total bank deposits were actively 
utilized, and since they cannot fully employ their existing 
deposits banks have no, or little incentive to raise more,
r
particularly interest-bearing, deposits. This expectedly 
inhibited competition amongst them, as manifested in the 
negative real returns on deposit paid by banks, without 
intervention by monetary authorities. The nominal deposit 
rate on saving and time or investment deposit averaged 8.3%, 
while the rate of inflation averaged 35% for the same period. 
Ironically, though banks were free to determine this rate, 
its actual level over the period 1983-1988 was lower than 
that previously fixed by the central bank.
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Table (4.9)
Average Resource Cost, Returns on deposits, and Loan-Deposit 
Ratios of Commercial Banksr 1983-88 (in %)
Year M 198,4 19.85. .1986 1987 1988
Average Resource Cost* 
Return on interest-bearing
5 5 5 4 5 n .a
deposits* 8.5 10.4 9.8 ’ •7.4 7.1 7.0
loan-deposit ratio** 64 78 49 51 53 52
Source: Bank of Sudan and commercial banks' Annual Reports, 
various issues.
Notes: * Calculated for four commercial banks, which are
among the five largest banks in Sudan. ** Calculated for all 
commercial banks from table (4.7) and (4.8) above. Cost 
include general and administrative expenses plus depreciation 
and bad debt allowances. The loan-deposit ratio is based on 
the value of total credits and deposits.
4.4.3 Findings of Interviews on the Nature, and 
Determinants of Commercial Banks’ Operations, 
and Prospective Role:
It has been argued in chapter 1 that financial 
intermediation may favourably affect the pace of economic 
growth by: (1) increasing the volume and improving the
composition of savings; (2) raising the amount and efficiency 
of investment; and (3) promoting entrepreneurial skills, and 
providing financial guidance for economic enterprises. Having 
examined the performance of commercial banks in terms of the 
first two elements, with reference to monetary and credit 
policies, we consider below the views of senior Bankers on 
the determinants of the expansion of banking services, 
deposit mobilization and credit allocation. In addition, the 
interviews regard the role of banks in promoting 
entrepreneurial skills, exploring investment opportunities, 
and undertaking other functions, which they are expected to
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fulfill in a developing country. It should be noted that 
bankers * views are helpful in explaining certain 
institutional and other factors affecting banks' behavior, 
but they do not represent a firm ground for our evaluation of 
the performance of these banks.
The interviews and specific bank studies covered eight 
commercial banks, whose holdings amounted, to about 60% of 
total commercial banks' assets in 1987. This group of banks 
consists of four Islamic banks, and three conventional banks, 
which have, recently, been compelled to switch, partly, to 
Islamic modes of finance, and one foreign bank. The 
differences between the first two categories of banks in 
terms of their deposits, lending and other strategies are 
explored in the following chapter. The eight banks have a 
total of 161 branches. All respondents hold university 
degrees in economics or finance.
On the basis of net benefits from expanding their banking 
services, and regarding the potential for growth, only one 
informant considers the present size of his bank as optimal, 
3 as reasonable, and 2 as sub-optimal. Of these, six pointed 
out to the central bank's policy, such as allocation of 
licenses for new branches and restrictions on banks' capital 
and reserves, as the limiting factor, while the rest believe 
that lack of managerial cadre, caused by out-migration, is 
the binding constraint. But, they all agree that credit 
ceiling is largely responsible for lack of ambition on part 
of banks to expand their services.
Inspite of high and unstable inflation, and falling real 
incomes, respondents generally believe that there is a 
considerable scope for increased savings to be mobilized. 
But, because of credit ceilings, and the need to reduce 
operational costs, banks sometimes have to set a large sum as 
a minimum requirement for opening current accounts. Moreover, 
since only part of total deposits may be profitably invested,
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half of the interviewees admitted that their banks, at a 
time, had to turn away customers wishing to open profit- 
bearing accounts. Such a policy is quite justifiable since 
banks, within-the ceiling, can rely on current deposits only 
to make short-term credit and maximize their profits - the 
height of the ceiling is not affected by the composition of 
deposits (see section 4.6.2).
Only two respondents believe that profits paid on time and 
saving deposits may have a positive impact on their growth. 
The rest argue that people save for certain targets, and not 
for income-earning purposes. This, however, does not rule out 
the possibility that substantially high rates of interest or 
profits on deposits may, at least, induce a change in the 
composition of total deposits in favour of those that earn 
income.
Bankers hold the view that exchange rate instability, and 
high black market rates relative to the fixed official rate, 
adversely affected the growth of deposits in foreign 
currencies, as well as foreign participation in banks' 
equity. This has also repressed the flow of remittance by 
Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad (SNWA) through official 
channels, though other factors such as inconvenience of banks 
compared to other channels also matter. Banks are accustomed 
to send officials abroad in order to create an awareness 
among SNWA of the facilities they provide to customers when 
remitting their savings through them or holding these savings 
in foreign exchange accounts.
The findings reported above suggest that the size of the 
financial market as a whole is not optimal, yet there is no 
strong reason for banks to compete among themselves. Only two 
banks offer special services, in the form of easy overdraft 
facilities, not to attract new customers, but to keep their 
established depositors/borrowers.
With regard to bank lending it is, however, rather
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unrealistic to expect banks to allocate their resources 
according to a social or even economic criteria. Bank 
lending, within the ceiling and apart from the policy- 
determined direction, is dominated by profitability or 
financial gain and liquidity considerations, irrespective of 
the type of activities being financed, or regional 
imbalances. These considerations, coupled with highly 
unpredictable investment environment, necessarily imply bias 
towards short-term credit. But, it deserves noting that two 
banks have special funds for projects with strong social 
impacts, and two government-controlled banks claim that they 
carefully follow the central bank policy, including moral 
suasion. Half of the banks considered have special lending
4
policies towards real capital formation in agriculture, and 
industry, two in transport and financial companies, but they 
all participate in the capital of commercial establishments, 
and disallowed to finance estate and construction. Advances 
to producers in the traditional subsector are perceived by 
5/8 to be inferior in terms of their risk and return 
characteristics. The rest, government-controlled banks, are 
not involved in this sector because it is left to special 
purpose banks. But, two banks are reasonably committed to the 
financing of development projects in rural areas through 
direct participation (Musharakah).
One of the eight banks studied provides only short-term 
credit, for which feasibility studies are rarely required, 
and seldom carries out an independent assessment of the 
borrower’s project, but always commands accounting 
statements, collaterals and other confidential information on 
the borrower's financial position. For the rest of banks, all 
the above mentioned documents are always required in support 
of applications for medium and long-term credit. But, in the 
case of short-term credit no feasibility study is required, 
and established borrowers need to meet very limited
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requirements, while new borrowers have to present all types 
of documents. This suggests another reason for banks to 
concentrate on short-term lending, and lends support to 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) argument that endogenous 
constraints such as imperfect information may bias the 
allocation of credit towards established and safe borrowers 
even if banks are free in their lending and interest rate 
policies.
Again, it is too early to expect banks to actively promote 
the development of entrepreneurial skills, though some hopes 
are raised by Islamic banks. Only two banks have been 
reasonably involved in exploring lending opportunities, by 
conducting feasibility studies and creating an awareness 
among investors about potentially profitable projects in 
agriculture, industry, transport and commerce. These and a 
third bank also provide technical and/or managerial 
assistance to investors. They normally appoint specialists to 
study and/or supervise projects, and the type of assistance 
provided ranges from technical aspects, accounting systems, 
and managerial organization to marketing strategies.
While banks, so far, seem not to have done enough to aid 
the course of economic development within the freedom they 
are allowed, interviewees tend to blame the deteriorating 
economic conditions(9) in general and government policies in 
particular for their limited role. Even after the 1972 de­
nationalization Act, commercial banks remained under the firm 
control of the government. But, banking control was 
relatively relaxed between 1975 and 1983. From then onward, 
though private banks flourished and interest rates abolished, 
credit policy became strict and rigid as well. Now banks are 
free to set deposit and lending rates on a basis of their own 
choice, and they are even allowed to opt out of a 
compensatory interest rate proposal (see section 4.6.5 
below). But, most banks (7/8) consider credit ceiling as a
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serious constraint on their activities, while they all 
concede that selective credit policy is acceptable, with the 
qualification that it is not the sector as such that matters, 
but the type of activity financed within the priority sector. 
Moreover, with tight credit ceilings, the reserve requirement 
ratio of 18% in 1988 is viewed by bankers as meaningless.
Continuous exchange rate depreciation rs.considered by 6/8 
of respondents to be detrimental to their external dealings, 
investment activities, and long-term contracts in general. If 
banks are to be induced to finance development projects, the 
central bank should maintain a relatively stable exchange 
rate for investment purposes or otherwise bear all the losses 
to investors and their financiers, resulting from exchange 
rate adjustments. It is also believed that free foreign 
exchange markets, as being allowed to exist in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, are not in the interest of formal 
institutions and development activities, as these cannot 
compete with the underground economy for the meagre foreign 
exchanges. However, it deserves noting that two banks, which 
have limited foreign relations, hold the opinion that foreign 
exchanges are not the binding constraint on investment 
activities, and that banks can still play a more profound 
role in stimulating investment activities. Provided a 
reasonable investment environment and well studied projects, 
the import-contents of investment may be financed through 
private, foreign or domestic, participation or by SNWA.
Finally, the profit tax policy at the rate of 70% in 1988 
is considered by the government-controlled banks as 
reasonable in the direction of supporting the public sector, 
but reckoned by private banks to be lavish, discouraging the 
growth of their assets, depressing dividends, and inhibiting 
the growth of banks.
To close this section, it seems that commercial banks have 
mobilized considerable amounts of savings, but, the
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application of which has been rather inappropriate from the 
country’s development needs viewpoint. Meanwhile, banks have 
been severely repressed by credit policy, rather than 
interest rate., policy, in recent years. Yet, it is not clear 
that they could have done better had they been more liberal, 
since despite the considerable freedom they enjoyed in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, there was no .notable change in 
their behaviour. Commercial banks have played a relatively 
insignificant role in promoting entrepreneurial skills, and 
initiating investment activities. But there are signs that 
they could do better in the future, if a healthy economic 
environment exists.
4.5 The Operations of Development Banks and the Post 
Office Savings Bank:
4.5.1 Development Banks:
Along with many other developing countries, Sudan has 
established four development banks, which are specialized in 
the type of the lending functions they perform. These 
banks(10) were initiated, and have been largely supported, by 
the government, to provide funds for development projects in 
agriculture, industry, and estate as well as other sectors.
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan was established in 1959, 
with an authorized capital of Ls 7 mn, which was fully paid 
by the government and the Bank of Sudan. The objectives of 
the bank are: (1) to provide credit to small and medium size
farmers and agricultural co-operatives and (2) to take the 
initiatives to modernize the agricultural sector and enhance 
its productivity. To create a sense of commitment, borrowers 
are required to contribute a minimum of 30% to the funds 
required for any project, and to ease access to credit, the 
bank accepts as collaterals moveable property and crop 
guarantees in the case of short-term loans, whereas real
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estate security is needed in the case of long-term loans.
However, the bank's sources of funds, which consist of its 
capital and borrowing from other financial institutions, are 
rather inadequate for its lending strategies. Its paid-up 
capital increased to Ls 50 mn by 1986, and Ls 80 mn by 
1988/89. As a result, and by virtue of the operations it 
finances, the bank has concentrated on short-term lending, 
which claimed over 70% of its total advances between 1980 and 
1988. Moreover, because of inflation, escalating costs of 
investment projects, and lack of foreign exchanges, the bank 
abandoned long-term lending altogether during the same 
period. Nevertheless, the total advances granted by the bank, 
which amounted to Ls 110 mn in 1988, are comparable to those 
made by major commercial banks in the sphere of agriculture, 
with the advantage that its advances are relatively well 
distributed throughout the country.
But, the bank has encountered many problems in attaining 
its objectives. These, besides the inadequacy of its capital, 
include lack of organization and awareness among its target 
groups (peasants and farmers), and unpredictability of rain- 
fed agricultural output. The latter problem, together with 
poor infrastructure and transport facilities, makes crop 
marketing quite risky and costly as well.
The Industrial Bank of Sudan was found in 1961 to assist 
and promote the establishment and modernization of public and 
private industrial enterprises, and to encourage external 
participation in industry in Sudan. Its authorized capital 
was Ls 3 mn in 1961, and increased to Ls 23 mn by 1987. The 
bank provides medium and long-term loans, and can contribute 
by up to 2/3 of the capital of any industrial enterprise. 
Because of its thin capital position, the bank makes quite 
moderate industrial advances, which stood at Ls 2.3 mn in 
1986, and Ls 12.4 mn in 1988. However, the bank helps 
mobilizing funds from outside the financial system, or
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assists in the utilization of funds that are short of the 
capital requirements of investors. For example, in 1987 the 
bank granted 29 loan for a total of Ls 13.7 mn, and this 
enabled a total investment of Ls 56.8 mn to be undertaken, 
creating 381 jobs. Moreover, the bank's advances are 
relatively well spread over the country, and it provides some 
technical and administrative services to its customers.
In 1967, the Sudanese Estate Bank commenced operations with 
the objectives of undertaking housing researches, and 
providing credit to low and medium income groups, for the 
construction of urban dwellings. The bank accustomed to 
charge low rates of interest on medium and long-term loans. 
During the 1970s, it had granted an annual average of 1200 
loan for Ls 2.2 mn per year. But, the bank's capital, which 
remained at Ls 15 mn since 1983, proved to be extremely 
inadequate. Accordingly, its advances dropped to just Ls 1.3 
mn in 1984, and Ls 1.2 mn in 1987. Its deposits, on the other 
hand, have virtually dried-up after the abolition of interest 
rates without a suitable alternative to reward 
depositors^^), and with that its lending has also almost 
come to a halt in recent years.
In contrast to the experience of the above specialized 
banks, the Sudanese Savings Bank, which was established in 
1974, has been quite successful. The bank was initiated by 
the government in the Central Region as a pilot project, with 
the objective of extending banking facilities to rural areas, 
and accelerating development there by means of specialized 
local finance. More specifically, the bank was originally 
intended to promote the growth of financial savings by 
tenants and farmers, which can then be utilized to finance 
local small and medium size projects. However, the bank has 
come to depend largely on checking deposits, and sizeable 
commercial advances in recent years.
The Sudanese Saving Bank is characterised by its huge
126
number of customers, which increased from 19 thousand in 1978 
to 121 thousand by 1988. It spends considerably in spreading 
banking habits among the public, as well as on evaluating 
numerous small projects. To undertake these functions over a 
wide area, the bank uses mobile banking and research units.
Table (4, IQ).
Classification of Credit by the Sudanese Savings Bank: 1980-
1988 (in Ls Million)
Credit Type 1980 1981 1982 1983 m i  1985 1986 1987 1 M
Industry 1.1 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.2 6.6 6.7
00KD 15.3
Agriculture 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.4 5.0 14.7 21.3 21.1 85.5
Commerce 2.9 6.1 9.6 11.3 16.8 28.3 42.6 50.0 61.5
Handicraft,
transport
and housing 1.0 2.3 3.6 3.8 5.6 11.2 3.7 14 .5 32.8
Others* 1.0 1.12 0.4 2.8 3.-0 4.3 14.1 10.0 22 .1
Total 8.0 14 .0 20.2 25. 6 38.3 69.2 96.6 114 232
Source: The Economic Survey 1988/89, P. 174.
Notes: * Includes professional and staff loans.
The bank's total deposits rose from Ls 10.3 mn in 1980 to 
Ls 415 mn in 1988. But, this increase was accompanied by a 
marked change in the composition of deposits in favour of 
current accounts as against saving and investment deposits. 
The share of the former appreciated from about 50% of total 
deposits in 1980 to 70% in 1987. Analysis of the bank's 
advances (table 4.10 above) shows that they are well 
distributed amongst various economic sectors, and that the 
bank has provided funds for agriculture, industry and housing 
far in excess of those jointly provided by other specialized 
banks. Commercial lending amounted to about 50% of the bank's 
total advances in 1988, and this was ascribed to the lack of 
profitable investment avenues in the targeted sectors and
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areas. Although the bank is subject to the central bank's 
credit policy, its loan-deposit ratio is far above that of 
commercial banks as a whole, besides its contribution to real 
capital formation, particularly in transport, small and 
medium scale industries and agriculture, compares favourably 
with that of commercial banks as a group.
The size and nature of the Sudanese Savings Bank's 
activities indicate its efficiency as a semi-private 
institution as against the fully government-controlled banks, 
and its development-orientation as compared to the privately- 
run commercial banks.
4.5.2 The Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) :
The POSB is, in fact, the first institution involved in 
banking business in Sudan. It has commenced operations in 
1913 under the administration of Mail and Telecommunication 
authorities. The bank is characterised by its low resource 
cost, and active promotion of savings habits through Post 
offices, which cover the whole country. It does not undertake 
investment on its own, and instead it supports the government 
budget with the savings generated for a fixed rate of 
interest.
As table (4.11) below may attest, the POSB's deposits are 
sizeable, reaching Ls 38.4 mn in 1988, but has, in recent 
years, increased at quite modest rates relative to those of 
commercial banks. This is not surprising in view of the 
problem the bank has faced after the abolition of fixed 
interest rates in 1984. The bank used to grant loans to the 
government, and public agencies at certain rates of interest, 
and, in turn, it pays depositors a reasonable interest rate. 
After the 1984 Islamization policy, the bank is still devoted 
to serving the government by extending loans, which may not 
be invested in particular projects, with specific returns. 
Hence, on Islamic basis, it is not possible to determine the
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rate of profit/loss payable to customers, while the bank 
receives no returns on its interest-free loans to the 
government. This seriously threatens its position, with the 
only remaining incentive for depositors that the nominal 
value of deposits is fully guaranteed by the government and 
that deposits are tax-free.
Table (4.11)
The Post Office Savinas bank Deposits: 1980-1988(in Ls mn)
Xeax 19.M 1981 1982 1983 1.9.84. 1233. 1986, 1987 IS M
Government 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.7 3.4
Private* 16.6 18.0 21.7 22.0 27.0 27 .3 31.9 34.6 35
Total 19.5 20.9 24 .5 24 .7 29.9 30 .4 35.0 37 .3 38.4
Source: The Economic Survey 1988/89, P.178.
Notes: * Includes deposits by private savers, public
trustees, and insurance companies.
The case of the POSB provides another example of the 
adverse effects on financial intermediation as a consequence 
of the abolition of interest-bearing instruments, without 
their replacement by sufficient and acceptable interest-free 
financial instruments.
4.6 Monetary and Credit Policy:
This section analyses the monetary and credit policies 
adopted by the Sudanese authorities, over the period 
considered, in the pursuit of achieving, in particular, 
certain stabilization and growth objectives. Monetary and 
credit policies necessarily involve measures that influence 
the financial sector, which is, often, viewed in LDCs, as a 
means of effecting economic activity in general. The economic 
priorities stated in a particular set of monetary, and credit 
policies may, therefore, form a framework for evaluating the 
performance of the financial system when it is effectively
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regulated.
In Sudan, the menu of monetary and credit policy^) 
objectives consists basically of full employment, price 
stability, economic growth and balance of payments 
equilibrium; but, the domain of these policies, particularly 
in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s period, was price 
stabilization and growth. These objectives,, however, may not 
be complementary. For instance, while stabilization requires 
containment of bank credit, growth requires increased 
mobilization and efficient utilization of financial savings.
The emphasis and tightness of monetary and credit policies 
have changed over time, from loosely stated objectives and 
lax control in the 1960s to comprehensive regulation during 
the 1980s. But, these policies have up-to-date relied on a 
few instruments; mainly manipulation of nominal interest 
rates, and qualitative and quantitative credit control. Other 
instruments such as variation in cash reserve ratios of 
commercial banks, and cash margins on certain loans and bills 
have also been applied, but only recently.
The stabilization question was not a prime objective during 
the 1960s, and up to the late 1970s, because of moderate 
rates of inflation. For fears of inflationary pressures that 
might result from rapid growth in bank lending, credit policy 
aimed, over most of that period, at restraining public and 
private borrowing, but no firm measures were applied. With 
increasing balance of payments deficits as from the late 
1970s, credit policy towards the private sector became more 
strict. Ceilings on credit to importers were set up, while 
banks were encouraged to increase their lending to the export 
sector.
In the 1980s, both stabilization and growth problems were 
pressing, because of high and rising rates of inflation and 
acute shortage of funds for development projects, as foreign 
capital was hardly obtainable. The pillars of the monetary
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and credit policies, which were thus designed to stabilize 
the economy and enhance its growth, were interest rate 
manipulation, credit control, and exchange rate adjustment. 
By and large., credit control was considered by monetary 
authorities as the most important instrument, while other 
instruments such as open market operations were discarded as 
inefficient. •
A drastic policy change, which has, perhaps, affected the 
effectiveness of these policies, occurred in 1984 when the 
entire financial sector was required to comply with Islamic 
principles of finance. These principles were narrowly defined 
in terms of abolition of predetermined deposit and lending 
rates of interest(13) _ The rest of this section discusses the 
instruments used as well as these policy changes, and 
critically assesses the stabilization and growth content of 
monetary and credit policies adopted in Sudan in recent 
years.
4.6.1 Interest Rate Policy:
Prior to 1984 all nominal rates of interest in Sudan were 
determined by the central bank. But, they were not considered 
to be effective policy instruments, and thus rarely changed. 
For instance, throughout the 1970s, the structure of nominal 
interest rates was amended twice, and by no more than two 
percentage points(14). until the late 1970s, nominal interest 
rates and the inflation rate were not substantially 
different, so that real rates of interest remained on the 
average above zero.
The reasons behind interest rate fixing are not difficult 
to deduct. First, the government as the largest single 
beneficiary from bank lending has a strong incentive to keep 
the cost of its borrowing down. Second, low interest rates 
together with selective credit control are perceived as a 
means of curtailing inflation and increasing output through
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subsidized capital inputs. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the policy of fixing deposit and lending rates was said 
to be intended to prevent undesirable competition among 
commercial banks in particular(15) # «j>he policy document was 
ambiguous about how this works. But, since the banking sector 
was dominated by government-controlled banks, it is 
indicative that that was meant to discourage private banks, 
and to ensure that financial resources are cheaply available 
to the government and public agencies. Nevertheless, despite 
the policy of fixed interest rates, the banking sector 
enjoyed some degree of freedom, especially with regard to 
credit allocation. Lees and Brooks (1977) wrote:
"It is difficult to find the extremes of overly tight 
(financial repression) monetary policy or inflationary 
development finance in Sudan (P.85)n
This is evident in table (4.12) below, which displays 
nominal interest rates and the rate of inflation, as measured 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), over the period 1960-1987. 
Prior to 1973, the real deposit rate was slightly positive, 
averaging 2% annually, whereas the real lending rate averaged 
6.9%.
In contrast, during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
though the structure of nominal interest rates was adjusted 
twice, the real rates were falling increasingly below zero as 
the rate of inflation was high and accelerating. However, the 
impact of the interest rate policy on the financial sector 
over this period was likely to be minimal, because the many 
Islamic banks, that have began to appear since 1978, are not 
subject to it. Moreover, the non-bank financial 
intermediaries are neither under the direct control of the 
central bank, nor being directly influenced by the interest 
rate or credit policy.
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Table (4.12)
Nominal Interest rate Structure and the rate of Inflation;
1960-1988 (Annu a l.J?.l
Year Pre^ -1966 1966 1973 1975 1981 1983 1987
Commercial banks
Lending Rate 8 10 12 14 18 21 27*
Deposits Rate 2 4 6 8 ' -12 15 24
Treasury bills rat 4 6 7 9 13 16 -
Post Office Deposits
Rate 2 4 6 8 10 13 20
The discount rate 4 6 7 9 13 16
Inflation Rate** 3 1 5.1 22 19.5 34.1 27.1
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues.
Notes: * Not binding, and to be charged on loans to sectors 
other than agriculture, and industry for which the relevant 
rate was 24%. ** The average rate of inflation over the
period during which the rate of interest remained the same.
4.6.2 Credit Policy: The Fight Against Inflation and
Struggle for Growth:
Restrictions on the size and direction of credit have been 
the most important instrument of monetary control, especially 
during the last decade. This was partly due to lack of well 
structured money and capital markets, which renders indirect 
methods of monetary control relatively ineffective. Credit 
policy in Sudan contained two types of direct credit control.
1. Quantitative Credit Control:
This type of control consists of direct ceilings on overall 
banks’ advances, under which limits on individual bank's 
credit are also determined on annual basis. The sole 
objective of such credit policy is to reduce the supply of
money in the hope of fighting inflation. The overall credit
ceiling, is based on the following c r i t e r i a ( ^ )  ; (l) the
position of the national economy, and the general direction
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of fiscal, monetary and commercial activities; (2) balance of 
payments position, and the expected changes in the quantity 
and prices of exports and imports; (3) credit performance of 
the banking system in the past year as it relates to changes 
in money supply; and (3) envisaged demand for credit by the 
private sector; the willingness and ability of banks to make 
credit is assumed to be unlimited.
The ceiling imposed on lending by individual banks is based 
on bank's credit-resource ratio, and cash-reserve ratio; 
where credit equals the sum of total advances and investment 
in the shares of domestic companies. Resources include total 
deposits, paid-up capital, reserves, and margins on letters 
of credit; reserves being equal to current account balances 
with the central bank. Additional criteria include conformity 
of the bank with the central bank's directives, and the 
extent to which it is involved in the financing of priority 
sectors over and above the minimum level set by the central 
bank. With the Islamization of banks, another criterion was 
introduced, that is the methods of lending used by the bank.
In the light of these considerations, the credit- 
liabilities ratio of commercial banks was kept within the 
limits of 0.5 and 0.7 during the last decade. However, the 
criteria for credit ceiling appear to be concerned with the 
application of funds, irrespective of their nature and supply 
constraints. For example, they fail to discriminate among 
various types of deposits, which could give rise to certain 
uses of funds.
2. Qualitative Credit Control:
While quantitative credit control is meant to curb 
inflation, qualitative control is intended to enhance 
economic growth by means of channelling credit to relatively 
more productive sectors and related activities. The priority 
sectors encompassed the export sector, agriculture, industry 
and transport, for which medium and long-term loans were
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particularly encouraged to finance working capital as well as 
fixed capital. The type of finance emphasized is generally 
referred to as development finance. Because of mounting need 
for such finance, selective credit policy, which took the 
form of advice throughout the period up to the mid 1970s, has 
become progressively more comprehensive and specific. In the 
late 1970s, and as part of a stabilization programme inspired 
by the International Monetary Fund, strict ceilings as well 
as selective credit policies were introduced. Private 
commercial banks were directed to extend at least 10% of 
their total advances in the form of development loans.
From 1986 onward, the selective credit policy^) was 
further tightened, giving private commercial banks clear 
instructions to distribute their advances under the ceiling 
as follows: 30% to the export sector; 25% to working capital 
in industry; 35% in the form of development, or medium and 
long-term, loans; and the maximum of 10% to local trade and 
other types of lending. But, the government-controlled banks 
were allowed to direct up to 45% of their credit ceilings to 
the finance of local trade. Moreover, banks have been 
repeatedly asked by the central bank to pay particular 
attention to disadvantaged regions within the country in 
making their credit policies. And to reduce the risk inherent 
in regional credits, consortium financing was encouraged.
Commercial banks, however, are not obliged to utilize their 
total credit ceiling, but disallowed to exceed it on 
sectoral basis. The trend of credit policy mentioned above 
is an indication that the performance of banks was not 
satisfactory. But, as we will argue below the appropriateness 
of these policies is not unquestionable.
4.6.3 Reserve Requirements Policy:
Reserves used to be held with the central bank mainly for 
liquidity purposes. Only in recent years that the legal
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reserves-deposits ratio has been considered as an active 
instrument of monetary control. Thus, while the reserve 
requirement ratio remained below 10% throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, it was.- raised to 10% in 1983, 12.5% in 1985, and 18% 
in 1988. Yet, with effective credit ceiling the reserve ratio 
is in practice redundant.
4.6.4 Other instruments of credit policy:
Instruments of indirect monetary control such as Open 
Market Operations (OMO) and the discount rate, which work 
through the reserve money side are virtually redundant. For 
OMO to be undertaken there needs to exist a relatively well 
organized financial and capital market. In Sudan, there are 
limited securities for the central bank to use, and secondary 
financial markets are yet to be conceived. Further, the bank 
rate was hardly used, since commercial banks suffer from 
excess liquidity rather than the reverse, and with the advent 
of Islamic banking the discount rate is made illegal.
Under these circumstances, monetary authorities have 
frequently referred to additional methods of direct monetary 
control. These included prohibition of inter-bank lending; 
forbiddance of foreign banks from taking deposits except from 
their approved clients; and strict licensing policy for new 
banks' branches. In 1988, credit policy gave top priority to 
circumventing commercial loans, because banks were believed 
to be excessively involved in storage of consumer goods, and 
helping traders to drive prices upward in order to generate 
monopoly profits. Banks are accordingly banned from financing 
22 consumer commodities, and from refinancing of trade 
altogether.
The direct methods of monetary control have been 
extensively applied not only because the indirect ones are 
ineffective, but also because it is believed that banks are 
entirely profit-minded, and unless policed would undermine
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the underlying social and economic priorities of the nation. 
In fact commercial banks were accused of triggering 
malpractice, corruption, and monopoly, and in response two 
special separate committees (18) were formed in 197 6 and 1985 
to investigate corruption within the banking sector. Be that 
as it may, the second committee was dissolved after two years 
of politically sensitive investigations, 'and non of the two 
reports is ever made public.
4.6.5 Islamization and Experimentation with 
Compensatory Rates of Interest:
Following radical political changes in Sudan, and its 
decoration as an Islamic state in September 1983, the central 
bank issued a brief circular(19) to all commercial banks 
instructing them to switch immediately to Islamic modes of 
finance. Fixed interest rates were made illegal and replaced 
by a profit-and-loss sharing system in both deposits and 
lending activities. And banks were given the right to levy 
charges on current accounts in order to cover their 
administrative expenses. But, foreign dealings were to 
continue according to previous arrangements until a further 
notice, which never happened.
Commercial banks started transferring savings and time 
deposits into investment or non-interest-bearing accounts. On 
the assets side three main instruments were introduced: (1)
Mudarabah, which is a financial arrangement in which the bank 
provides all the financial capital and the borrower caters 
for the human capital needed for a particular project; (2) 
Musharakah or participation arrangement in which the bank 
provides part of the financial capital required for 
investment; and (3) Murabahah, which is a form of deferred 
payment sale, in which the bank supplies borrowers with 
goods, whose value is repayable in the future at an agreed 
price and a mark-up. Musharakah is an instrument of short­
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term lending. In all three types of arrangement, the bank, 
according to a negotiated formula, gets part of the profit or 
loss realized by the borrower, and in turn, shares that 
profit/loss w.ith its depositors. Thus fixed and guaranteed 
returns on financial assets are theoretically discarded.
However, in 1987 the central bank felt that the Islamic 
instruments available to banks were rather inefficient or 
unsuitable for all banking operations. Accordingly, a 
compensatory rate of interest scheme (20) f in which the minimum 
deposit and lending rates were set close to the annual rate 
of inflation, was introduced. But, banks were given the right 
not to comply with that scheme if they are not entirely 
satisfied that it is not in conflict with Islamic principles. 
The central bank justifies the compensatory rates of interest 
in that a real rate of interest which is not significantly 
different from zero is acceptable in Islam, and that the use 
of these rates will enhance the growth of financial 
intermediation by allowing the use of both conventional and 
Islamic banking instruments. The scheme stipulated nominal 
deposit and lending rates at 24% and 27% respectively. 
Expectedly, this policy was rejected by all banks, except 
some of the government-controlled ones, for two reasons: 
Firstly, because compensatory interest rates are no more than 
a new name for predetermined interest rates; and secondly, 
and foremost, because these rates are too high; provided the 
tight credit ceiling, banks will be bound to pay high 
interest rates on deposits that they can only use part of 
them. Eventually, banks have continued to use policies of 
their own choice, and the central bank has lost control over 
deposit and lending rates. But, conventional banking is 
allowed to exist alongside Islamic banking.
It emerges from the foregoing discussion that the monetary 
and credit policies executed in the 1980s, were rather 
ineffectual. The cornerstones of these policies were the
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control of money supply in pursuit of curbing inflation, and 
the enhancement of the rate of economic growth via an 
improved allocation of credit. It has already been 
demonstrated that the central bank was less successful in its 
attempts at controlling money supply, because this was mainly 
caused by changes in the monetary base, which responds 
passively to public sector borrowing requirements. On the 
other hand, it may also prove difficult to control the money 
multiplier. Even if the central bank effectively carries out 
its credit policy, commercial banks still have incentives to 
exceed the ceilings on their advances. According to the 
central bank Act, any bank that exceeds the ceiling may be 
required to pay an interest to the central bank at 5% above 
the prevailing rate of interest. Provided the interest rate 
structure in table (4.12), the penalty rate will still be 
lower than the opportunity cost or the rate of inflation. 
Therefore, banks may exceed the fixed ceiling and if failed 
to conceal that pay the penalty rate and still make profits.
Furthermore, most of the holding or speculative companies 
were established as part of a group that includes a leading 
commercial bank, and they are, in one way or another, engaged 
in banking business, particularly in the sphere of lending. 
Thus, they can help banks to siphon off, at least part of, 
their excess liquidity.
Regarding their development content, the monetary and 
credit policies executed during the 1980s seem to be self- 
defeating, as they discourage the growth of financial 
intermediation in general and financial deepening in 
particular. The emphasis placed on development finance 
should, logically, be accompanied by a commitment to 
stimulate the growth of relatively stable financial assets, 
such as investment and time and savings deposits. These types 
of deposit are traditionally more prone to risk-taking, and 
at the same time provide the basis for development finance
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according to the profit-and-loss sharing system. Yet, the 
formula for credit ceiling discourages banks from accepting 
interest-bearing or profit-sharing deposits, irrespective of 
how high or low the money rate is. This was the case, because 
within the credit ceiling banks can rely on checking deposits 
and earn a risk-less commission income, or profit from short­
term lending, whilst accepting interest-bearing deposits that 
may not be utilized would only add to increased costs. Thus, 
as profit-seeking and security-minded capital institutions, 
banks have no incentive to mobilize investment and time and 
savings deposits over the fixed ceiling, except that this may 
help them to secure some increases in their ceilings in 
subsequent years.
In view of this adverse effect, and since interest-bearing 
deposits in general and investment(21) deposits in particular 
are less active component of the money supply, the credit 
ceiling policy should be linked to the relative share of 
various types of deposits, rather than total deposits as 
such. A sensible credit policy would either fully exempt 
investment and time and saving deposits from the ceiling or 
make the ceiling progressively widening with increases in 
their share in total deposits. This may raise the volume of 
resources that can be used for real capital formation, and 
curtail short-term lending, which is more inflationary.
4.7 Summary, and Concluding Remarks:
The objective of this chapter has been to analyse the role
of banks in economic development in Sudan vis-a-vis savings 
mobilization and investment financing. Starting with the
financial and banking structure, it appears that, despite its 
long experience, the Sudanese financial system remained
underdeveloped and traditional as the operations and 
dominance of commercial banks, the relative unimportance of 
non-bank financial intermediaries, and absence of capital
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markets may testify.
The financial system, however, underwent a series of ill- 
studied changes, such as the nationalization and 
Islamization._ Though the financial sector had enjoyed some 
degree of freedom in its operations, it was also subjected to 
various types of credit and interest rate controls.
But, banks, along with foreign trade .and the rate of 
exchange were liberalized in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Yet, the behaviour of banks showed no distinct change in
response to these developments. Unfortunately, the credit and 
banking policies reviewed in this chapter can, hardly, form 
part of a well-defined and integrated stabilization and 
development strategy, and thus it is not easy to isolate the 
impact of exogenous factors on the banking sector, from those 
endogenous to it.
However, the banking sector, though less evenly dispersed 
over the country, has contributed to a rapid growth in
financial savings, and monetization of the economy. Had this 
trend been, favourably, augmented it could have led banks to
play a more profound role in the process of economic
development in the country.
In examining the performance of various types of banks, it 
was clear that the central bank has been overshadowed by the 
political will, at the levels of both policy making and 
implementation. The bank failed to control currency issue, 
which became a function of public borrowing. As such the 
attempts by the bank at shaping banking activities in a way 
conducive to stabilization and growth have been 
disappointing.
Commercial banks in particular have generated sizeable 
deposits relative to GDP, the composition of which, though 
changed over time, has always been heavily weighted by non- 
interest-bearing deposits. There, however, seems to be a 
considerable room for more savings to be mobilized, if credit
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ceilings are relaxed. This conclusion appears to be in 
conflict with our discussion of domestic saving rates, which 
were found in the previous chapter to be poor. But, as we 
have already ..indicated there, the private savings rate was 
high relative to that of the public sector, and adding this 
to remittance by SNWA, the overall private savings rate may 
well be in tune with the trends in banks' deposits.
The application of commercial banks resources has been
rather inappropriate from an economic development standpoint. 
It has been excessively geared towards short-term lending, 
with inadequate attention to real capital formation. This was 
the case when positive and relatively high real rates of
interest were prevailing and banks were relatively 
liberalized as well as when they were comprehensively 
regulated.
The Sudanese savings bank apart, the experience of the 
special purpose banks and the POSB, in the 1980s, suggests 
that they have been adversely affected by the Islamization 
measures. Some of these institutions are already in the 
process of being phased out of the financial market.
The analyses in this chapter suggest that the present 
banking system may not be able to play a leading role in
economic development unless genuine banking policy and 
regulation are in place; adhoc monetary and financial policy 
may not only hamper the growth of financial intermediation, 
but also reduce its efficiency. It is obvious that financial 
reform is urgently needed. But, policies to enhance financial 
development and a more efficient participation by banks in 
development financing should be part and parcel of an overall 
economic strategy that aims, first, at economic stabilization 
by means of containing public deficits, and thereby public 
borrowing from the banking system. Second, improvement of the 
investment environment, and third broadening of the financial 
structure and instruments, and harmonization of banking
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activities.
Notes:
1. In Burae (1984). PP.6-13.
2. Bank of Sudan-Act (1959) as amended up to 1983.
3. for further discussion see Ali (1975), P.145.
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5. The Exchange Bureaus Act (1979) as amended up to 1983, Bank of Sudan
, Khartoum.
6. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 197 6, P.60.
7. Bank of Sudan Act (ibid), section 5.
8. Interviews were supplemented by banks annual reports and books.
9. The investment environment in Sudan, among others, suffers from: (1) 
the lack of clear development plans and strategies, and the consequent 
lack of well-defined economic priorities and investment incentives; (2) 
Instability of macroeconomic policies such as exchange rate policy, and 
inadequate tax and custom rates and rigid regulations in the formal 
sector.
10. These banks are: the Agricultural bank of Sudan, the Industrial bank
of Sudan, the Sudanese estate bank, and the Sudanese savings bank.
11. Ministry of Finance (1988/89): The Economic Survey, P.172.
12. A full discussion of monetary policy and its impact on economic 
growth may be found in chapter 7.
13. Banks’ Islamization Act, Dec. 1984, PI.
14. See table (4.12) section 4.6.
15. Bank of Sudan Annual Report 1978, P.68.
16. In M. M. Ahmed (1983), PP.5-6.
17. See Bank of Sudan Reports 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1988 - sections on 
credit policy.
18. Interview with S. Ambada of the department of economics, University 
of Khartoum, a member of the second committee.
19. The Banks' Islamization Act (ibid), P.l.
20. Bank of Sudan (1987): The compensatory interest rate scheme, P.l
21. Some banks do not permit the withdrawal of investment deposits 
before the lapse of a certain period, normally one year.
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CHAPTER 5
ISLAMIC BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE
5.1 Introduction:
The introduction of Islamic modes of finance has been a 
characteristic feature of recent developments in banking 
throughout the Islamic world. The core of Islamic finance is 
the abolition of predetermined rates of interest received or 
paid for the use of money. Although the prohibition of 
interest rates by the Quran is not debatable, some of those 
concerned tend to distinguish between nominal and real rates 
of interest and maintain that Islam is concerned with the 
latter. In this view, a^nominal rate of interest that is not 
higher’than the rate of inflation is permitted. Nonetheless, 
legislation of Islamic banks throughout the world consider 
interest rates, however defined, as i l l e g a l .
It is beyond doubt that the elimination of interest rates 
and subsequent creation or adoption of non-interest-bearing 
financial instruments can have far-reaching economic and 
social consequences, particularly in the sphere of resource 
mobilization and allocation. In Sudan, the first Islamic bank 
commenced operations in 1978, and was soon followed by a 
number of banks, as well as non-bank financial 
intermediaries, that operate according to Islamic principles. 
The entire financial system of Sudan was instructed in 1983 
to remove interest rates from its domestic operations. But, 
this policy was soon relaxed and a form of interest rate was 
permitted in 1987.
This chapter endeavors to provide an objective theoretical 
and empirical analysis of the economic significance of 
Islamic finacial instruments and intermediaries. The scheme 
of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section (5.2) 
contains a brief discussion of Islamic injunctions concerning
144
interest rates, whereas section (5.3) discusses the main 
financial instruments innovated or adopted by Islamic banks. 
Section (5.4) examines the theoretical basis of financial 
intermediation in.Islam, with special reference to its role 
in the saving-investment process. In section (5.5) Islamic 
modes of finance are compared with recent financial 
innovations in Western banking. Section (5.6) provides an 
empirical assessment of the operations of Islamic banks in 
Sudan during the period 1978-88. Finally section (5.7) gives 
a summary and examines the implications of Islamic banking on 
wider aspects of monetary development.
5.2 Islam and the Rate of Interest:
Is
The Quran explicitly prohibits transactions involving 
Riba, which is the Arabic term connoting payment or receipt 
of a fixed amount over the principal of borrowed money. 
Condemnation of Riba may be found in many Quranic verses:
"Those who live on Riba shall rise up before Allah like 
men whom Satan has demented by his touch; for they claim 
that Riba is like trading. But, Allah has permitted 
trading and forbidden Riba(II,275) ".
The interpretation of the word Riba by Islamic jurists and 
economists has been rather controversial. One v i e w ( 2 )  
identifies Riba with exhorbitantly high rates of interest 
(usury), which exploit borrowers and enable lenders to make 
undue gains. In this view the rate of interest is permitted 
as a reward to savers, especially in the case of productive 
loans and provided that its real magnitude is not 
substantially different from zero. The alternative view 
forbids all forms of interest rate, nominal or real, 
irrespective of the nature of transactions in which it is 
used. The reason being that interest is an addition to the
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principal, and the Quran says:
"O ye who believe observe your duty to Allah, and give 
up what remains (to you) from Riba, if ye are in truth 
believer. And if you do not then be warned of war 
(against you) from Allah and his Messengers. And if ye 
repent then ye have your principal (without interest) . 
Wrong not and ye shall not be wronged1* (II, 27 8-7 9) . .
The term principal in the above verse refers to the nominal 
or face value of lent money. Although the original Quranic 
injunctions prohibiting interest rates are axiomatic, various 
justifications(3) may be found in the Quran as a set. Islam 
is a system of social justice in which wealth is considered 
as a trust from God to man who is supposed to use it to help 
others in every way possible. The rate of interest runs 
counter to this principle because it reinforces the tendency 
of wealth to accumulate in the hands of a few. Moreover, 
Islam encourages hard work and condemns guaranteed gains from 
financial operations in which the lender does not take part 
in the risk of potential loss as this may in turn inhibit 
innovative and productive economic activities. Conversely, 
under predetermined interest rate regimes and in the event of 
substantial gains from investment, the borrower gets the 
entire amount of profit less the fixed interest payment. 
Therefore, interest rate will be inadequate as a reward to 
lenders. Finally, interest rate gains which relate to time 
and not hard work may make part of the society dependent on 
others’ labour, hindering it from realizing its full output 
capacity.
The former Quranic verse indicates that, and indeed in 
several passages, Islam allows trade and profit making. But, 
Islam condemns abnormal profits derived, for example, from 
monopolies and cartels as well as profits relating to 
socially destructive activities such as drugs trafficking. 
The distinctive features of profit, as opposed to interest
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rate, are that it is uncertain and variable. The essence of 
Islamic finance is that returns to savers (lenders) are to be 
linked to profits or losses realized by borrowers, and 
therefore both parties are subject to the risk involved in 
investments. We examine below the financial instruments 
adopted by Islamic banks in order to manifest the Islamic 
principles, according to which profits and.losses are shared 
among savers, investors and financial intermediaries.
5.3 Instruments of Finance in Islam:
Islamic banks have been actively engaged in search for 
financial instruments that are compatible with Islamic 
principles. In fact, some conventional banking instruments,
such as general banking services, which do not involve
finance and for which a fee or commission is allowed, are 
permissible in Islam. The discussion in this section, 
however, focuses, basically, on the instruments innovated by 
Islamic banks. For analytical convenience, these instruments 
are classified below, in terms of those relating to the
liabilities side of a commercial bank1s balance sheet, and 
those relating to the assets side, i.e.;! sources and uses of 
funds respectively.
5.3.1 Sources of funds:
In addition to their own capitals and equities, Islamic 
banks can raise funds by creating two basic forms of 
liabilities:
(1) Transaction deposits: These deposits are equivalent
to demand deposits of conventional commercial banks in that 
they are directly related to transactions and payments. The 
nominal value of transaction deposits is guaranteed by the 
bank without any interest payment. The bank provides a 
variety of services to depositors in this category such as 
checking facilities. In essence, transaction deposits have a
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100% reserve requirement, and thus the only way for the bank 
to cover the costs involved in their maintenance is to levy a 
commission or service charge on them. Though such reserves 
ratio makes transaction deposits completely safe financial 
assets, it restricts the ability of banks to provide credit. 
The reason for the 100% reserves ratio is that since 
transaction deposits are of short term nature, they can only 
be used to finance loans for short-term operations such as 
purchase of production inputs. The profit/loss pertaining to 
such loans may prove to be impossible to calculate. It is 
interesting, however, to note that Islamic banks have, in 
practice, introduced legal procedures by which they can, 
subject to individual depositors’ discretion, obtain 
authorization for the use of funds in transaction deposits to 
finance short-term c r e d i t I t  is also possible that part 
of transaction deposits can be used for the purchase of 
suitable government securities, the face value of which is 
100% guaranteed.
(2) Investment Deposits: These deposits are normally
held for the purpose of earning income and cannot be 
withdrawn before the lapse of a certain period of time. They 
closely resemble business shares, in that their nominal value 
is not guaranteed and the returns on them are uncertain and 
variable. The bank acts as a financial trustee that accepts 
deposits and invests them on the behalf of depositors in any 
form of financial arrangement that satisfies Islamic 
requirements. The only thing agreed upon in advance to the 
employment of funds in this deposits category is the basis on 
which profit/loss is distributed between the bank and the 
borrower on one hand, and between the bank and savers on the 
other. The basis of distribution in the former case is 
normally the net profit/loss realized by the investor, and in 
the latter case is that realized by the bank. A distinction, 
however, needs to be made between investment deposits and
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bank's common stocks. Firstly, in contrast to shareholders, 
depositors would not have any say in the management of the 
bank, and/ secondly, payments of dividends on common stocks 
depends on the bank's discretionary policy, where a certain 
percentage of profit or loss will always be paid to 
depositors.
It is to be conceived that since there- are no uniform and 
predetermined rates of interest, savers wishing to hold their 
funds in the form of investment deposits would face the task 
of obtaining information on the relative performance of 
different banks, in order to choose between them. This, of 
course, gives rise to various uncertainty and information 
costs. The implications of such costs, together with that of 
uncertainty of profits, on savings and investment behaviour 
are discussed in the following section. Uncertainty and 
information aspects aside, depositors in this category also 
face the fact that investment deposits are highly illiquid. 
As we will argue in chapter 6, both the information and 
liquidity problems might be substantially reduced if there is 
a secondary securities market in which investment deposit 
certificates can be traded. This market/ in addition to 
providing liquidity through the transfer of deposits 
certificates, may provide the necessary signals to the public 
on the relative current and future performance of individual 
banks through pricing of their deposit certificates. But, it 
remains unclear how Islamic banks can mitigate the liquidity 
and information problems if secondary securities markets do 
not exist.
It appears that in as much as investment deposits are 
concerned, Islamic banks are basically equity institutions. 
This has the important implication that banks can respond 
easily and rapidly in the event of a banking crisis, because 
as the face value of these deposits is not guaranteed and 
will vary according to the performance of the bank, any
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change in its assets' position will be partly absorbed by 
changes in the value of deposits held by the public.
5.3.2 Lending Instruments of Islamic Banks:
The profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) principle calls for 
partnership between savers and users of funds, and financial 
intermediaries, and implies that various•parties are liable 
to risk and uncertainties characteristic of investment 
activities. There are two basic forms of participation 
devised by Islamic banks; namely Mudarabah and Musharakah.
(1) Mudarabah: Mudarabah is a financial arrangement in 
which the bank provides all the necessary financial capital, 
while the investor provides all human capital needed. The two 
parties share the uncertain profit according to an agreed 
formula. In the case of project failure, the capital holder, 
or the bank and its depositors, bears the entire financial 
loss, whereas the entrepreneur loses his time and effort 
invested in the project. In the life time of the project, the 
bank is the sole owner of it, and the borrower is the 
manager. M u d a r a b a h has traditionally been confined to 
commercial activities of short duration (Igbal and Mirakhor, 
1987) . Banks can make loans to customers directly or 
indirectly through a Mudarabah (equity) company, the capital 
of which is provided by banks in the form of direct equity or 
through loans with equity features. Banks receive Mudarabah 
certificates which can be traded.
(2) Musharakah: Musharakah is a joint venture in which 
there is more than one contributor to the financial capital. 
The profits and losses are to be shared according to the 
respective capital contribution of each party. Since 
M u s h a r a k a h financing involves more than one party, it 
corresponds more closely to an equity market in which shares 
can be acquired by the public, banks or the government. This 
form of financial arrangement can be used by firms to raise
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funds by offering transferable Musharakah certificates in the 
market. Such certificates may be secured by the assets of the 
company and their value (price and return) determined by 
market forces►
(3) Other Forms of Financing. The strict PLS system may 
not be easily tailored to accommodate the needs of small 
scale borrowers and consumers, where projects cannot be 
clearly identified and evaluated by banks. There are four 
main alternative lending instruments, which are legally 
approved by Islam.
(i) Deferred payment sale or mark-up (Murabahah) . This 
method provides a means for banks to purchase a product and 
resell it on the basis of deferred payment, in installments 
or lump-sum. The borrower (buyer) and the bank agree on the 
price of the product plus a profit margin or mark-up. This 
method satisfies Islamic legal requirements in so far as the 
lender takes physical possession of the goods being financed 
and the mark-up is not related to the length of the period 
over which the transaction is to be completed. This means 
that the lender is also subject to the risk of potential 
loss.
(ii) Purchase with deferred delivery. This method enables 
banks to purchase goods at negotiated prices, but to be 
delivered at some future date. The bank pays the seller the 
full amount at the time the contract is signed. It is 
suggested that this method can be of particular importance 
for agricultural fianancing. For instance, it can be applied 
to farmers to help them obtain the funds they need for 
agricultural operations, with the promise of selling an 
agreed amount of their future output to the bank. The assets 
of the farmer can be used as collaterals or security against 
fraud and negligance, but the lender would bear all financial 
losses incurred in the operation (Attia, 1986) . But, 
obviously this kind of contract can be quite unfair to the
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lender or the borrower if the market price of the product at 
the time of delivery turned out to be substantially different 
from that agreed upon in advance.
(iii) Leasing or Hire-Purchase. The bank can purchase a 
commodity - be it a machinery or consumer durable - and lease 
it to a borrower for a specified sum and for a certain period 
of time. The agreement can also provide f-or a lease-purchase 
of the commodity. In this case payments made by the borrower 
would include a portion which can be earmarked for the final 
purchase and transfer of ownership of the product i.e. the 
bank can receive a payment for the cost of the product as 
well as a share in its net rental value. Over the period of 
the lease, both parties also take part in the risk of 
potential damage.
In view of difficulties associated with credit f i n a n c i n g ^ )  
and lack of capital markets in most LDCs, the idea of leasing 
has recently been proposed(7) as a means for domestic as well 
as foreign financial institutions to assist development in 
LDCs in a more direct way. It has been suggested that funding 
of capital investment in LDCs requires a turn to lease 
finance that passes effective ownership to the lessee 
irrespective of the lessor's legal title. The owner (lessor) 
has an interest that is over or equal to the rights of a 
secured creditor. The lessee gets closer to 100% financing, 
without high collaterals or compensating balances. Besides, 
the transaction can be tailored to its precise needs, 
sometimes to the point of avoiding controlled interest rates. 
In fact, hire-purchase, deferred payment and purchase with 
deferred delivery as financial instruments are commonly used 
by Western financial intermediaries, particularly specialized 
ones (8).
(iv) Services charges. As mentioned earlier, Islamic banks 
are legally allowed to levy a service charge on the loans 
they make or for their services as trustees. The only
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condition, here, is that the charge should not be related to 
either the amount of the loan or its duration. This method is 
particularly relevant in the case of consumption loans, 
overdrafts or_small scale borrowers.
In addition to financing investment through the above 
instruments, Islamic banks can undertake investment directly 
by establishing their own corporate enterprises. The bank 
will eventually be responsible for both funding and 
management.
The above discussion indicates that Islamic banks have 
developed a variety of financial instruments, which make it 
possible for them to perform two functions. First, they can 
provide much of conventional banking services, and second 
they can actively participate in promoting capital markets, 
and thereby provide a new impetus to economic growth.
5.4 The Islamic Financial System and Economic 
Development:
It has been argued in chapter 2 that though the interest 
rate mechanism is central to the functioning of conventional 
financial systems, its effect on the growth of savings and 
investment is rather ambiguous. Similarly, the extent to 
which the elimination of interest rates, and their 
replacement by profit rates, can influence the saving- 
investment process is not clear cut; it depends on the 
initiatives undertaken by financial intermediaries and how 
savers and investors respond to the profit-and-loss-sharing 
instruments. This section examines the economic context of 
the participation principle in terms of its possible 
influences on saving and investment in specific and on wider 
development aspects in general.
5.4.1 Saving Behaviour Under the Islamic System:
The focus of both critical and proponent economic analysis
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of the PLS system has been the behaviour of savings. It is in 
this area that the profit-and-loss-sharing instruments appear 
to have no clear advantages over conventional ones. The 
critics contend that the introduction of a financial system 
based entirely on PLS arrangements would reduce savings and 
retard development(9) ; the reasons being increased 
uncertainty of the rate of return (profit’) , and consequently 
high risk surrounding consumption and savings decisions. 
Where savers in the conventional financial system face only 
inflationary uncertainties, those in the Islamic counterpart 
are subject to uncertainties pertaining to both the rate of 
inflation and the nominal rate of return on deposits. And 
assuming that the two types of financial systems are 
confronted with the same investment opportunities (i.e., the 
same mean rate of return) and use them in an equally 
efficient way, the volume of savings is expected to be lower 
under the PLS system. However, the question of whether 
uncertainty lowers the rate of savings relies on the 
assumptions made about the utility function and its risk 
properties; the degree to which the future is discounted, the 
income and substitution effects and on the relationship 
between uncertainty and returns.
Theoretical studies of the impact of uncertainty on saving- 
consumption decisions are far from being conclusive. For 
example, on the one hand, Pheleps (1967) shows that if future 
non-capital income is subject to risk, then an increase in 
temporal risk dislike (aversion) is a sufficient condition to 
raise uncertainty about future income. This, in turn, would 
lower consumption and raise savings. Hanson and Menezes 
(1978), on the other hand, demonstrate that, with respect to 
capital income the combined income and substitution effects 
of rising uncertainty is indeterminate. Aside from this, it 
is theoretically possible that the two sources of uncertainty 
(inflation and nominal return) to depositors are not really
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independent. If inflation and the profit rate are positively 
correlated, the nominal rate of return would tend to balance 
or even outweigh the rate of inflation, considerably 
suppressing potential variability of the real rate of return 
on savings.
There can be many reasons for increased uncertainty being 
associated with increased nominal return. ’Firstly, the use of 
borrowed money on a PIS basis amounts to removing interest 
payments from the cost side, and accordingly both lenders and 
entrepreneurs become residual income earners. In contrast, 
since in the interest rate regime entrepreneurs take the 
whole risk and ensure repayment of borrowed funds, they may 
have to pay low rates of interest relative to the return on 
investment. Thus, the rate of return on savings is likely to 
be higher under the PLS system. Secondly, since the 
remuneration of savers, financial intermediaries and 
entrepreneurs is determined by investment performance, and 
since all parties participate in the risk of potential loss, 
better^ quality investment would be undertaken (see the 
following section) .
It appears, therefore, that there is no strong theoretical 
reason for the volume of financial savings to decline if 
Islamic modes of finance are adhered to. Nevertheless, the 
issue of whether savings would actually decrease or increase 
when the financial system is fully Islamized remains to be 
largely empirical. But, introduction of PLS instruments 
alongside their traditional counterparts may well generate a 
net increase in financial savings. There are two main reasons 
for this to happen. Firstly, the coexistence of the two 
systems will widen the range of financial assets available to 
both savers and investors, and assuming that competitive 
conditions prevail this would result in an increased 
financial intermediation, as well as higher real returns on 
savings. Secondly,uthe PLS instruments may attract additional
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savings from individuals who either have religious 
inhibitions concerning the use of interest-based instruments 
or regard the risk and return characteristics of the new 
instruments sufficiently attractive” (Karstein, 1982, and De­
Rosa, 1986).
The economic characteristics of the PLS system aside, there 
are certain religious elements of Islam that can favourably 
influence the behaviour of consumers and investors in an 
ideal Islamic society (H) . First, adherence to Islamic 
percepts imposes a number of constraints on the utility 
function of the believer. For example, Islam explicitly 
prohibits the consumption of non-basic necessity commodities, 
and discourages acquisition of goods that have no use, 
prestige apart. Second, Islam requires the payment of 
compulsory levies representing transfers to those in need, 
and imposes a 2.5% tax rate on idle wealth including 
jewellery. This tax together with inflationary pressures may 
effectively reduce any tendency towards hoarding, even on the 
part of rural people who would then seek profitable 
investment avenues for their savings. Finally, the Islamic 
financial system may be characterized by a low degree of 
risk-aversion (disinclination), as Islam encourages believers 
to undertake adventuresome activities and to rely on God's 
will when risk cannot be calculated. These arguments are 
simple deductions from the whole set of Islamic tenets and 
appear to link the success of Islamic finance to the 
existence of an ideal Islamic community.
5.4.2 Investment Behaviour Under the Islamic System:
It is in the sphere of investment that the argument for 
Islamic finance seems to be more convincing. The discussion 
in chapter 2 suggests that the extent to which the financial 
system can contribute to development financing in a 
developing economy is subject to a number of constraints.
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These include shallow and fragmented financial markets, and 
narrow choice of financial assets and claims available to 
savers and investors, as well as endogenous constraints that 
bias the allocation of credit against less established and 
small scale enterprises. The repressionist models have 
emphasized the need for positive and relatively high real 
rates of interest in order to mobilize • s.avings, integrate 
financial markets and bring about a more efficient allocation 
of investible resources. In the PIS system where returns to 
savers are determined by the performance of the real sector, 
they are unlikely to be kept artificially low. Nonetheless, 
the level of returns on deposits would depend on the 
availability of investment opportunities and an allocation of 
credit based primarily on the expected profitability of 
projects. This is the virtue of our hypothesis regarding the 
allocation problem, which we have already examined in terms 
of the allocation mechanism of a conventional system of
finance (chapter 2). It might be constructive to contrast the 
analysis there with the PLS mechanism.
As we have already seen in the Stiglitz and Weiss
framework, interest rate liberalization may not result in an 
improved credit allocation due to conflict between the 
interests of borrowers and those of lenders. For example, 
given the choice of projects borrowers would undertake 
projects that promise higher returns, and probably involve 
higher risk. Such inclination would be reinforced by rising 
or high interest rates. Banks, on the other hand, would 
prefer more secured loans even if they promise lower returns. 
As a result the average productivity of investment projects 
financed through debt is likely to be lower than that of the 
projects which investors alone may undertake. The disharmony 
in attitudes towards risk and return stems from the fact that 
rewards to investors depend on the performance of the
projects undertaken, whereas rewards to banks and their
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depositors are fixed in nominal terms. In contrast, in the PLS 
system - all parties take part in the risk involved in 
investment activities and returns to each of them depend on 
the investment's performance. Assuming that risk and return 
are positively correlated, as Stiglitz and Weiss suggest, 
there will be a tendency of decreasing risk-aversion on the 
part of the Islamic bank as its income becomes a function of 
investment's yield. Moreover, the PLS system may be more 
adaptive to the requirements of new and innovative 
entrepreneurs, since there is less or no need for 
collaterals. Hence, it seems that the PLS system is likely to 
allocate investible resources in a more competitive and 
productive way. Indeed, it can also raise the volume of 
investment as Ulhaque and Mirakhor (1987) suggest:
"The level of investment may actually increase under 
certain conditions. Intuitively, this..result seems 
plausible as the move to a profit-sharing system does 
away with the distinction between the entrepreneur and 
the lender. A fixed cost for capital is no longer 
required to be part of the firm's profit calculations.
The marginal product of capital can be taken up to the 
point where maximum profits are obtained without the 
constraint of permitting a fixed cost on capital"
(P.158).
In practice, PLS financial arrangements necessitate a more 
direct involvement(13) Qf banks in investment activities by 
acquiring information about (or influencing) customers' 
projects. This, with a resulting understanding and reduced 
need for collaterals, may eventually provide a more wider 
access of banks to rural and small scale investors. 
Consequently, the PLS system may be a suitable mechanism for 
rural credit markets to be dismantled in the long-run. The 
integration of financial markets and rationing of investments 
on profitability basis may, in turn, lead to unification of
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returns to investments across economic sectors.
5.4.3 Islamic Banking and Promotion of 
Entrepreneurship:
Although it may hinder those investors who like to have a 
free hand in the use of borrowed funds, the principle of 
participation, and implied project monitoring by banks will 
ensure that they either act as entrepreneurs themselves or 
provide valuable technical and managerial support to 
investors. This would undoubtedly enhance the growth of 
entrepreneurial talents. Again, since participation allows 
banks to finance the entire capital requirements of an 
entrepreneurs from the beginning, it may not only promote 
entrepreneurship, but also ensure that full use is made of 
potential entrepreneurial skills.
Banks can play a particularly important role in 
entrepreneurial development where the phenomenon of demand- 
leading finance prevails. Where finance follows, banks may 
expand and merely respond to the needs of businesses, in 
which case close links between financial and corporate 
enterprises are likely to give rise to such market 
imperfections as bank-holding company structures.
In the early stages of industrialization of many developed 
countries banks had, through the provision of credit as well 
as non-credit services, spawned entrepreneurship. One 
commonly cited(13) example is that of Germany in the 19th 
century, where private bankers were successful in promoting 
and organizing various manufacturing establishments and 
infrastructure, including railroads. German banks were also 
characterized by direct funding operations. Besides their 
relatively large capitals, banks, through their close links 
with capital markets, took care of the necessary issues of 
stocks and bonds to help entrepreneurs find additional means. 
And in addition to funding, banks performed entrepreneurial
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functions of considerable importance. "In some instances 
bankers initially perceived new opportunities for investment 
and suggested methods of exploiting them. More important, 
however, were entrepreneurial tasks that were allied with 
certain financial ends. Frequently, interested bankers 
obtained government approval and support for the projects of 
others. Then they have to create a market for the new 
securities. Finally, it was essential for them to ensure that 
the policies, financial or otherwise, of enterprises newly 
created or enlarged would continue to favour" (Tilly, 1967, 
PP.178-79).
The relevance of such banking functions to Islamic banks is 
perhaps obvious, as these functions are invariant to their 
nature and the instruments that call for close participation. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the form of German 
multipurpose banks, which was also a feature of financial 
intermediation notably in Australia, Switzerland, and 
Belgium, has been recently recommended^^ for LDCs as an 
alternative to conventional banking, provided their 
preoccupation with economic development. The distinctive 
feature of multipurpose banking is direct funding and close 
relationships between banks and borrowing firms, which, 
often, entails banks providing non-credit services. In 
addition to promoting entrepreneurship, such relationship is 
said^1 )^ to: (1) give bankers deep insight and close
surveillance into the business network of customers, thereby 
lessening dangers of business failure; (2) facilitate banking 
and industrial assets’ diversification which will also 
attenuate risk. Furthermore, in stressing the significance of 
increased participation under universal banking, Karl Erich 
Born (1984) argues that since banks and depositors have 
stakes in the long-run prosperity of enterprises and the 
latter assume the role of technical and financial consultants 
as well as marketing advisors, this would alleviate the need
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for specialized financial institutions necessary to provide 
long-tern industrial capital.
Assuming that multipurpose banks are likely to be large in 
size, they may also enhance economic efficiency as predicted 
on economies of scale. This, together with promotion of 
entrepreneurship, increased financial stability via reduced 
risk and elimination of conflict in * the interests of 
borrowers and lenders, makes multipurpose banking, and to a 
comparable extent Islamic banking, a possibly more efficient 
form of intermediation.
5.5 Islamic Financial Instruments and Recent Financial 
Innovations in Western Banking:
Rapid and sophisticated financial innovations^^, relating 
to both institutions and instruments, are characteristic 
features of developed economies. Our aim in this section, 
however, is to examine innovations in financial instruments 
that bear similar characteristics to those found by Islamic 
banks or can easily be adopted by them.
wThe borrower's desire for flexibility in debt-servicing and 
the lender's wish for greater liquidity are not mutually 
exclusive objectives" (Saini, 1986, P.6). Therefore, 
innovations in capital market instruments should satisfy at 
least one party's needs without impairing those of the other 
side. Accordingly, two types of innovations may be identified 
in terms of those designed to provide flexible repayments for 
borrowers, and those intended to satisfy lenders' needs for 
greater liquidity in their assets. In the first category the 
following arrangements have been introduced to adapt 
borrowers' debt-servicing to changing economic environment; 
particularly inflation and exchange rate fluctuations.
1. The flexible maturity loan under which debt services 
payments are held constant in absolute terms. The 
amortization component of debt services decreases with
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interest rises, and subsequently the maturity of the loan is 
increased. If interest rates rose sufficiently, however, 
negative amortization would occur, so that lenders would be 
providing new., money to borrowers . This method can help 
borrowers to correctly anticipate their debt-servicing 
commitments, and make their plans accordingly. It also helps 
lenders to match their loan commitments ’and loan maturity, 
and consequently minimize interest rate risk. But, the lender 
will still be unsure of the timing of principal repayments. 
Interest rate aside, the characteristics of this method 
appear to be compatible with PLS requirements. Thus, 
replacement of the interest rate by a profit rate would not 
only make its application by Islamic banks straightforward, 
but also make it more reflective of changing economic 
conditions, as the profit rate may bespeak business 
conditions more accurately than the rate of interest.
2. The graduated payment loan under which debt services 
payments are initially low and gradually build up. This 
method is especially relevant to project finance, where the 
earning power of the project improves as it proceeds towards 
maturity. Such type of credit arrangement may also invite new 
money from lenders, should the capital requirements of the 
project exceed their budgeted level. Again replacing the 
interest rate component by the profit rate, the graduated 
payments loan may be identical to loans under Musharakah 
arrangement. In either method, debt-servicing is linked to 
the completion of the project and additional benefits and 
responsibilities exist for both lenders and borrowers. 
Borrowers will be relieved that other sources of fund will 
not be tied up to service a particular loan, while lenders 
must carefully evaluate the commercial viability of the 
project and accept the responsibility in terms of lower 
amortization should the project not be as successful as 
planned.
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3. Shared equity loan, which invites lenders to accept 
below market rates on loans in exchange for an equity share 
in the revenue generating project. Thus both lenders and 
borrowers will be concerned with the riskiness and 
profitability of the project, but without contradictory 
interests. Saini (ibid) points out that since equity lenders 
assume added risk, they will presumably 'be compensated for 
doing so; in the form of dividends on equity shares that 
arise by the loan, besides the below market rate of interest. 
The total reward, however, can be easily defined in terms of 
an appropriate share in the profit generated by the project, 
and accordingly the method can be used by Islamic banks.
Generally, lenders need to diversify their loan portfolios 
in order to reduce exposure concentration and attendant risk. 
One of the innovations that can help lenders to do so, and 
meanwhile ensure greater liquidity, is Transfer Loan 
Instruments (TLI). This method standardizes the system of 
transferring loans from a primary to a secondary market. In 
effect, it creates a market in which loans already 
outstanding may be traded and banks can grant TLIs with 
varying maturity denominations. When a TLI is sold the new 
holder will be entitled to receive interest rate and other 
benefits of the original loan agreement. A transfer loan 
instrument that carries profit instead of interest might be 
valuable to Islamic banks in the pursuit of raising liquidity 
ratios and managing their assets while abiding by Islamic 
principles.
The discussion of the theory of finance in an Islamic 
context seems to suggest that though Islamic financial 
intermediaries may not be more efficient than their 
conventional counterparts in mobilizing savings, they are 
likely to produce an allocation mechanism that is more 
growth-oriented. But, the practice of Islamic banks may 
entail higher costs to them relative to those of traditional
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banks. We examine below the relative economic significance 
and cost-efficiency of Islamic banking as practiced in Sudan.
5.7 The Activities of Islamic Banks in Sudan:
This section examines the emergence and objectives of 
Islamic banks in Sudan, and attempts to assess their economic 
significance in terms of their deposit, investment and profit 
strategies during the 1980s period.
5.7.1 Emergence and Objectives of Islamic Banks:
The emergence of Islamic banks in Sudan has been associated 
with certain economic and political developments. Following 
the 1972 denationalization Act, both domestic and foreign 
private enterprises grew rapidly. The banking sector which 
was dominated by government-controlled, and foreign, banks, 
however, continued to offer little access, especially to new 
and relatively small scale, indigenous enterprises. Thus, 
local business groups were eager to penetrate the banking 
sector not only as a form of investment perse, but also for 
the services and credit facilities they expect to have in the 
future. Besides, political developments in the country have 
been increasingly overshadowed by revival of Islamic ideals, 
which were then manifested in the establishment of Islamic 
enterprises, including banks.
The first bank, The Faisal Islamic Bank, was incorporated 
in 1978, and its immediate business success provided the 
impetus for five other Islamic banks to be opened between 
1982 and 1987. Researchers and policy makers(18) concerned 
with the appearance of Islamic banks in Sudan were largely 
preoccupied with their ethical and conceptual aspects. It is 
natural, therefore, that we focus our attention on the 
economic dimension of Islamic banking. It should be, however, 
noted at the beginning that any conclusions to be drawn from 
the experience of Islamic banks in Sudan, which is quite
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short, are necessarily tentative.
Islamic banks in Sudan have a wide range of social and 
economic objectives, that are claimed to be consistent with 
Islamic principles. The main objectives are: (1) elimination
of interest rates from financial activities, and undertaking 
of business on the basis of profit-and-loss-sharing; (2) 
payment of Zakat or Islamic tax; (3) prohibition of monopoly; 
and (4) promotion of all aspects of business that are 
socially desirable and not specifically disallowed by Islam.
The first objective has already been elaborated. The second 
implies that even if not required by the authorities to pay 
tax, or on top of legal tax, Islamic banks shall pay Zakat. 
The rate of Zakat is 2.5% per annum, and its base is the 
bank’s net assets; Zakat proceeds are payable to the poor and 
needy in the society. The last two objectives state 
explicitly that Islamic banks are, by .virtue of their own 
constitutions, bound not to have monopolistic statuses, and 
that they are, in fact, multipurpose financial institutions.
5.7.2 Deposits, Investment and Profit Performance of 
Islamic Banks:
Islamic banks in Sudan provide for three types of deposit 
accounts; transaction or current accounts; investment 
accounts; and saving accounts. The characteristics of the 
first two types of account are the same as discussed in 
section (5.2.1) above. Saving accounts differ from 
transaction accounts only in that they carry no service 
charges, and their holders may be entitled to special 
borrowing facilities.
The deposits performance of a sample of Islamic banks (18) 
in the period 1983-87 is contrasted in table (5.1) below with 
that of a sample of traditional commercial banks. While the 
rate of growth of the total deposits of the latter category 
was fluctuating, that of the deposits of the former was
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steadily rising, reflecting, perhaps, their rapid horizontal 
expansion. In terms of deposits composition, Islamic banks 
compare favourably with conventional banks in that a higher 
percentage of'their deposits is in the form of investment and 
saving accounts. These deposits, being more stable, can 
provide funds for relatively long-term projects.
Table (5.1)
Size and Type of Islamic Banks Deposits Compared with 
Conventional Banks: 1983-87
Year Islamic banks Conventional banks
Demand Investment Total Demand Time and Total
Dep. % And savincr% Ls mn %C g,Q Savina% Ls mn %C
1983 62 38 288 77 23 1963
1984 69 31 320 11 83 17 1219 27
1985 72 28 370 16 84 16 1480 22
1986 78 22 441 19 * 83 17 1896 28
1987 82 18 577 31 80 20 2364 25
Source: Annual Reports of respective banks, for respective 
years; Note: %C is percentage increase. All figures have been 
rounded.
Unfortunately, the share of investment and savings deposits 
has been decreasing, probably as a result of falling profit 
rates on them (table 5.2). This is -particularly evident in 
the experience of the Faisal Islamic Bank. The bank had 
maintained an annual deposit rate of profit of about 15%(19) 
between 1979-82, whereas the average deposit rate of interest 
was 10% per annum. Over this period the bank's deposits grew 
at the average rate of 339%, compared with 33% for all 
commercial banks' deposits. On the basis of this observation 
Brown and Shaeldin (1985) concluded that the bank had 
attracted savers by the policy of paying high rates of profit 
rather than that of not paying interest. This argument seems
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plausible, as, despite the huge increase in the bank's 
deposits and indeed the deposits of Islamic banks as a group, 
total commercial banks' deposits have maintained, nearly, the 
same historic rate of growth (Chapter 4) . During the period 
1983-87, however,- the rate of profit paid by Islamic banks 
individually and collectively was comparatively low; and, at 
the same time, total deposits grew at lower rates and the 
relative share of profit-bearing deposits was shrinking. If 
profit rates were not the cause of depositors switching away 
from conventional to Islamic banks, which appears to be 
evident, then the reasons must relate to religious 
satisfaction and the special credit facilities provided by 
Islamic banks as a reward to certain categories of deposits.
Table.. (5-..2L
Averaae Annual Kates or Kront (interest) 
Conventional Banks.; 1983
Faia oy 
-87
isiamic ana
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Islamic banks n. a 7.2 9.0 8.2 6.0
Others* 12.6 14.9 10.5 8.7 7.7
Source: As in table 5.1 above
Notes: n.a = not available, * While Islamic banks strictly 
confirm to profit arrangements, conventional banks were 
allowed to use both profit and interest instruments.
On the application of funds side, Islamic banks in Sudan 
use almost all the non-interest-based instruments discussed 
earlier. There is also an additional lending instrument known 
as Qard Hassan, which is a profit-free loan provided mainly 
for consumption purposes. Moreover, Islamic banks are allowed 
to undertake direct investment provided that: (1) the fixed
capital requirements of the project can be met from long-term 
financial assets such as equity capital and investment 
deposits; and (2) the economic feasibility and profitability
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of the project is based on a well documented appraisal.
Indirect investment or lending takes largely the form of 
M u d a rabah f which is normally of short-term nature, and 
M u s h a r a k a h, -which is usually of relatively longer-term 
nature. Unfortunately we do not have a breakdown of Islamic 
banks1 advances by various types of arrangements. But,
available information, relating to the Faisal Islamic Bank 
and the the Sudanese Islamic Bank indicates that Musharakah 
accounts for about 40% of their total advances during 1983- 
87. Besides being suitable for project finance, Musharakah 
arrangements have the advantage of mobilizing resources from 
outside the banking sector, because normally investors have 
to contribute to the capital requirements of their projects
before inviting the bank’s participation. For instance,
between 1980 and 1987, the Faisal Islamic Bank extended Ls 
922 mn in the form of advances towards 13,971 undertakings, 
the total cost of which was Ls 21,137 mn. The funds provided 
by customers were, thus, Ls 1,215 mn.
Table (5.3)
TOcai Advances ana tne uoan-u 
Conventional Banks
eposit Hat 
Compared:
ios or lsiamic ana 
1983-87
Year Islamic banks Conventional banks
Advances 
Ls mn
Loan/deposit Advances 
Ls mn
Loans/deposits
1983 268 93 623 65
1984 265 83 654 54
1985 260 70 749 51
1986 288 66 1083 57
1987 374 65 1480 63
Source: As in table (5.1) above.
Table (5.3) above contains data on the loan-deposit ratios 
of, and total advances by, the two samples of banks referred
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to above. With the two types of banks being subject to the 
same credit policy, the relatively higher loan-deposit ratio 
of Islamic banks may well indicate the acceptability and 
success of their lending arrangements.
Our study of total commercial bank advances, in chapter 4, 
showed the overwhelming share of commercial loans; namely 
export-import credit and domestic trade credits. Advances to 
agricultural and industrial producers were, until the late 
1970s, negligible. Aside from that, commercial banks were 
suspected of confining their credit facilities to only a 
handful of monopoly capitalists(20) . This picture has changed 
considerably since then. The share of agricultural and 
industrial loans has increased, and new classes of borrowers 
emerged, including artisans and handicraft. It is not 
possible to testify whether these changes in banks lending 
were due to the incorporation of Islamic banks as we have no 
complete data on their lending activities as a whole. But, 
the sectoral distribution of the advances of the Faisal 
Islamic Bank, FIB, (table 5.4) and their number and average 
size (table 5.5) is indicative.
Table (5.4)
Sectoral Distribution of Advances by the Faisal Islamic
Bank (Ls mn): 1983-87
SectorXyear .1983 198.4 .19.85. 1986 1987
Local trade 35 43 62 63 62
Foreign Trade 30 38 13 4 24
Industry 4 9 11 15 26
Agriculture 0.7 5 6 44 54
Handicrafts 2 2 4 7 11
Services 2.3 11 4 6 15
Total 74 108 100 139 192
Source: The Faisal Islamic Bank: 10 years of banking
operations, FIB, Khartoum, 1988.
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The former table suggests that the credit contribution 
of the Faisal Bank to priority sectors, agriculture and 
industry, exceeded that of specialized banks and as a 
percentage of the bank1s total advances, it compares 
favourably with that of commercial banks in general (see 
chapter 4, table 4.8). In fact, the bank is accustomed to 
purchasing and leasing modern machineries' and equipments 
to relatively small scale producers, as well as providing 
production inputs such as fertilizers and herbicides, 
which private small producers may not afford to import on 
their own.
The stated anti-monopoly aim of Islamic banks also 
appears to have been manifested in the Faisal Islamic 
Bank's lending policy. The figures in table (5.5) below 
show that its loans are becoming available to an 
increasing number of borrowers over the period 1983-87, 
with an average loan size of Ls 64,000.
Table (5.5)
Number and Average Size of FIB's Advances: 1983-82.
Year 1 983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total Advances (Ls mn) 74 108 100 139 192
Total number of advances 1141 1366 2118 1891 3374
Averaae advance (Ls 000) 64.8 79.11 47 .2 74 57.
Source: As in table 5.4 above.
In addition to indirect investment, Islamic banks have been 
involved in direct investment in various economic sectors. 
For example, the FIB has established four specialized 
subsidiaries in the areas of insurance, trade, services and 
estate development. Almost all other Islamic banks have 
participations in the fixed capital of some economic 
enterprises. These investment and development orientations
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have been well documented in our interviews and the reports 
provided by the four Islamic banks which are part of our 
sample of 8 commercial banks. The lending operations of 
Islamic banks., appear to have the following common desirable 
characteristics features:
1. Apart from the central bank's directives, Islamic banks 
allocate specified amounts of funds to each economic sector 
in their investment strategies.
2. Finance of fixed capital, which is made possible by stable 
liabilities such as investment deposits, besides capital and 
equity shares.
3. Initiation of projects, sometimes in areas that had never 
been penetrated by commercial banks, such as agricultural 
crops product ion (21 )-m Through direct participation, some 
Islamic banks have been successful in overcoming the 
traditional barriers of high risk, low return and lack of 
information, to rural credit markets.
4. Loans repayments are usually secured through partnership 
contracts, which are easily accessible for economically 
feasible projects.
5. Finally, participation, often, implied banks providing 
technical and managerial assistance, especially in connection 
with agricultural and industrial finance. Such services may 
not be affordable by individual investors, and, therefore, 
Islamic banks may fill this important gap in development 
activities.
Again it is not possible to quantify the contribution of 
Islamic banks to the development of entrepreneurship in 
Sudan. However, the non-credit services provided by Islamic 
banks in efforts to secure their investment commitments, and 
the fact that they normally establish relatively well- 
equipped research and development departments to help 
undertake direct investments, may well prove to be valuable 
to the economy as a whole. Further, Islamic banks have
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sometimes financed projects that are socially desirable such 
as rehabilitation projects for drought-displaced families. 
These projects are hardly profitable, but undertaken 
basically in the pursuit of establishing the Islamic ideals, 
which banks have set for themselves. Whether the economic 
benefits from these and other lending activities of Islamic 
banks can be sustained in the future can only be judged after 
a reasonably longer experience.
Financial development as a catalyst of economic growth, 
however, requires financial intermediaries mobilizing and 
allocating funds to productive projects with greater economic 
efficiency. There is no precise measure of economic 
efficiency, but a crude approximation could be total cost per 
unit of resources mobilized. An economically efficient 
financial institution would entertain a low ratio of total 
cost to total deposits. The figures in table (5.6) below 
indicate that Islamic banks tend to have a higher, though 
slightly, cost-deposit ratio than conventional banks. This 
may reflect the costs implied by the nature of their 
financing instruments, or possibly the costs of opening new 
branches as these banks have been rapidly expanding.
T,ab,le_.(.5_a.6.)_
Average Resource cost of Islamic and Conventional Banks
Compared: 1985-1987
Source: Annual reports of the banks considered.
Note: (1) these banks are the 4 Islamic and the 4
conventional banks covered in our interviews and case 
studies.
19-8.5_____198i______1987
Islamic banks 
Others
0.05 0.06 0.05
0.04 0.03 0.03
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5.7 Summary, Limitations and Implications:
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the 
nature and economic significance of Islamic banking at both 
theoretical and empirical levels. The theoretical analysis 
suggests that replacement of the conventional banking system 
by the PLS system appears to have an ambiguous impact on 
savings mobilization, but a more favourable effect on credit 
allocation and economic activity in general. The 
institutional aspects, instruments and strategies of Islamic 
banks seem to be geared towards supply-leading as against 
demand-following finance. It is, however, to be expected that 
allowing Islamic financial intermediaries to operate 
alongside conventional ones would foster financial 
intermediation in general and may thereby speed the process 
of development.
The theoretical discussion also pinpoints possible 
limitations of Islamic banking. Both the liabilities and 
assets of Islamic banks that are invariant to their 
development-oriented strategies would involve a higher degree 
of illiquidity. Moreover, extended involvement of Islamic 
banks in business aspects entails increased costs to them. 
These problems may, to some extent, inhibit the growth of 
financial intermediation under the strict PLS system, but 
obviously they can be overcome if a secondary securities or 
capital market exists. The relevance of such a market to 
Islamic banking in general and in the context of Sudan in 
particular will be examined in detail in the following 
chapter.
The empirical analysis of Islamic banking in Sudan showed 
no clear evidence to suggest that the incorporation of 
Islamic banks has significantly altered the historic growth 
rate of overall financial savings. But, it has been 
associated with an improved composition of these savings as 
well as a more desirable allocation of credits. Moreover,
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Islamic banks have been relatively successful in penetrating 
rural credit and product markets. This may in the long-run 
lead to integration of not only financial markets but product 
markets as well.
It may be appropriate to point out some important 
implications of Islamic banking, namely on monetary policy 
and government finance. The elimination- of fixed interest 
rates from the economic system would abandon all instruments 
of monetary policy that rely on them. These include deposits 
and lending rates, the discount rate and open market 
operations. While the central bank cannot control the rate of 
profit, however, it can still influence banks' deposit and 
lending activities by altering the respective percentage 
shares of depositors, banks and investors in total profits. 
As for the discount rate, it may be legally acceptable for 
the central bank to earn a certain percentage of the 
borrowing bank's profit; agreeing on a higher percentage than 
that due to customers will still be acceptable as profit is 
variable. The penalty rate, on the other hand, may be 
replaced by a financial, or otherwise, penalty that is not 
related to the size and duration of the bank's excesses. It 
is, however, not clear how the rate of interest can be 
replaced by the rate of profit in order to enable open market 
operations to be conducted, since securities, mostly 
government securities, are normally not tied to a specific 
project.
Government borrowing from the banking sector to finance 
current spending may create serious problems as the returns 
on such expenditure cannot be identified. But, in the case of 
loans for productive government investment, banks can provide 
funds on the PLS basis. Two suggestions have been offered for 
banks to accomodate government needs for current expenditure 
purposes. First, banks can simply extend Qard-Hassan or 
profit-free loan (Awad, 1985) . But, obviously banks may not
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have enough incentives to do so. Second, returns to banks on 
such loans can be linked to the rate of growth of national 
income (Karstein, 1982). The justification for this is that 
the rate of growth of national income is vafiable and may be 
closely related to the average rate of profit in the economy. 
Be that as it may, the Sudanese authorities are yet to 
respond to the monetary and financial .problems posed by 
Islamic banks and to accomodate the latter's own 
requirements.
Notes:
1. S.A. Amin (1989), Chapter 4.
2. For example Abdelnasir (1988).
3. For elaborate theological arguments see M.N. Siddiqi (1985a).
4. N. F. AL-Mola (1985). As we shall see in section (5.3.2), this does 
not mean that Islamic banks have no instruments for short-term finance.
5. See the section below on the implication of accompanying risk and 
uncertainty on the saving-investment behaviour.
6. Problems with debt finance were discussed in detail in chapters 2 
and 4.
7. OECD study (1986) by Wellon et al.
8. See Jack Revell (1973).
9. Traute Wholers-Scarf (1983), Pryor (1985) and Taylor and Evans (1987) 
give critical accounts of Islamic finance.
10. e.g. Hahn (1970) .
11. These aspects are given utmost importance by such writers as K. 
Ahmed (1987) .
12. Such involvement entails increased, and even prohibitive, costs to 
banks. Suggestions to reduce costs may be found in chapter 6.
13. See e. g., Tilly (1967) and Khatkhate and Riechel (1980).
14. Arguments concerning the relevance of multipurpose banking to LDCs 
can be found in Hester (1981), Silber (1983), Saini (1986), and Wellons 
et al (1986).
15. For instance, Virmani (1985) recommends" that Korean banks should be 
allowed to hold equities to help reduce excessive debt-equity ratios of 
S. Korean business corporations.
16. For the processes and forces generating these innovations, and their 
universality in the West see Mayer (1982) and Silber (1983) .
17. Saini (1986), P.7.
18. The comparison involves two’leading Islamic banks (Faisal (1978) and 
EL-Tadamn (1983) ) on the one hand, and two of the three largest 
conventional banks (Khartoum and Unity banks) . The period is entirely 
dictated by data availability.
19. The FIB, however, enjoyed considerable privileges in return for its 
promotion of Islamic ideals. These privileges were not normally 
affordable to other banks, and included tax exemption of all its assets, 
profits, salaries, wages, gratituties and pensions of its employees 
(Brown and Shaeldin, 1985, P.22)
20. Brown and Shaeldin (Ibid), P.27.
21. An example of this is the participation by the Sudanese Islamic bank
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in six crop production schemes/ and the purchase of tractors on behalf 
of small farmers for the value of US$12 mn by FIB in 1980.
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CHAPTER 6
THE OPERATIONS OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES,
AND THE CASE FOR A SECURITIES MARKET
6.1 Introduction:
In examining the performance of the - banking sector in 
chapter 4, it was found that bank lending is excessively 
manipulated by the authorities. Meanwhile, banks1 own 
policies have, firmly, accorded with the "Golden Principle" 
that short-term deposits should only be used to finance 
short-term loans. And, in our study of the theory and 
practice of Islamic banks in the previous chapter, it is not 
clear that the relative success of these banks is, largely, 
due to the economic characteristics of the instruments they 
introduced. But, we concluded that the Islamic financial 
system is, essentially, an equity-based system, whose 
practical efficiency would require a market in which deposits 
and investment certificates may be traded. In the present 
chapter we shall examine the theory of capital or securities 
market, and argue that such a market should be viewed as a 
necessary and integral part of an economy whose financial 
sector conforms to Islamic principles.
But, first, we analyse the operations of non-bank financial 
intermediaries, and assess their contribution to capital 
formation in Sudan. Since the assets of these institutions 
are, generally, of long-term nature, the larger their share 
in the total financial assets of the economy, the more likely 
that a securities market can be successfully developed. 
Second, the chapter will advance a case for a securities 
market in Sudan.
The chapter is divided into 5 sections. Section (6.2), 
deals with the operations of non-bank financial 
intermediaries, and briefly discusses the informal money
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market, whereas section (6.3), examines the theory and 
practice of securities markets, and how they relate to 
Islamic financial and capital markets. In section (6.4), the 
reasons and prospects for developing a securities market in 
Sudan are analysed. Finally, section (6.5), gives a summary, 
and concluding remarks.
6.2 The Operations of Non-bank Financial 
Intermediaries:
As mentioned earlier the financial system of Sudan embraces 
a number of non-bank financial intermediariesM , of which the 
insurance industry, development and holding (M u d a r a b a h ) 
companies are the most prominent in terms of size and
strategies. This section examines•the performance of these 
institutions, their response to the abolition of fixed 
interest rates, and their likely impact on the development of 
a securities market.
6.2.1 The Insurance Industry:
Insurance!2) is a common fund intended to compensate 
individuals or groups for financial losses that occur outside 
their control. Its role in providing services of economic
security is well summarized by Dunning (1971):
"The insurance business is concerned with the pooling 
of risk; indeed one of its chief functions is to
minimize costs of risk-bearing by shifting them from 
individual persons or institutions to groups of persons 
or institutions. The industry 'socializes' risks by
converting high contingent loss into a low fixed 
charge...and in so doing releases resources for more 
productive uses (P.12)"
Thus, the economic significance of insurance activity stems 
from its function in effecting productivity and growth or
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enhancing economic activities via the reduction and spread of 
risk. Though this function is important, it is usually 
difficult to assess. But, the process through which insurance 
companies provide security services, enables them to act as 
financial intermediaries or as borrowers and investors of 
loanable funds. Unlike banks, insurance companies cannot 
create money, but, with the generally long-term nature of 
their assets, they can contribute to development financing in 
relatively more substantial proportions. In addition to 
effecting development finance, insurance firms may influence 
monetary demand through the buying and selling of securities 
or by changing their investments' structure. For instance, in 
the USA, "because the contracts of life insurance companies 
involve, for the most part, long-term liabilities, the 
savings they accumulate are, largely, held in capital market 
assets, rather than money market instruments" (Dougall and 
Gaumnitz, 1986, P.111). On the other side, the insurance 
business augments, and expands with, foreign trade, and its 
development may be necessary for a country to earn foreign 
exchanges in international insurance markets.
The insurance industry in Sudan evolved around under the 
colonial administration and was closely linked to the 
expansion of foreign trade. However, little is known about 
the industry prior to the passing of the Insurance Control 
Act in 1960. Following this, the insurance market which was 
totally controlled by foreign firms witnessed the 
incorporation of national firms, which started transacting 
nearly all classes of insurance business. In 1970 all 
insurance firms were nationalized and their number dropped 
from 42 to 6. After economic and financial liberalization in 
1979, their number, like that of banks, has more than doubled 
during the 1980s.
By 1988, there were 15 direct insurance companiesW , of 
which 12 are private, 2 public, and one jointly owned by the
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private and public sectors. Out of this total, 10 companies 
are engaged in general insurance business (marine, fire, 
motor... etc), one in life insurance, and 4 in both life and 
general insurance (Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 1988, P.56).
Be that as it may, only recently 'has the share of the 
insurance industry in the total assets of the financial 
market appeared to be significant. Insurance firms came to 
accumulate substantial savings in the form of premium 
installments, which are, then, invested in a wide range of 
assets, both real and financial. But, with one public 
reinsurance company, the insurance business is dominated by 
government companies and transactions, which amounted to 60% 
of the market's assets in 1985. Though it might generate a 
more competitive environment, this large number of firms, 
taking share in a thin insurance market, are likely to be 
less efficient as there could be enormous diseconomies of 
scale.
The general trend of the sources and uses of insurance 
funds may be represented by information relating to 12 
companies, for which data were available. In Sudan, insurance 
funds are composed of net premium installments plus shares of 
premiums reinsured, locally or abroad, that the insurer is 
allowed to retain. Premium installments rose from Ls 11 mn in 
1978 to Ls 56.2 mn in 1983, and ls 161.3 mn in 1987. But, the 
respective net premium (after deducting amounts reinsured) 
income stood at Ls 3.5 mn, Ls 16.3 mn, and Ls 42.5 mn; with a 
high proportion of reinsurance transactions undertaken 
abroad. This amounted to 63% of the total of Ls 75 mn 
reinsured in 1986, and is partly attributable to under­
capitalization of the national reinsurance company.
On the other hand, net claims, i.e. claims for which 
insurance firms are directly liable, have been steadily 
falling in proportion to net premium income. The net claim- 
installments ratio decreased from 99% in 1978 to 65% in 1983
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and 55% in 1987.
A breakdown of gross premiums, as in table 6.1, reveals 
that Motor insurance is the main source of insurance funds; 
the second source is Marine and Aviation, 'followed by Fire 
and Allied business. Life insurance contributions were quite 
low for many years, and have completely disappeared as from 
1987. The reasons being low per capita income, relative 
public unawareness of its benefits, and the Islamic views 
towards life assurance. With respect to the latter, Islamic 
insurance companies have adopted a system of "Social 
Reciprocal Responsibility" to substitute for conventional 
life insurance policy, which was judged incompatible with 
Islamic principles.
Table. ,6.1
Gross Premiums Received* for Main Classes of Insurance: 1986-
1988 (in' Ls mn)
Year 1986 1987 1988
Life and other
Long-term funds 1.5 - -
Motor** 28.4 63.5 90.96
Marine and Aviation 51.8 25.3 39.4
Fire and Allied Business 24.4 23.1 47.3
Others 8.96 12.3 20.8
Source: Insurance Control Office, Ministry of Finance,
Khartoum.
Notes: * The 12 firms covered here are not the same as those
referred to earlier. ** Third party liability and other.
Thus, there appears to be a rapid expansion in insurance 
funds, which is attributable to increases in international 
insurance prices, and revaluation of assets so that current 
values rather than book values are used*4) . But, other
factors, such as rises in imports due to trade and foreign
exchanges liberalization in the 1980s, may have played an
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important role.
The uses of insurance funds are tightly restricted by the 
Insurance Control Act as amended up to 1964. General 
insurance firms are required to hold 60% of their resources 
in deposits with the POSB, 30% in either bank deposits or 
government securities, and 10% in cash. Meanwhile, 90% of all 
long-term insurance income is to be placed in government 
securities and/or with the POSB, and the Insurance Control 
Office has to give consent for the release of amounts 
deposited with the POSB or commercial banks. Accordingly, the 
bulk of insurance assets are held in deposits, and in the 
form of outstanding (overdue) premiums to finance short-term 
credit, besides investment in real property. Investment in 
land and other real property accounted for 16.6% of total 
insurance assets in 1986, and 41.2% in 1987, while shares 
holdings were 5.6% in 1986 and 7.4% in 1987. Bank deposits 
were 17% and 25.4% in 1986 and 1987 respectively, whereas 
outstanding premiums amounted to 4 6% in 1986 and 17.3% in 
1987. Of total outstanding premiums in 1986, 30% were due
from government units and 60% from the private sector*5). 
Notwithstanding this, insurance companies have participated 
in financing medium-term and long-term investments in the 
form of Musharakah, which amounted to Ls 15.8 mn in 1986. 
This indicates the willingness of insurers to take risks, if 
the restrictions on the uses of their funds are relaxed.
To sum up, insurance firms have mobilized sizeable savings 
in recent years, but the uses of which are, largely, dictated 
by government policies. Yet, the rapid expansion, and 
increasing competition among insurance firms can play an 
important role in economic development. This trend, however, 
is restrained by a number of factors. Firstly, insurance 
firms are characterised by low capitalization; the paid-up 
capital of the 12 companies considered was Ls 11.6 mn in 
1986. Secondly, and perhaps for inflationary conditions,
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these companies, like individual investors, have shown a 
marked preference for investment in real property. Finally, 
with the abolition of fixed interest rates, the spectrum of 
investment instruments available to insurance firms is 
narrowed. Hence, for them to operate competitively in an 
Islamic system, they should be allowed to explore new 
investment avenues based on the PLS system. The future 
prospects for the insurance industry would depend on the 
removal of these constraints, and efforts to widen the local 
reinsurance market.
6.2.2 Development and Holding Companies:
The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the incorporation of 
3 development companies, and 3 holding companies. With the 
exception of two public development companies, all these 
companies have been established on the PLS principles. And 
they attempt to harness investible resources, mainly through 
the sale of shares in a portfolio of securities, but the 
public development companies are mainly financed from 
official sources.
For both types of companies a profitable use of funds is 
the main objective. Aside from that they differ widely in 
terms of objectives, methods of operations, degree of risk 
undertaken, and relation with investors. Holding companies 
focus almost exclusively on short-term finance, or Mudarabah 
arrangements, and for this they are known as "Mudarabah 
companies". In contrast, development companies attempt to 
promote economic development by providing medium and long­
term loans and non-credit services. The evolution of both 
types of institutions in the 1980s seems to be inspired by 
the PLS system, as the marked participation of Islamic banks 
in their activities may suggest. And this is probably an 
expression of the need for a capital market as an additional 
investment outlet under the Islamic system. We analyse below
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the strategies and practices of these companies.
1. The Operations of Development Companies:
The first and largest of these companies is the Sudanese 
Development Corporation (SDC), which was incorporated in 
1974, with an authorized capital of 500 mn (American Dollars, 
$) . Its objectives include: exploration and evaluation of
potentially profitable projects in various, sectors; capital 
participation in private and public development projects; 
provision of consultation and guarantees to investors; and 
promotion of an entrepreneurial class oriented towards 
productive investment. The SDC participation in any project 
is, however, not to exceed 50% of total capital requirements.
Over the period 1974-83, the company granted $151.5 mn to a 
large number of projects whose total costs amounted to $1.2 
billion. These projects are well distributed amongst various 
sectors: spinning and weaving received 25% of the company's 
non-financial investment; food processing 45%; transport 11%; 
and construction and housing 19%. Consequently, 28000 direct 
jobs were created. Participation in financial institutions 
totalled $5.8 mn, and guarantees were provided for $22.5 mn 
private loans. Between 1984 and 1987, and in accordance with 
economic stabilization and recovery programmes, the SDC 
confined its investment to on-going projects so as to raise 
their productive capacities through increased fixed and 
operating capital. Again following the Islamic legislation 
the corporation has adopted Musharakah and Murabahah as bases 
for its investments. In 1986, SDC extended funds for $1.8 mn 
and LS 3.6 mn, and in 1988 a total new investment capital of 
$2.1 mn and LS 40 mn was granted to 17 firms, mainly on 
Musharakah basis.
It follows from the above analysis that, the SDC was 
successful in promoting development activities in comparison 
to commercial banks. However, the additional funds mobilized 
for projects partly financed by the corporation seem to have
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been met from investors' own resources or from other 
financial institutions, as there is no evidence of shares 
being issued. And it is, probably, for its dependence on 
official sources of finance that the SDC ~ activities have 
shown a marked slowdown recently.
The need for wider public participation in development 
financing is manifested in the establishment of The Sudanese 
Rural Development Corporation (SRDC) , akin of the SDC, in 
1981. The SRDC consists of two subcompanies: a holding
company, with a capital of Ls 7.5 mn paid by the government 
and some financial institutions; and a development bank, with 
a capital of Ls 10 mn paid by the government (40%) , and 
European partners (60%). The main objective of the SRDC is to 
raise funds for small development projects in rural areas. 
Over the period 1981-84, the corporation had, partially, 
funded 16 projects for the sum of Ls 3.9 mn, and in 1986 and 
1988, 24 projects were financed for a total of Ls 11.7 mn. 
There is no information on private funds being mobilized, but 
it seems that the company relied mainly on its meagre 
capital.
In contrast to the experience of the above corporations, 
the Islamic Development Company (IDC), which is a private 
company with similar objectives, has relied on public 
participation through the sale of shares. In addition to 
participation in development projects, the company's Act 
states its role in providing technical, managerial and other 
services to investors in various economic sectors^ .
The company started operations in 1983, with an authorized 
capital of $200 mn, but with the deteriorating investment 
environment in the country, the company raised just $25 mn as 
a paid-in capital and $0.6 mn in the form of shares. These 
together with retained profits grew at a low nominal rate 
reaching $30 mn by 1988.
Meanwhile, the company's contribution to long-term
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investment rose from $2.9 mn in 1985 to a sizeable amount of 
$15.2 mn in 1988. Its short-term investment in the form of 
bank Musharakah and Mudarabah portfolios decreased from 
$22.5 mn in 1985 to $8.4 mn in 1988. By i989 the company 
helped establish 15 relatively large scale development 
projects, and 8 medium and small size projects, besides 
extending funds to some existing projects.-
It is clear that there is a notable shift in the company's 
investment orientation towards real investment, as against 
riskless and quick-yielding short-term investment. It has 
helped mobilizing funds through shares and through productive 
utilization of funds raised by investors. The IDC may play a 
more profound role in economic development if, given the 
nature of Islamic finance, real returns on financial assets 
come closer to those on real investment. Undoubtedly, a 
considerable boost to the company's work would take place if 
a securities market exists.
A common feature of development companies is their 
willingness to undertake risk, and their commitment to 
influence the allocation of development projects in favour of 
less privileged areas and activities, that are generally 
neglected by private individual investors. And this requires 
coordination of investment activities in order to avoid 
duplication of efforts.
2. Holding Companies:
All Mudarabah c o m p a n i e s ^ )  have been found on Islamic 
principles, for the purpose of issuing and marketing shares, 
whose proceeds are then invested on short-term basis. But, 
they can use their capital^ and retained profits to make 
long-term investments.
The first of these, the Islamic Investment Company, was 
established in 1983 as a joint venture between the Faisal 
Islamic Bank (49%) and the Islamic Finance House of Geneva 
(51%) . The volume of the company's shares and other
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activities, perhaps, for confidentiality, is not 
discloseable. However, its assets rose from Ls 4 mn in 1984 
to just Ls 4.3 mn in 1987, with sizeable net annual profits 
over the same period. Similarly, the Elruasi Islamic 
company^8* (1985) and Emigrants Islamic Company (1986) have 
also been active in issuing shares and extending short-term 
credits, whose exact volume also remains confidential.
The experience of Mudarabah companies is of recent origin, 
and is, therefore, difficult to assess. However, their shares 
are available to the public as well as financial 
institutions. Since they are not subject to the central 
banks1 policy, they could form an outlet for banks suffering 
from excess liquidity due to credit ceilings, and siphon-off 
resources to finance short-term credit. Nevertheless, the 
relative publicity of Mudarabah transactions - usually of 
one-year maturity and involve non-tradeable shares - may 
indicate the willingness of the public to buy shares, which 
is necessary if a securities market is to be developed.
6.2.3 The Informal Money Market:
The observed concentration of formal banking services in 
major urban cities, entailed that informal money lenders are 
the only source of credit to rural producers. We consider 
below the rural credit market, in Sudan, in so far as it 
indicates the fragmented nature of the financial system, and 
the implications of this to economic activity in general, and 
monetary policy in specific.
Beshai (197 6) noted that during the 1960s, the only source 
of credit to about 70% of rural producers was the "Shall" 
system, which is essentially a system of crop mortgage, under 
which the borrower pledges to sell in advance a certain part 
of his future crop in return for a loan from the village 
trader. Loans could be in the form of consumer goods or cash. 
This form of credit could be productive in as much as it
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helps producers to meet their urgent seasonal consumption and 
production needs. But, it could also be counterproductive if 
it involves exorbitant rates of interest, or enables monopoly 
over rural output and prices, which appears to be the case in 
Sudan.
Excessively high rates of interest, . however, are 
characteristics of rural money markets across LDCs, but their 
explanation is rather controversial. Bottomley (1975) 
attributes high rates of interest in rural money markets to: 
the opportunity cost of rural credit, taken as the rate of 
interest in urban riskless investment; the lenders' risk 
premium; high transaction costs; and monopoly elements. In a 
sample of 240 tenants/farmers in the leading agricultural 
schemes (Gezira and Rahad), Saleem. (1984) found that 44% of 
them are engaged in "Shail" transactions. In a typical 
"Shail" arrangement, the lender receives the amount of crop 
pledged immediately after harvest and sells it at harvest 
prices, or latter when prices have risen. Saleem argues that 
the only plausible explanation of the too high rates of 
interest implicit in "Shail" agreements is in terms of power 
relations, monopoly and the corresponding undervaluation of 
borrowers' crops.
Money lenders are usually village1 traders with high socio­
economic and political status* i? They tend to have closer 
contacts with villagers, and advantages over them in terms of 
access to organized money markets, and knowledge of future 
crop output and prices. Sufficient knowledge on the part of 
the lender as to the borrowers' creditworthiness alleviates 
the need for collaterals, but restricts intervillage "Shail" 
transactions. Thus, "Shail" traders function as non-competing 
groups. Because of the personalized nature of the system and 
its articulation with various social and economic activities, 
the borrower is unlikely to default voluntarily, i.e, when 
his realized output exceeds the quantity pledged in "Shail".
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In an otherwise situation loan repayment is normally 
rescheduled, and the flexibility of the system allows some 
tenants to be chronically in debt.
The economic implications of the rural credit market, and 
indeed the rural output market alike, are numerous. The 
monopoly nature of the system means that prices paid to 
producers by lenders or village traders .are, in general, 
quite low, and invariant with market conditions elsewhere, 
e.g in towns, let alone international markets. And with 
inadequate pricing, policies to increase output are 
meaningless to rural producers since they signal no incentive 
to them.
The magnitude of the rural money market is, however, 
expected to have been generally diminishing during the 1980s, 
not only because of the relative widespread of banks, but 
largely because of out-migration and marked increase in 
commercial businesses. On average at least one member of each 
extended family has had worked abroad, and this could mean an 
increased liquidity to the immediate family and soft loans to 
relatives. Moreover, with the rapid expansion of trading 
activities, the number of merchants at village level has 
risen, and the monopoly element is, therefore, expected to be 
less profound.
This, however, does not amount to saying that the "Shail" 
system would be.self-liquidating. As official monetary policy 
is hardly transmitted to the rural money market, deliberate 
policies directed towards its gradual displacement may prove 
to be necessary. Such action should be part of a programme to 
integrate money markets for a more efficient mobilization and 
application of investible resources in connection with 
efforts to improve rural crop production and marketing 
conditions.
The concern of some private banks, e.g.. the Sudanese 
Islamic Bank, with rural development should be encouraged to
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create a new agricultural credit system as subsistence and 
rural producers may be induced to make surpluses if the 
present credit and product market conditions are changed.
6.3 The Case for a Securities Market in Sudan:
This section discusses the functions that a securities 
market may fulfill in the longer-term development strategies 
of a LDC, and advances a specific case for a securities 
market in Sudan. This case is based on the hypothesis that 
the essentially equity-based Islamic financial system may 
enhance the development of the market, which is, in turn, 
necessary for the former to meet its envisaged objectives. 
Further arguments and prospects of a securities market in 
Sudan are discussed in the following section, along with the 
Sudanese experience and measures for its promotion.
6.3.1 Scope, Nature, and Advantages of Securities 
Markets:
For the purpose of this study the term securities market*9* 
is used in Drake's (1980) sense to denote "the market for 
instruments/claims/obligations that are commonly and readily 
transferable by sale - namely the shares, debentures, bills, 
bonds, stocks..etc issued by companies or the government" 
(P. 192). Thus, the market comprises the complex of mechanisms 
and institutions via which medium and long-term funds are 
harnessed and made available for use by businesses, 
government, and individuals. In the case of a securities 
market in an Islamic system, however, we discard*10* all 
fixed-interest-bearing instruments such as bonds.
The securities market consists of two segments: a primary 
market in which new securities are issued or underwritten; 
and a secondary market in which securities already 
outstanding are transferred or traded. The securities market 
is, generally, distinguished from the money market in that it
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is the market for longer-term assets, while the latter is 
dominated by short-term assets of one year or less maturity. 
Nevertheless, most individuals, firms and institutions may be 
active in both markets, and this implies that decisions taken 
in either market necessarily incorporate expectations and 
predictions concerning the other. There remains, yet, an 
important difference between the money and .capital markets in 
terms of the risk, return and liquidity characteristics of 
their instruments. Long-dated instruments, as against short­
term ones, are usually more risky, less liquid, but promise 
higher returns.
It has, sometimes, been argued that since such financial 
institutions as commercial banks may hold both short-term and 
long-term assets and liabilities, there is little need for 
securities markets. And, as Drake (1977 and 1980) noted, it 
is commonly held*11* that such markets would be difficult to 
create, costly to establish and nurture, and of little 
economic benefit. While taking into account the merits and 
demerits of a securities market, we argue below that it 
should not only be viewed as complementary to the money 
market in an Islamic system, but also a necessary condition 
for it to be efficient.
Like financial intermediaries, securities markets play an 
important role in generating savings, but their potential for 
effecting economic development through real investment is 
substantially different. Through the issue of shares, 
debentures..etc, a securities market would help enterprises 
raise funds that would otherwise, and at the best, be put 
into less productive uses. It provides a mechanism through 
which returns on savings are related to expected yields on 
real investments. This, notwithstanding accompanying risk 
increases, may result in a net increase in savings that are 
linked to profitable investments. The securities market 
would, therefore, foster the process of financial
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intermediation, and "by widening the spectrum of investment 
alternatives, it is bound to produce allocational 
improvements over a system of segregated investment 
opportunities.. Since it enlarges the financial sector, a 
securities market would widen the scope for specialization, 
division of labour, and reduction of costs in financial 
operations" (Drake 1980, P.196).
These considerations are, particularly, important in 
connection with the Islamic system, in which, and in the 
absence of such a market, each financial institution has to 
collect information on the economy as a whole and by sector 
when assessing or exploring investment opportunities. Hence, 
in the case of an Islamic system, a securities market would 
not only form an additional channel for investible resources, 
but also a pool of information that would assist large as 
well as small financial intermediaries to reduce their 
operational costs and function more competitively. Meanwhile, 
"securities markets need not be costly to run ..they entail 
relatively small advertising, clerical,..,and postage costs" 
(Drake, Ibid, P.196) . Moreover, securities markets would 
enhance other functions envisaged in Islamic banking. The 
skills required for entrepreneurship have to improve across 
firms if they are to survive by means of resources raised in 
a world of competitive securities markets.
The securities market may provide the government with 
additional means of raising funds. In an Islamic system, 
where such instruments as bonds are illegal, the government 
may still be able to use the market to raise funds for 
projects whose returns are identifiable.
By enhancing the process of intermediation in general, the 
securities market may speed up the process of integrating 
formal and informal money markets, and increase the 
effectiveness of monetary and credit p o l i c i e s .
The above discussion, however, must not amount to
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neglecting possible shortcomings of securities markets, 
especially in the context of LDCs. Securities markets may 
lead to an unequal distribution of wealth, encourage rash 
speculations .with destabilizing economic effects, and give 
rise to dishonest practices such as false statements and 
insider dealing. However, these limitations may be contained 
through adequate regulations and genuine supervision by 
authorities. For example, wealth distribution may be 
favourably influenced by ensuring that the values of shares 
are affordable by average savers, and that appropriate tax 
policies are implemented. Another important objection to 
securities markets is that they may allocate funds to 
projects according to a financial criteria irrespective of 
their economic and social benefits, and that due to, e.g, 
inadequate information investors may still be biased in 
favour of shares issued by large and well-established firms 
as against new ones. These are significant issues that have 
to be carefully dealt with by the authorities to avoid 
allocational problems. Again, the authorities may through tax 
concessions or subsidies influence the flow of funds in the 
direction of projects that are, strongly, in line with 
national interests. But, such policies must not amount to 
manipulation of the market, or go beyond what is necessary to 
correct its inefficiencies.
6.3.2 Capital Market Theory and the Islamic Theory of 
Finance:
The risk and return features of the PLS system are at the 
centre of the debate over the Islamic financial system 
examined in the preceding chapter. But, the relationship 
between risk and expected return is also at the heart of 
capital market theory^14*, or modern portfolio theory (Kitchen 
1986, P.24). It is, therefore, not difficult to point out the 
similarities between the PLS system and capital markets. In
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particular, we make the hypothesis that the solvency, 
liquidity, risk and return aspects of the main PLS 
instruments, namely Mu s h a r a k a h  and Mu r a b a h a h , are 
essentially the same as those of a securities market. 
Moreover, unless the present organization and structure of 
PLS institutions is supported by a securities market, they 
may not have any significant positive contribution to the 
process of intermediation and growth over conventional 
financial intermediaries; the ethical, and socio-religious 
fulfillment of being in conformity with Islamic tenets aside. 
We have already seen in the previous chapter that 
notwithstanding their relative success, Islamic banks, in 
Sudan, tend to have relatively higher operational costs than 
conventional banks. To demonstrate the hypothesis stated 
above, we discuss below the capital market theory, and its 
application to a PLS system.
According to Kitchen (ibid) the origin of the capital 
market theory lies in Markowitz (1952), who demonstrated that 
unless returns on securities are perfectly correlated, 
portfolio diversification reduces risk. Total risk was 
subsequently delineated into: Market or systematic risk,
which cannot be reduced through diversification; and non- 
market or specific risk, which can be eliminated by 
diversification. Market risk results from factors exogenous 
to firms whose shares are being traded, and affect share 
prices as well as the whole economy in the same direction. 
The values of individual shares vary around a market average 
with high variability shares offering prospects of greater 
gains/losses as well as risk and vice versa. In contrast, 
specific risk originates from factors, such as product mix, 
managerial and technological innovations,...,etc, that are 
endogenous to firms.
Assuming an efficient market(15), i.e. a market which fully 
comprehends and reflects all available information, the
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expected returns on diversified portfolios would depend on 
market risk, which is acceptable. For a single period, 
expected return, r, may be defined as:
(6.1) r = (D+T-I)/I
Where D represents dividends or assets; I and T are the 
initial and terminal prices of the asset, at the beginning 
and end of the period, respectively. On the assumption that 
investors use expected values of D and T, the expected value 
of T is given by:
n
t  Ti?i
1=1
Where Tj_ is the ith outcome of T, and is the probability 
attached to that outcome; there are n outcomes, each having 
its own probability.
The theory, further, assumes that the riskiness of an asset 
may be measured by the dispersion of its returns, 
approximated by the standard deviation (G) or by the variance 
(<j2 f v) around its expected return. Moreover, possible 
returns are assumed to be normally distributed, and this 
precludes the possibility of a skewed probability 
distribution. The framework just outlined may be used to 
determine the relationship between expected return and total 
risk, as divided into market and non-market risk. Denoting 
the sensitivity of individual share prices to a change in 
overall market conditions by (3, and specific risk by a , then 
the two types of risk may be estimated by the model:
(6.2) y = P% + a
Where y is the return on an individual share over a certain 
period of time, and % is the return on the market portfolio 
over the same period. Given a and (3, the resulting 
correlation coefficient (p) indicates the extent to which
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individual share price is correlated with the market average.
In the above equation only a is a choice variable for 
investors, since it can be influenced by portfolio selection 
or diversification. But, this depends on the availability of 
risk— free (albeit in a relative sense) investments or 
returns, which are usually provided by government securities 
or bank time deposits. The choice of a risk-free investment 
depends on investors' preference; long-term investments, as 
opposed to short-term ones, are, normally, less liquid, but 
promise higher returns/losses. In the presence of risk-free 
assets, the relationship between an investors's expected 
return and the accompanying risk may be demonstrated as in 
figure (6.1). At zero risk, the investor can obtain the risk­
free rate of return, but as his willingness to take risk 
increases, so his required rate of return rises. The 
existence and shape of the market line, represented by the 
combinations of risk and expected return available to the 
investor, depend on the efficient market hypothesis. The 
relationship in figure (6.1) is known as Capital Market Asset 
Pricing Model <16), CMAPM. The behaviour of a risk-averse 
investor, the relationship between portfolio risk and return, 
and the position of the capital market line are also shown in 
figure (6.2) below. In addition, the figure shows the 
Efficiency Frontier (EF)*17*, which represents the set of 
perfectly diversified portfolios giving the highest expected 
return for a certain portfolio risk. The risk-averse investor 
would select a portfolio along this line according to his 
risk-return preferences.
Provided the possibility of investment in risk-free assets, 
with a rate of return, r^ , and risky assets, with a rate of 
return ra, the investor may wish to combine the two by 
putting a proportion X of his funds into the latter, and (1- 
X) into the former. Thus, his total return, r^ , will be:
(6.3) rt = raX + ri(l-X)
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Figure (6.1)
Risk and Expected Return
Market Line
Expected
Return
Risk-free
Rate
Risk
The investor's portfolio will be located somewhere along 
the line r-j_M (the capital market line) depending on the value 
he attaches to X. The line must intersect the EF at some 
point (where X=l). But, since it reflects increases in total 
returns corresponding to some increases in risk, it is 
tangential to the frontier at the point of optimum risk- 
return combination (point M) . The lender would at any point 
between r^ and M, maximize his expected return for the same 
level of risk, but only at M that an optimum risk-return 
combination may be attained. On the other hand, a borrower 
would be able to raise his risk-taking and expected return to 
a point beyond M, say point C. But, he will be above the EF, 
and would obtain higher return for the same risk he would 
take at D, a point on the EF.
This, however, is not the case in practice, where lending 
and borrowing do not take place at the same market rate; 
while the capital market line, r-j_M, may approximate the 
lending rate, the borrowing rate would be slightly higher. In 
addition, it is possible, especially, for large and
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institutional investors, to reduce, or even eliminate, risk 
even when there are no risk-free assets. This can be done 
through the simultaneous issue of risky assets and holding of 
risky liabilities, which generate hedged portfolios.
Figure (6:2.)
The capital Market Line (CML)
Expected
Return
CML
r
m
EFr
a
r
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a a Total Portfolio Risk
The capital market theory is constructed as a tool for the 
analysis of the workings of capital markets in advanced 
countries. Leaving aside its relevance to LDCs, for a moment, 
we consider its application to a PLS system.
To start with, in a PLS system, the assumption of risk-free 
assets and returns has to be abandoned, since only investment 
deposits earn profits from productive investments, and 
portfolio hedging is at odd with the Islamic principle of 
risk-sharing. Portfolio diversification is only relevant in 
the form of risk pooling in the case of institutional 
investors. Therefore, the only alternative to risk-bearing
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investment are cash balances, that have no real yield, 
assuming a zero rate of inflation. The portfolio selection 
for an investor in the PLS system would, thus, be between 
cash balances an_d PLS instruments. The risk and return 
combinations confronting an investor, and their implications 
may be demonstrated, with the use of the following notations 
and in the framework of a portfolio model<18k.
Recalling the basic PLS instruments of investment, e.g,„ 
M u s h a r a k a h , lenders and borrowers/entrepreneurs share 
expected profit/loss according to an agreed formula. 
Representing the average operating surplus- resulting from 
entrepreneurial activity by 7C, and the proportion of this 
surplus forwarded to depositors in a PLS account (19> by q, the 
respective shares of depositors and entrepreneurs in total 
profits will be given by qK and (l-q)7t. Given total deposits, 
K, then the overall profit rate, Z, may be defined as Z= 7C/K, 
and returns to depositors, Z^ , as Z^qn/K. As in the capital 
market theory, the risk attached to an asset under the PLS 
system is given by the normal probability distribution of 
returns, <J, around their expected values. Assuming that total 
wealth, CO, put in deposits is forwarded for use by 
entrepreneurs, then total risk, CT, will be:
(6.4) (JT = CJCO
And on the assumption that profit expectations are based on 
last year’s profit rate, Z e x p e c t e d  profit, ZE, is given 
by:
(6.5) ZE = (qic.1)/(k_1)
Total expected return, R, would thus be:
(6.6) R = ZECO
From equation (§»4) C0=aT/O, and substituting this into 
equation (6.6), we obtain:
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(6.7) R = ZE 0T/0
The information contained in equations (6.4) and (6.7) may 
be used to show the characteristics of the PLS system as in 
figure (6.3).-The upper right hand quadrant shows the budget 
line representing the trade-off between risk and expected 
return (profit). The slope of this line (Zg/G) is obtained by 
differentiating equation (6.7) with respect to G^. The lower 
quadrant gives the degree of risk undertaken corresponding to 
wealth placed in PLS accounts. The slope of the risk-wealth 
line, 1/G, is obtained by rearranging equation (6.4) and 
differentiating with respect to Gy. ©t is the point at which 
all funds are invested in PLS accounts, with the 
corresponding total risk, GTmax. Similarly, R<j gives the 
maximum expected return that oTmax corresponds to. A 
preference ordering for a risk-averse individual may be 
superimposed on the budget line.. The point of tangency 
between the indifference curve and the budget line represents 
the optimal portfolio mix of money holdings (M*C0) and PLS 
accounts (OM*) . Corresponding to OM* is OR* the expected 
return to the lender/depositor.
In the above analysis, the supply of funds to PLS 
accounts would vary positively with q (provided and
Z2=q7C_i/K_]_) . This is so because higher q would lead to a 
higher budget line, and shows more wealth being diverted into 
PLS accounts.
The analyses of the PLS system are based, among others, on 
the assumption that banks play a pure intermediary role. The 
validity of this assumption seems to depend on the existence 
of competitive markets, in which case there would be little 
difference between purely intermediary banks and non­
intermediary banks. In practice, competition will reduce 
returns to non-intermediary banks to the level of costs plus 
normal profit, and this amounts to the administrative fees 
charged by pure intermediary banks.
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Figure (6.3)
Risk and Return in a PLS System
Expected
Return
R*
M*
1/a
Contrasting the position of individual investors under the 
PLS system and the conventional one, it is clear that the 
former is worse-off in so far as risk is concerned. The PLS 
system resembles a capital or securities market with no fixed 
interest rate, or risk-free assets. -Thus, the PLS' investor 
faces both market and non-market risks. But, higher risk may 
entail higher returns, and the underlying preference 
functions of investors in the two system may be different. 
The PLS instruments may still maximize economic welfare if 
they attract a net increase in the supply of investible funds 
by devout Muslims. Meanwhile, there is no prior reason to 
suggest that borrowers would be worse-off under the PLS 
arrangements, as against the conventional system.
To conclude, there are arguably specific ethical and socio-
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religious points for the PLS system, but there are no prior 
reasons for it to be more preferable than the traditional 
one, as judged on risk and return grounds. Moreover, since 
the PLS system is geared towards equity rather than debt- 
finance, there arises the problem of choice between long-term 
assets and short-term assets; the latter would be more 
limited*21* . As a result of the relative illiquidity of equity 
instruments the supply of funds to the capital market would 
be restricted if there is no market for outstanding PLS 
assets to be traded. Such a market would be needed to provide 
liquidity for holders of long-term investment instruments who 
wish to sell them before maturity. Thus, the analysis in this 
section lends support to our previous argument that while the 
nature of the PLS instruments makes it similar to a primary 
securities market, the existence of a secondary securities 
market appears to be a pre-requisite for it to be successful. 
We discuss below the relevance of the capital market theory 
to LDCs.
6.3.3 Capital Market Theory and Developing Countries:
In reviewing empirical tests of the capital market theory 
in developed countries, Kitchen (ibid) concluded that the 
results of the tests have, at best, been ambiguous. Capital 
markets*22) are relatively efficient in some of these 
countries, but not in the sense embodied in the efficiency 
assumptions. Nevertheless, the principle of portfolio 
diversification and the linear relationship between risk and 
return remain widely accepted. Samules (1981) identifies the 
sources of securities markets1 inefficiency with: (1)
inadequate number of traders to ensure competition and 
insufficient number of securities to enable portfolio 
diversification; (2) different risk preferences of investors, 
and thereby lack of uniform response to market changes (this 
is not necessarily a drawback as investors with different
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risk preferences can choose different points along the 
capital market line); (3) inadequate market regulations and
standard of disclosure by companies; (4) poor communication 
facilities, which result in costly and limited access to 
information; and (5) lack of competent analyst and 
professional advisors, resulting in differing predictions 
about market performance.
The repercussions of all these types of inefficiencies are 
that capital markets are less likely to be efficient in LDCs. 
Yet, Kitchen (ibid) concludes that the capital market theory 
may provide a guide to capital markets in developing 
countries. The principle of investment diversification may 
lead to an improved project choice, and international 
portfolio selection may be relevant to financial institutions 
operating in LDCs. But, volatile inflation and interest rate 
control may have profound adverse effects on capital markets 
in these countries. A more fundamental problem in countries 
whose scarce resources are desperately needed to be 
productively utilized is the potential conflict between 
financial efficiency and economic efficiency.
A financially efficient market is one in which prices 
reflect all available information, whereas an economically 
efficient market is the one that allocates resources in a 
Pareto-efficient way, i.e., no one can be made better-off 
without someone else being made worse-off. If other markets 
are distorted a perfectly efficient capital market may not 
lead to an economically efficient allocation of resources. 
This possible divergence between financial and economic 
efficiency results from differences between private and 
public interests, and may only be mitigated by government 
action that carefully observes the balance between the two.
It follows from the above discussion, however, that market 
efficiency is not a solid criteria in determining whether or 
not securities markets should be promoted in a particular
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country. As Keane (1985) argues "there are no significant 
assumptions upon which the validity of market efficiency 
depends.... It is not conditional upon there being a certain 
proportion, let alone a majority of skilled investors.... The 
only assumption that the theory may be said to depend upon is 
that it is possible, notwithstanding the existence of naive 
investors, and despite the activities -of speculators and 
claims by analysts that they possess superior skills, that 
the market is, nonetheless, successful in generating prices 
that instantaneously and correctly capture all new 
information", (P. 13).
This possibility, as the theory asserts, is amenable to 
verification only by rigorous empirical analysis. It is our 
point that there is not a prior reason for securities markets 
not to be efficient, in some sense, in LDCs, or they should 
not be developed for the latent fears of inefficiency. But, 
there are certain limiting factors that ought to be 
considered in assessing the potential for a securities market 
in a LDC. The main of these factors relate to the supply of, 
and demand for securities.
On the supply side, the types of ownership of economic
enterprises and the traditional financing patterns may 
present serious challenges. Large firms are usually owned by
governments or foreigners and may not welcome public
participation unless asked by the authorities to do so. At 
the same time, endogenous private enterprises are normally 
family-owned, and tend to be small in size. Such firms also
tend to have a limited scope for expansion and fear
participation by outsiders to protect family or minority
rights. While local firms may rely on self-finance, given low 
costs of borrowing in LDCs, entrepreneurs in general would 
prefer institutional finance.
In an Islamic financial system, however, the cost of
borrowing is likely to be in line with returns on shares, and
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financial institutions providing credit would act as 
participants. Firms may, therefore, be encouraged to issue 
shares instead of relying on debt-finance in their expansion 
strategies. Yet, possible constraints on the supply of 
securities, resulting from the type of ownership may persist.
On the demand side, there are prior-, reasons, according to 
Maniatis(23) ( 1971), in believing that the demand for 
securities would be limited in a LDC. Firstly, individual 
savings accrue, mainly, to financially unsophisticated 
people, who may only through a protracted process of learning 
consider dealing in a securities market. Secondly, shares 
ownership may only be attractive to individuals with high 
incomes, and capable of making diversified portfolios. 
Thirdly, the generally underdeveloped financial system means 
that there would be a limited institutional demand for 
securities. Fourthly, price uncertainty reinforces the 
traditional preference for money over financial assets. 
Finally, accurate information is scarce and costly to obtain, 
with the result that securities holding may be extremely 
risky.
In a counter argument, Drake (1980) concludes that there is 
no enough empirical evidence to support the first four 
points, and that the experience of some developing countries, 
namely Singapore and Malaysia, seems to refute Maniatis' 
case. Nevertheless, the scarcity of information and 
regulations are important problems that merit careful 
attention by the authorities in LDCs. In fact, as Parkinson 
(1984), who investigated the issue behaviour of companies 
quoted in the Nairobi Stock Exchange over the period 1974-78 
suggests, demand side problems in LDCs have been exaggerated. 
He notes that:
"Kenya has a supply of savers who are willing to invest
in corporate securities, but who cannot find sufficient
investment opportunities.... In almost every case the
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issues have proved to be sufficiently attractive to be 
fully subscribed... Hence companies could make more new 
issues available to investors, with every expectation of 
success" (Italics added), P.371.
It is conceivable that the aforementioned factors are 
likely to be less potent to constrict demand for securities 
in an Islamic context. Islam discourages hoarding, by making 
its holders liable to a religious tax (Zakat) , and this may 
induce savers to seek financial or other investments with 
positive nominal returns. As far as risk and return are 
concerned there may be little difference between high income 
and low income savers; differences would arise only in terms 
of diversification within risky assets, and cost of portfolio 
management. Substantial risk reduction may not be possible, 
as there are no risk-free investments in the PLS system. But, 
since real investment and profit-making are the primary 
concern of Islamic financial' institutions, institutional 
participation in a securities market is likely to be high. 
The marked participation by Islamic banks in investment and 
holding companies may be an indication of this.
Prices uncertainty is a problem to reckon with in any way, 
particularly if prices are highly variable. Finally, the 
information problem is one of substance, but it is in the 
interest of all Islamic financial institutions, which would 
otherwise invest individually on information gathering, to 
support or establish a central mechanism for collecting and 
disseminating economic information.
6.4 Prospects of a Securities Market in Sudan:
This section summarises the main arguments for a securities 
market in Sudan, discusses Sudanese attempts at its 
promotion, considers recent socio-economic and legislative 
developments that could influence its progress, and suggests 
measures for its gradual implementation.
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6.4.1 Summary of The Arguments for the Securities 
Market:
Apart from the general benefits from securities markets in 
LDCs, the following arguments for a securities market in 
Sudan emerge from the preceding discussion.
1. It has been shown that the risk and return characteristics 
of the Islamic financial system are, essentially, the same as 
those of a conventional securities market supported by a 
limited financial market. Therefore, the arguments for 
Islamic banking would, generally/ apply to the case for a 
securities market.
2. To enhance the liquidity of Islamic banks, and holders of 
long-dated or investment deposits, we pointed out that there 
need to exist a market in which such financial assets as 
investment certificates may be traded. This gap in the 
Islamic financial system may only be bridged through the 
development of a secondary securities market.
3. As we have indicated in this and the previous chapter, by 
virtue of their operations, Islamic financial institutions 
have to be in close contact with the real economic activities 
they finance. Therefore, individual banks will have to invest 
considerably in collecting information concerning these 
activities. The presence of a securities market may provide a 
pool of information that would help banks and other financial 
intermediaries to reduce their operational costs.
4. Since, the securities market may help integrate real and 
financial sectors, it may reduce general costs leading to 
both financial and economic efficiency improvements.
5. The activities of development and holding companies 
provide an encouraging example of the possibility that share 
companies may be successfully developed. However, at the 
present Mudarabah companies represent sources of funds 
outside the domain of monetary and credit policies. If a 
securities market exits, the activities of these companies
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will be part of it, and may thereby, be properly regulated. 
Accordingly, public and private equity will cease being 
traded on an adhoc basis.
6. Though it is not clear how the proposed securities market, 
and indeed the present Islamic financial system, can deal 
with the problem of public deficits' financing, the 
securities market would help raising • funds for public 
investments with identifiable returns. And this will ease the 
government budget and release resources for other social 
investments.
7. Finally, there are reasons to believe that a securities 
market would attract foreign equity capital, particularly 
from rich Arab nations. Private Arab funds, for instance, 
have contributed substantially towards the establishment of 
the largest sugar production scheme, and the second largest 
agricultural scheme. And muslims from outside the country 
hold, among other financial investments, 40% of the Faisal 
Islamic Bank's capital, and 51% of that of the Islamic 
Investment Company. Besides, Sudanese nationals working 
abroad form a large class of relatively wealthy individuals, 
the majority of whom may not be able to undertake investment 
on their own, and for whom buying company shares, e.g., might 
be an attractive type of investment.
6.4.2 Sudanese Attempts at Establishing a Securities 
Market:
The Sudanese practical experience with share dealings as a 
step towards a securities market began in 1966, with the 
issue of government bonds for the value of Ls 15 mn. The 
objective was to raise medium-term and long-term funds to 
finance development projects. In the following year, national 
defense bonds were also issued, and a stock exchange 
committee was set up. The committee considered giving the 
leading role, in this respect, to financial institutions.
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But, it was concluded in 1968 that due to their structure, 
strategies, lack of qualified cadre, .etc, these institutions 
were not prepared to mobilise resources through a stock 
market, f.ublic participation was expected to be limited 
mainly due to its primary concern with liquidity and quick- 
yields. It was also reported that government and family-owned 
enterprises represent the main form of ownership at that time 
(Lees and Brooks, 1977), and that the shares of only 5 
companies were distributed widely enough to be transacted. 
Instead of a stock exchange market, the committee recommended 
the establishment of the Sudanese Savings Bank as a channel 
for development funds, besides a department for government 
securities. With rising public deficits and foreign debt 
servicing, the securities department continued issuing 
government stocks and bonds, held mainly by financial 
institutions, in addition to treasury bills.
Be that as it may, the stock exchange committee was less 
enthusiastic, and lacked government support, as may be 
deducecL: from its inability to act upon simple policy areas 
as the development of a legislative framework for the market, 
which can provide an umbrella for private initiatives. 
Indeed, the idea of the market came to a complete halt with 
the 1970 nationalization Act. Since then the largely 
government - controlled financial sector responded passively 
to its demands for credit on its own terms. Government 
securities and bonds issued at various times were to be 
automatically renewed as they reach their maturities .
Between 1966 and 1983, the central bank accustomed to hold 
non-transferable treasury bills for a constant annual amount 
of Ls 13 mn, which was raised to Ls 29.1 mn as from 1984 
onward. Commercial banks also used to hold government bills 
for a constant annual total of Ls 5.1 mn between 1966 and 
1975. This together with treasury bills, which banks started 
holding in 197 6, increased to Ls 55.7 mn over the period
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1976-1984, and to Ls 60.3 mn from 1985 onward. Government 
bonds held by the public maintained an annual average of Ls 5 
mn between 1978 and 1985, but fell dramatically since then. 
This was presumably due to their falling real returns, and 
the adoption of Islamic principles of finance.
In 1975, a secretarial office for a stock exchange market 
was set up within the central bank. Not surprisingly, it took 
the office 7 years to prepare the Stock Exchange Act, which 
was passed in 1982. The Act stipulated that a primary and 
secondary securities market will be developed, and that all 
financial institutions shall subscribe to its capital of Ls 
300,000. It has also referred to measures to be taken in 
order to promote and protect the market. These included 
adequate legislation, listing rules, disclosure 
principles, , and encouragement of professional brokers.
Again the laxity with which the Stock Exchange Act was 
brought forward continued to shadow its implementation, and 
the Act as well as the office were overtaken by subsequent 
developments, of which the 1983 Islamisation measures are 
paramount. "It was not clear by 1989 that the office was 
formally dissolved or spontaneously faded out" . Before 
considering the necessary steps for making the securities 
market a reality, we discuss below these socio-economic and 
legislative changes, and the likelihood of their impact on 
the progress of the market.
On the economic front, we have already seen in chapter 3 
that the economy was actually retrogressing with massive 
public deficits and soared inflation. Public as well as 
private companies depended heavily on bank credit, while most 
of them were operating below the break-even point. Indeed, 
some companies ceased operations and still obtain bank loans 
under government pressures, and many public enterprises have 
had their short-term loans being transferred into long-term 
credits due to repayment problems. The denationalization era,
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however, witnessed widespread privatization, and with trade 
and foreign exchange liberalization in the late 1970s, 
private enterprises flourished with marked foreign 
participation.. The number of firms operating in the country 
was believed to be about 6,000 (Stock Exchange Act 1982). 
But, with deteriorating general economic conditions, and 
continuing dominance of family-based ownership, few of them 
may qualify or opt for dealing in a securities market.
Over the last two decades many social changes occurred, 
with marked effects on individuals attitude and behaviour. 
Among these factors are rapid economic changes, internal and 
external migration, and rising literacy rate. For fears of 
the future, widening wants and aspirations, individuals are 
becoming increasingly concerned with achieving personal 
economic targets. As a result, the drive for profit-making 
and wealth accumulation has been accentuated, and economic 
and commercial dealings are no longer based on complete 
confidence, as before, but rather on legal contracts in order 
to secure ownership and rights. Another related phenomenon, 
as we noted in chapter 3, is the prevalence of informal 
economic activities, such as black marketeering. The exact 
extent of the "underground" economy is unknown, but it is 
believed to be substantial relative to the whole economy. 
This, of course, squeezes organized markets, and together 
with other factors suggest that there is a high need for 
legal structures and organization so as to regulate economic 
activities, before a securities market can be developed.
The most important legislative change is the adoption of 
Islamic Sharia code in 1983, and the economic dimension of 
this is represented by the abolition of fixed interest rates 
in all internal formal financial arrangements. The 
traditional form of securities markets is based on interest 
rates, shares excepted. The issue and trading of shares is in 
harmony with Islamic injunctions, preference shares apart.
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Moreover, as the adoption of compensatory interest rates in 
1987 may indicate, the authorities may allow such a means if 
necessary for the functioning of the securities market.
There have .been no other economically important legislative 
developments. The 1925 company Act and the 1982 Stock 
Exchange Act remained intact. But, as we have seen before, 
the central bank Act was amended several•times as to remove 
constraints on government borrowing; some short-term bank 
credit to the government have been rescheduled over 94 years. 
To the extent that bank loans are easily available to the 
government it has little incentive to resort to financing 
through a securities market. However, provided the economic 
impact of excessive deficit financing, this position is bound 
to change if the political system has any responsibility 
towards economic stabilization and growth.
To conclude this section, in the unstable political and 
economic environment in Sudan, the idea of a securities 
market could only be put forward as part of a package 
encompassing measures to stabilize the economy, and set up a 
macroeconomic framework for future policy action. 
Nevertheless, the importance of this market remains, at least/ 
as far as, the Islamic financial system is maintained. 
(Parkinson's remarks about the stock exchange market in 
Kenya, which is in a comparable stage of economic development 
with Sudan, provide an encouraging example.) And this implies 
that the securities market should be gradually implemented, 
but total commitment on the part of the authorities, 
institutions, and industrial associations is vital.
6.4.3 Measures to Promote the Securities Market:
The prospects of the securities market would depend, 
largely, on political stability, moderation of inflation and 
exchange rate fluctuations, and clear development strategies 
both in the private and public sectors. These conditions are,
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in one way or another, necessary for the economy to grow. 
Apart from that, the starting point of the gradual process of 
implementing the market is the development of a legal and 
administrative framework, besides an efficient information 
system. This is necessary in order to evaluate potential 
supply and demand for securities, and to spread the idea of 
the market amongst potential participant’s. Banks and other 
financial institutions ought to be convinced and persuaded to 
subscribe substantially to its initial costs, and at the same 
time, be given reasonable freedom under competitive 
conditions. The companies operating at losses should no 
longer be protected via cheap loans, but exposed to 
competition if they can survive, or otherwise be liquidated. 
Moreover, the investment and share companies Acts ought to be 
harmonized. Pricing of shares, and output alike, should, in 
general, reflect changes in the underlying market conditions.
At the initial stages of the market, however, adequate 
involvement of the authorities may be required as to protect 
it against wide fluctuations in prices. It may be necessary 
to be ascertained that shares, e.g., maintain their nominal 
values, and that in the event of oversubscription, individual 
share values are sufficiently lowered to allow a more wide 
distribution of wealth and income. It may be particularly 
necessary to take firm measures for effecting the supply of, 
and demand for securities.
Measures to induce the supply of securities would include 
the following. Firstly, widening of the ownership of public 
sector's companies, which may still be 51% government 
controlled if that is necessary for distribution of income 
and wealth without impairing their economic standing. The 
financing of new development projects should be through the 
market as far as it is possible. Secondly, broadening of the 
market infrastructure by such means as shares insurance, and 
guaranteeing of the nominal values of shares. Thirdly,
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regular assessment and publications providing information 
about firms and operations of the market. Finally, the 
evolution of sharec companies in recent years needs to be 
properly encouraged.
The following measures may favourably influence demand for 
securities. Firstly, tax concessions for profits on shares, 
and encouragement of share companies to .allocate adequate 
portions of their profits to shareholders. Secondly, 
stabilization of the exchange rate so as to make securities 
attractive to foreigners. Thirdly, ensuring monetary 
stability is necessary for investment projection and 
predictions about the market.
To reduce risk, information officers and market analysts 
should be legally bound to give a clear picture to all 
participants about developments in the market. And to enhance 
the degree of liquidity for the market as a whole, the 
secondary market should be properly developed. Furthermore, 
it may be appropriate that banks make credit on shares 
guarantees.
In short, the creation of a securities market can only be 
perceived as part of efforts to reconstruct and develop the 
Sudanese economy. But, with the evolution of the Islamic 
financial institutions, the securities market is not only 
important for the whole economy perse, but particularly 
necessary for the well-functioning of these institutions.
6.5 Summary and Conclusions:
The objective of this chapter has been to examine and 
assess the performance of non-bank financial intermediaries, 
and to analyse the need and prospects for a securities market 
in Sudan. The analysis suggests that though insurance 
companies have come to play an important role both as 
providers of security services and as financial 
Intermediaries, their activities, particularly lending, have
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been tightly restricted by government policies. Moreover, the 
operations of these companies have also been adversely 
influenced by the abolition of fixed interest rates, without 
suitable alternative investment outlets. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that within the limited freedom they enjoyed, 
insurance companies have tended to invest mainly in real 
property.
Besides enhancing the process of financial intermediation 
in Sudan, the experience of development and holding companies 
indicates the willingness of the private sector to invest in 
shares, and to play a more profound role in economic 
development. But, the activities of these companies, like 
those of banks, are largely limited to urban domains, and the 
informal money market still seems to be an important source 
of credit to rural producers. With the recent developments in 
the financial sector, there is a need as well as a 
possibility for a securities market to be developed. It has 
been argued in the chapter that the Islamic financial system 
is essentially a form of a securities market, whose legal and 
administrative structures are yet to be developed. But, the 
existence of the latter is a prerequisite for the former to 
be well-functioning.
The development of the securities market, however, ought to 
be linked to economic stabilization and development 
strategies, and be gradually and carefully pursued, but with 
total determination, which appeared to be lacking in previous 
attempts.
Notes:
1. There is a pension fund, whose operations are not covered, here, 
because of data unavailabilty.
2. For Such aspects as principles of insurance see e.g. J. Revell 
(1973), PP.401-443, and Siddiqi (1985b).
3. Two of these companies were established on Islamic principles, but at 
the present time all of them are asked to comply with these principles.
4. Ministry of Finance: The economic Survey (1987/88), P.195,
5. This includes co-insurance debts and indirect business from ceding 
companies.
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6. The Islamic Development Company Act (1983), P.5
7. These are the Elruasi Islamic Company, the Islamic Investment 
Company, and the Emigrants Company.
8. The public office of the company refused to disclose information 
relating to its operations.
9. The securities market is a narrower concept than ~the capital market. 
For a further discussion of concepts and terminologies see, e.g., A. 
Gart (1988).
10. This, of course, implies that the securities market in an Islamic 
system is narrower than the conventional one.
11. For a survey of economists views see Kitchen (1986).
12. This assumes away market distortions such as monopoly.
13. It provides a mechanism for the use of such monetary instruments as 
open market operation. But, again this may not apply in the case of the 
Islamic system, and will be discussed further later in this chapter.
14. The term capital market is used as synonymous to securities market 
as defined above.
15. For markets to be efficient in a financial sense, the theory asserts 
that there should be:(l) no transaction costs; (2) freely available 
information to all participants;(3) agreement among market agents on the 
implications of available information on the current and future prices, 
risks and returns of securities;(4) all investors are risk-averse, i.e.. 
maximize return for a given risk and vice versa; and (5) a large number 
of traders and securities so that balanced portfolio selection is 
possible.
16. For further discussion see Kitchen (1986), PP.35-37.
17. The EF shows combinations of risk and returns from a given set of
securities. Only the points along the EF are both attainable and 
efficient.
18. The basic features of the model below are due to S. R. Khan (1987),
whose concern was to analyse the risk and return aspects of the PLS
system. The point of departure, here, lies in the contrast between the 
PLS system and the conventional capital or securities market.
19. This assumes that banks play a purely intermediary role.
20. The supply of loanable funds (S) is a function of a and ZE , i.e. 
S=f(CJ,ZE ); AS/AZE>0., while demand (D) is a function of q and PE  ^ with 
2 E =(i_q)ft 1/k besides other factors such as technology, product
m i x , ...,etc.
21. Because their returns are difficult to identify - see chapter 5.
22. Among many capital markets in both developed and developing 
countries, only London, New York, and Tokyo markets are fairly efficient 
(Samules, 1981) .
23. See also Samules and Yacout (1981) for similar observations.
24. Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various editions.
25. Stock Exchange Committee Report (1989), Bank of Sudan, Khartoum.
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CHAPTER 7
MONEY, CREDIT AND THE REAL SECTOR: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL 
OF THE SUDANESE ECONOMY
7.1 Introduction:
It has been argued in chapters 1 and- 2 that changes in 
monetary variables may influence real variables in the 
economy. In chapter 4/ t*16 Granger's causality test indicated 
a supply-leading role for monetary growth in Sudan. But, it 
was also maintained that monetary expansion in Sudan was 
largely the result of increasing government deficit financed 
chiefly via borrowing from the central bank. This was 
particularly the case since the late 1970s, a period during 
which inflation rates soared, while the average real growth 
rate was negative.
There is a good deal of literature (1) that suggests that 
money created to finance government expenditure, or 
inflationary finance, may induce economic growth by raising 
the rate of investment. But, far from promoting growth, high 
and unstable inflation rates may have rather destabilizing 
effects. Particularly with fixed nominal rates of interest 
this may lead to financial disintermediation by lowering 
demand for financial assets, and reversing the process of 
monetization, with adverse effects on the saving-investment 
process. Moreover, disequilibrium interest rates would entail 
non-price credit rationing, leading to misallocation of 
investible resources.
We have already examined the role of monetary and financial 
institutions in resource mobilization and utilization, 
besides the structural and institutional factors influencing 
them (Chapters 4-6) . Taking into account the basic features 
of the Sudanese^ economy, this chapter attempts to construct 
and estimate a macroeconometric model using data for the
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period 1960-88. The main aims of the model are:
1. To provide quantitative information on the behaviour of 
key monetary variables.
2. To test the major hypothesis on finance and growth by 
examining quantitatively the link between the financial and 
expenditure sectors of the Sudanese economy.
3. To evaluate, through simulation experiments, the relative 
effectiveness of major policy variables in the process of 
economic transformation and development.
As far as we know, no such attempt has been made with 
respect to Sudan, though several single equation models have 
been estimated^) . An exception is Omer and Ahmed (1985) who 
developed and estimated a macroeconomic model for Sudan, in 
which the monetary sector is not explicitly modelled. 
However, there is a good number of macroeconomic models that 
explicitly incorporate the financial sector. But, most of 
these models (3) have been constructed and tested in the 
context of developed economies, with interest rates playing a 
major role in the transmission mechanism, or the link between 
the monetary and real sectors, as a common feature. Under 
conditions of interest rate fixing and other constraints in 
the financial market in LDCs, interest rates may not play a 
significant role in the transmission mechanism. Therefore, a 
more direct process of transmission is required. Theoretical 
models of the direct transmission process date back to, 
notably, Johansen (1958) and Shapiro (1966), but again such 
models have rarely been applied to developing economies^).
In the model of the Sudanese economy to be specified in 
section (7.2) below, there is credit-rationing because of 
below equilibrium rates of interest, while government 
borrowing from the central bank provides the main stimulus 
for changes in high-powered money. In this section the model 
is specified equation by equation. The complete model and its 
salient features are presented in section (7.3), whereas
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section (7.4) discusses the estimation techniques and 
structure, and reports and analyses the results of the 
estimated equations. In section (7.5), the model is 
simulated, various policy experiments conducted and their 
implications analysed. The main estimation and simulation 
results of the model, and their implications will be further 
considered in the following chapter in co.nnection with the 
major findings of other chapters.
7.2 Formulation of the Model:
7.2.1 An Overview:
The model places emphasis on the implications of changes in 
reserve money, and credit on the rest of the economy. It is 
Keynesian in spirit in that output is demand-determined, 
while attempting to incorporate the main features of the 
Sudanese economy in general and the financial sector in 
particular. These features include:
1. Changes in reserve money are determined largely by 
government borrowing from the central bank, where government 
borrowing from deposit banks and the non-bank private sector 
is negligible. This is so because there is no, or extremely 
limited, primary market for government or private securities, 
while secondary securities markets are yet to be conceived.
2. There is no direct lending by the government or the 
central bank to the non-bank private sector.
3. Interest rates are administratively determined, normally 
below their market-clearing levels, resulting in non-price 
credit-rationing. Accordingly, credit availability is one of 
the determinants of aggregate expenditure.
4. There is strict control over exchange rates, foreign 
exchanges and foreign capital movement.
The Sudanese financial system is based on the banking 
sector, whose liabilities form the bulk of financial assets
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in private portfolios. Deficit spending units finance their 
expenditures chiefly through retained earnings and borrowing 
from banks. As noted in chapter 4, in this economy the 
authorities .use directives or quantitative measures to 
implement monetary policy. Further properties and assumptions 
of the model will be elaborated in the discussion below, but 
one basic deficiency of the model needs• to be highlighted. 
The model is built around the modern exchange sector, and 
does not account for the unorganized money market because of 
lack of information.
Throughout the rest of the chapter, the symbol A indicates 
change in, or flow of, a variable over period t, and is 
measured as the difference between end of period stocks in 
the present and previous periods. All relevant variables are 
measured in current domestic price and the real value of each 
variable is obtained by dividing by the appropriate price 
deflator(5).
7.2.2 The financial sector:
(1) Money supply: The stock of money in the economy (M) 
is the sum of total bank deposits (TD) and currency outside 
banks (C):
(7.1) Mt = TDt + Ct
Where TD comprises demand deposits plus time and saving 
deposits in period t. According to the equation above, money 
supply is demand-determined.
The stock of reserve money (RM) may be defined as banks' 
reserves, which consist of banks' deposits with the central 
bank plus vault cash, plus notes and coins in circulation 
with the public plus government deposits with the central 
bank. But, the stock of reserve money, which is the liability 
of the central bank, is by definition equal to its assets. 
The latter comprise central bank lending to the government 
(CBLG) and to banks (CBLB) plus foreign exchange reserves
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(F). Thus, the flow of reserve money may be expressed as:
(7.2) ARM = ACBLG + ACBLB + AF
The flow of foreign reserves into the 'central bank is 
determined by the balance of payments position, and net 
foreign capital flow (Fc), that is:
(7.3) AF = EX - IM + AFc
Where EX is the value of exports of goods and services; IM 
is total imports value.
According to equation (7.2) changes in reserve money may be 
considered as the result of a combination of fiscal and 
monetary policies. However it is to be expected from the 
discussion in chapters 3 and 4 that ACBLB is of little or no 
significance as a policy variable. It remains in the 
equation, therefore, that ACBLG is the main source of 
increases in RM, with foreign exchange reserves flow playing 
a mitigating function. Furthermore, while AF, which reflects 
balance of payments objectives, may hardly be used as a 
policy instrument, central bank lending to the government 
adjusts passively to its budget deficit (see equation 7.18 
below).
(2) Demand for Monetary Assets: We disaggregate demand
for financial assets by the non-bank private sector into 
currency and bank deposits. This disaggregation is necessary 
because the two types of assets may be substitutes; currency 
as opposed to deposits does not earn interest or profit 
income. Therefore, we assume that deposits will be preferred 
to currency holdings as a form of savings. Moreover, it is 
important in our model to study the demand for currency, 
which is a component of reserve money, separately, because 
the less of high-powered money held outside banks the greater 
the credit extension on a given stock of it (see equation 7.6 
below).
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Demand for currency is essentially a stock demand. We 
relate demand for currency in real terms (C/P) to real income 
( Y / P g ), and the opportunity cost of holding currency as 
represented by the deposit rate of interest (rd). Thus:
(7.4) Log (C/P) = OCq + cc^ log (Y/Pg) t + 0C2rd + (X3D78
+ a4Log(C/P)t-i
Where P and Pg are the consumer price index and GDP 
deflator, respectively. The income coefficient is expected to 
take a positive sign, while that of the interest rate would 
be negative. We believe that currency holdings may also be 
influenced by factors other than those already in the 
equation. For example, as the banking sector expands, 
currency may be partly replaced by bank money as a form of 
payments, and accordingly demand for C decreases. In the 
empirical literature, the number of banks1 branches is 
usually used as a proxy for development in banking services. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough data on this variable. 
However, we include D78, which is a dummy variable intended 
to capture the possible impact of Islamic banks on currency 
demand. As Islamic banks, which were incorporated as from 
1978, may encourage the use of banking facilities by those 
who may have religious inhibitions concerning the use of 
conventional banking facilities, the coefficient CC3 is 
expected to have a negative sign.
Demand for deposits is also a stock demand. We assume that 
the stock of deposits is determined by the banking system by 
its credit expansion as follows:
(7.5) TD = R + L - CBLB
There is, however, a certain long-run relationship between 
assets1 stock and private disposable income, and equation
(7.14) below ensures that this long run relationship holds.
(3) The flow of bank credit: The behaviour of
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commercial banks may be examined in terms of their lending 
activities and the reserves ratio. The flow of reserves (R) 
into commercial banks, at any particular point in time, is 
given by the flow of high-powered money(6) less currency held 
by the non-bank private sector. That is:
(7.6) AR = ARM - AC
The flow of total bank credit (AL) to the private sector is 
determined by the following identity:
(7.7) AL = [(1-ARR)/ARR]*AR + ACBLB + ANOL
Where ARR is the average reserves ratio, which is equal to 
the sum of the required reserves ratio (RRR) and free 
reserves ratio (FRR) . The term in brackets is the credit 
multiplier^). It has been assumed that the flow of central 
bank credits to commercial banks is relent to final 
borrowers. These loans are exogenously determined according 
to the extent of credit rationing, and in particular the 
credit requirements of priority sectors such as irrigated 
agriculture. ANOL accounts for the flow of net other loans by 
commercial banks, including forced lending to the government.
Having defined the credit multiplier in terms of ARR, we 
then need to explain the behaviour of this ratio. With a 
stable stock of deposits, and a relatively well developed 
interbank market, commercial banks may be assumed to hold 
reserves for transaction purposes only. Moreover, since the 
banking sector in Sudan was dominated by government- 
controlled banks over most of the period considered, it was 
easy for banks to buffer unexpected falls in reserves by 
borrowing from the central bank, and, thus, precautionary 
need for reserves was minimal. Under these conditions, the 
required reserves ratio may well explain both the forced 
reserves ratio and the free reserves ratio. Therefore, the 
equation for ARR may be specified as:
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(7.8) ARR = OC5 + (XgRRR + a7rl + (XqD78
Where rl is the lending rate representing the opportunity 
cost of keeping reserves, and, hence, (X7 would have a
negative sign. Transaction deposits of Islamic banks have, in 
theory, a 100% reserves cover, and, therefore, D78 is
employed in equation (7.8) to capture the .effect of this on
ARR after the incorporation of Islamic banks in 1978. 
Meanwhile, credit policy was also tightened as from 1984 
onward. But, in either case, the coefficient of D78 is
expected to be positive. In general if banks wish to hold, on 
average, a fixed free reserves to deposits ratio this will be 
reflected in the parameter OC5 taking on a larger value than 
unity. The coefficient (Xg is expected to be positive and 
highly significant.
It is to be noted before closing this subsection that 
because of credit rationing regimes, the quantity of credit 
available at any time is determined by suppliers of funds.
7.2.3 The Inflation Equation:
To explain changes in consumer price, we employ a function 
similar to the one developed by Laidler (1975), and applied 
in several subsequent studies. Consumer price inflation is 
assumed to depend on the expected inflation rate (II) and the 
level of excess demand in the economy. Excess demand is 
measured by the difference between actual real output (Y/Pg) 
and potential real output (Y/Pg)*. Thus we obtain:
(7.9) ALog Pt = <x9 + a10 [Log (Y/Pg)-Log (Y/Pg) *] + a1;Ln t
Where potential output is obtained by regressing real 
actual output on a constant and trend variables. Both (Xiq an(* 
a 11 would have positive signs. Under conditions of zero 
excess demand in the economy, the actual rate of inflation 
will depend on the expected one.
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Expectations are assumed to be adaptive in the sense that 
in each period people form their expectations in the light of 
their present and previous experiences. Variation in the 
expected value of a variable is a positive function of the 
difference between its expected and realized magnitudes. 
Following Cagan (1956), the expected rate of inflation in 
period t may be measured as follows:
(7.10) Ilt =XAPt + (l-A,)]!^
If expectations are fully realized, then the expected and 
actual rates of inflation will be equal. In practice, 
however, II may be generated as a three years moving average, 
or a distributed lag of measured inflation.
7.2.4 The Expenditure Sector:
Demand for real output is the sum of real private 
expenditure, government expenditure and net exports:
(7.11) Y/Pg = PC/P + PI/P + GE/P + EX/Px - IM/Pm
Where Y is Gross Domestic Product^); pc and PI are private 
consumption and investment expenditures respectively; GE is 
total government expenditure; EX denotes exports, IM is the 
domestic currency value of imports; and Px and Pm are export 
and import prices, respectively.
Turning to the components of aggregate demand, we attempt 
to explain the behaviour of the private sector in equations
(7.12) and (7.15), which embody, among other things, the 
effects of financial conditions on real private expenditure. 
The two equations attempt to capture the influence of credit 
availability on private consumption and investment, but the 
investment equation also tries to account for the 
complementarity hypothesis by incorporating real private 
financial assets as a regressor. The consumption function is 
specified as follows:
225
(7.12) Log(PC/P) t = a 12+ a!3Log(Y/Pg)d + a14ALog(L/P)t
+ a15Log(M/P)t + a 6^ (rd-II) + O^Log (PC/P) t-l
Where (Y/Pg)d is real current disposable income, and L is 
the stock of bank credit to the private sector. All other 
variables are the same as defined earlier, and with exception 
to the real rate of interest (rd-II) , all of. them are expected 
to be positively related to real private consumption. 
Financial assets are included in the consumption function as 
a proxy for wealth; the greater the accumulated wealth, the 
higher is the level of consumption (Rowan, 1983) . Bank
lending to the private sector is included because households, 
like businesses, are likely to be liquidity-constrained. As 
such, and with low or even negative real loan rates,
consumers may be more concerned with credit availability than 
its price(9) e Notwithstanding this, the deposit rate is 
included to represent the opportunity cost of consumption as 
against savings. The sign of the interest rate coefficient, 
which depends on the substitution and income effects, is 
ambiguous. As it will be elaborated later the present model 
may be seen to depend on a simple lag structure based on the
notion of partial adjustment. Thus, lagged consumption
appears in equation (7.12) as an argument.
Disposable income is defined to be GDP less tax revenue 
(TR), that is:
(7.13) ( Y / P g ) d t = (Y/Pg)t - (TR/P)t
Furthermore, consumer disposable income is linked to net 
change in consumer wealth (financial assets), by the private 
sector budget constraint:
(7.14) ( Y / P g ) d t = [<PCt + PIt) + (AM - AL)]/pt
Where, as in equation (7.1), M is the sum of currency in 
circulation and private deposits with banks. The identity
(7.14) signifies that disposable income is either consumed,
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invested or saved in the form of financial assets.
Real gross private investment is specified in terms of 
purely financial variables (3-0) as follows:
(7.15) Log(PI/P)t- = a^g + a-j^ ALog (L/P) t + a2QLog(M/P)^
. + a21rl + a22Di + a23Log(Pi/P)t_1
This specification is, perhaps, consistent with the 
discussion in chapter 2, which suggests that investment in 
LDCs is constrained by the availability of savings, which 
depend on past as well as current income, and as such 
savings, especially in the form of financial assets, may well 
explain variations in investment. Thus, we incorporate the 
stock of financial assets, besides the flow of bank credits, 
and the lending rate of interest (rl) to explain modern 
sector investment in Sudan. Gross private investment is 
largely financed from investors own resources, by borrowing 
from banks or a combination of the two. Increases in bank 
credit would stimulate investment, and thus OC-^g would assume 
a positive sign. Following economic theory, the sign of the 
interest coefficient may be left to be empirically 
determined. Private savings in the form of financial assets 
appear in the investment function, providing a means for a 
more direct testing of the complementarity hypothesis. It has 
been demonstrated in several studies,' e.g Gupta (1984), that 
the flow of resources from traditional to modern sectors is 
identical to changes in the stock of financial assets. This 
being chiefly implemented through financial development, the 
complementarity test may also be considered as a test for the 
effect of financial development in general on investment. 
Finally, DI, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
in 1971 and 1983, the periods during which the level of 
investment was spectacularly low^1), is expected to take a 
negative sign.
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In the model, we consider export supply, which may be 
extremely sensitive to internal supply conditions such as the 
duration and amount of rainfall, to be exogenously given. 
Moreover, for a small open economy like Sudan, both export 
and import prices may be regarded as exogenous variables,
i.e. determined in world markets.
Demand for real imports, which are dominated by necessary 
consumption and capital goods, is specified as follows:
(7.16) Log(IM/Pm)t = OC24 + 0C25Log (Y/Pg) t + (^^(Pm.ER/P)
+ (X27ALog (L/P) t + a2gLog (IM/Pm) ^ -1
Where ER is the nominal rate of exchange, defined as the 
value of the Sudanese pound per US$; and the term (Pm.ER/P) 
is the real rate of exchange; all other variables are the 
same as defined previously. With exception to Ct-26r 
coefficients are supposed to have* positive signs. Positive 
links between domestic credit and imports are well 
established at both theoretical and empirical levels(12). 
While credit expansion adds to domestic absorption, both 
consumption and investment in LDCs tend to have substantial 
import contents.
7.2.5 The Government Sector:
As noted in chapter 3 continuous resort to money creation 
as a means of financing government deficit has led to a close 
association between the size of the deficit and monetary 
expansion in general. This is particularly true during the 
1980s period, when monetary and financial-* policies were 
largely driven by fiscal considerations. Government 
expenditure and the size of the budget deficit depend, 
however, on government revenue, availability of foreign 
resources and the ability of the authorities to issue nominal 
money. While the flow of foreign resources is not a direct
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policy variable, the ability of the authorities to print 
money appears to be unrestrained; it was largely guided by 
political rather than economic considerations. In effect, the 
flow of high-powered money becomes endogenous. In our model 
only domestic tax revenue is modelled as a function of 
income, and inflation:
(7.17) Log(TR/P)t = (X29 + Ol3oLog (Y/Pg) t + (X3iALogPt
+ &32L°g (TR/P) -£-1
Income is a fairly standard variable on which tax revenue 
positively relies. Inflation is included in order to test the 
hypothesis ) that real government revenue tends to fall as 
inflation proceeds, whereas government expenditure tends to 
be fixed in real terms. Accordingly, the budget deficit 
widens with inflation. The relationship between government 
borrowing in general, and money creation in specific, and 
government budget deficit is given by its budget constraint 
as follows:
(7.18) ACBLG = GE - (TR+OR) - ABFA
Where ABFA represents government borrowing from abroad, and 
OR is non-tax government revenue. In the above equation any 
excess of government expenditure over its total revenue can 
be financed either by borrowing from abroad, or from the 
central bank, or a combination of the two.
To sum up, the model consists of 18 equations, of which 
only 8 are behavioural, and the rest are identities or 
definitions. For ease of reference, we present the complete 
model below.
7.3 The Complete Model and its Salient Properties:
The equations of the model and definitions of variables are 
reproduced below:
(7.1) Mt = TDt + Ct
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(7.2) ARM = ACBLG + ACBLB + AF
(7.3) AF = EXt - IMt +AFc
(7.4) Log (C/P) ^  = (Xq + a^log(Y/P)t + OC2rdt +- (X3D78 
+ a4log (C/P)'t-i
(7.5) ATD = AR + AL - ACBLB
(7.6) AR = ARM - AC
(7.7) AL = [ (1-ARR) /ARR] *AR + ACBLB + ANOL
(7.8) ARR = a5 + (XgRRR + a7rl + (XgD78
(7.9) Alog Pt = a9 + a10 [log (Y/Pg) t-log (Y/Pg) *t] + OCl;Lnt
(7.10) IIt = X AP  +
(7.11) (Y/Pg)t = (PC/P)t + (PI/P)t + (GE/P)t + (EX/Px)t - 
(IM/Pm)t
(7.12) log(PC/P)t = a12 + a13log(Y/Pg)dt + a14Alog(L/P)t 
+ a15log (M/P) t.! + ai6(rd-ri)‘ + a17log (PC/P) t_i
(7.13) (Y/Pg) = (Y/Pg)t - (TR/P)t
(7.14) (Y/Pg)dt = [(PCt+PIt) + (AM - AL)]/Pt
(7.15) log(Pl/P)t = a18 + a19Alog(L/P)t + a20Alog(M/P)t +
a21rl + a22Di + a23log(Pi/P)t_1
(7.16) Log(IM/P)t = a24 + a25log(Y/Pg)t + a26(Pm.ER/P)t 
+ a27Alog (L/P)t + a2glog(IM/Pm)
(7.17) log(TR/P)t = a29 + a30log(Y/Pg)t + a31APt 
+ a32log(TR/P)t_!
(7.18) ACBLG = GE - (TR+OR) - ABFA
Endogenous variables:
M-j- = Stock of money supply in period t.
TD{- = Stock of total private deposits with commercial banks
C^ = Stock of currency outside banks
ARM = Flow of reserve or high-powered money
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AR = Flow of commercial banks1 reserves
AF = Flow of foreign reserves into the central bank
AL = Flow of bank loans to the non-bank private sector
ARR = Average ..Reserve-Deposits Ratio
P = Consumer price level
II = Expected inflation rate
Y-t = Gross Domestic Product over period t •
= Consumer Disposable Income in period t 
PCt = Private Consumption Expenditure in period t 
Pit = Gross private investment expenditure in period t 
IM-j- = Demand for imports in period t.
TR = Government domestic tax revenue
ACBLG = Flow of central bank credit to the government 
Exogenous Variables:
ACBLB = Flow of central bank credits to commercial banks 
AFc = Net foreign capital inflow per period, 
rd = Annual deposits rate of interest
rl = Annual rate of interest on bank loans.
RRR = Required Reserve Ratio
ANOL = Flow of net other loans by commercial banks, based on,
e.g., borrowing from abroad and drawing on other assets
such as capital, which are all quite limited in volume. 
Y* = Trend value of Y
EX = Supply of exports of goods and services in current 
domestic price.
GE-j- = Total government expenditure during period t.
Px = Export Price Index
Pm = Import Price Index
ER = Rate of exchange, defined as the value of the Sudanese 
pound relative to the American Dollar 
OR = Non-tax government revenue
ABFA = Net flow of loans to the government from abroad, per 
period
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D78 and DI = Dummy variables 
All lagged dependent variables.
In the model, two major links between the financial and 
expenditure sectors are specified. First, credit availability 
is one of the determinants of private expenditure and 
aggregate imports. The existence of credit-rationing has long 
been incorporated in macroeconomic models for developed 
countries on the assumption of significant imperfections in 
the loan market, so that non-price credit rationing occurs 
(Shapiro, 1966, and Stilitz and Weiss, 1981) . In most LDCs 
such as Sudan, credit rationing may be assumed to take place 
because of interest rates fixing policy that keeps them below 
their market clearing levels, though other forms of 
imperfection may also exist. The second major link between 
the financial and real sectors is specified following the 
repressionist hypothesis of complementarity between financial 
and real capital. This is exemplified in the investment 
equation in which financial assets appear among the 
regressors.
In most of the stochastic equations of the model, the 
lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor. Lagged 
variables offer some flexibility in modelling economic 
behaviour, which may not be safely assumed to be rigid under 
any circumstance. The present model incorporates a simple lag 
structure based on the notion of partial adjustment, which 
may also enable us to calculate long-run elasticities, as 
well as short-run elasticities. Before turning to estimation, 
it should be noted that the model is essentially a demand- 
determined model, with the supply side being represented by 
potential income and inflation only. A comprehensive model 
should also account for other supply factors by 
incorporating, for instance, production functions. This has 
not been attempted for data constraints, and for similar
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reasons, only consumer price inflation is modelled, whereas 
other types of inflation such as wage inflation may not be 
irrelevant.
7.4 Estimation of Stochastic Equations and Discussion 
of Results:
7.4.1 Estimation Issues:
As mentioned previously, the Sudanese economy underwent 
significant changes, especially over the last decade. It 
would have, therefore, been more appropriate to use quarterly 
data that reflect these changes without going far back into 
the past. Unfortunately, only annual data is available, and 
the model will be estimated using such data ^ 14 ^ for the 
period 1960-88. Again, as already stated, original variables 
are all measured in current domestic prices, and their real 
values are then obtained by dividing through by the 
appropriate price deflator, with 1980 as a base year.
The estimation strategy followed in this model is a 
conventional one. We begin by testing our maintained 
hypothesis using the specification of stochastic equations in 
section (7.3) above. Various statistical tests are then 
conducted to test for the validity of the functional 
relationship, the lag structure on variables and the 
possibility of omitted variables. Our research strategy, 
thus, follows' the variable addition principle(15) , which 
starts with a simple initial hypothesis, and then test for 
their validity, and omit those variables that fail the 
diagnostic checks. Meanwhile relevant variables can be added 
and their joint or separate significance evaluated. This 
strategy is used, here, for two reasons. First the number of 
observations may not allow the inclusion of all relevant 
variables, and estimating the equation at a time. Second, 
there would be a high possibility of a multicolinearity
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problem, which renders estimated coefficients inefficient.
The presence of multicolinearity in time series data makes 
it difficult to separate the influence of individual 
explanatory variables on the dependent one. It enlarges the 
standard error, lowers t-ratios, and generates inconsistent 
numerical values and signs of explanatory variables. 
Multicolinearity, which results largely from the tendency of 
economic variables to move together over time, is 
particularly a problem when lagged values of regressors are 
used as separate independent variables in the relationship. 
Where multicolinearity is present, the method of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) becomes an inefficient estimator.
The use of OLS assumes that the explanatory variables are 
truly exogenous, i.e. there is no simultaneous dependence 
between explanatory and endogenous variables in the model. 
But, the various relations in our model are to a great extent 
part of a whole system of equations. As a result OLS 
estimates might be biased and inconsistent. Accordingly, with 
exception to one equation, we have estimated the model using 
Two Stage Least Squares, which is a simultaneous equations 
method. The application of this method permits the 
interaction of various variables in the form of a 
simultaneous equations system, so that the simultaneous bias 
existing in OLS estimates is eliminated. To obtain TSLS 
estimates we, first, using OLS, regressed all the dependent 
variables that appear as regressors in other equations on all 
predetermined variables in the system. The resulting 
estimates are then used instead of endogenous variables in 
the original relations, and OLS again applied to' this 
reformulated relation.
Variable deletion or addition is decided on the basis of 
the goodness of fit and statistical significance of 
parameters. But, it is on the adopted estimates that 
subsequent diagnostic tests were conducted. These tests were
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as follows:
1. The DW-statistics is used to detect autocorrelation, but 
where a lagged dependent variable is employed, this test is 
replaced by the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test. The latter is 
also a test for serial correlation of the residuals, and has 
an F-distribution with n-k degrees of freedom; where n is the 
number of observations and k is the number of parameters in 
the regression (see Godfrey, 1978) .
2. Normality test, which is a test for the normality of the 
residuals. It has a Chi2(2) distribution.
3. Heteroscedasticity test (H) , which is a test based on the 
idea that squares of the regressors have been excluded from 
the model. It also has an F-distribution.
4. Test for structural stability. We use Goldfeld and Quant, 
G.Q., (1965) test to examine the structural stability of the
model, i.e. stability of the variance (Homoscedasticity 
assumption) . To perform this test we omit some central 
observations and run two separate regressions for the periods 
1961-71 and 1978-88. The latter period showed major 
unfavourable developments in the Sudanese economy. These 
included several devaluations of the Sudanese pound which 
began in 1978, and failed to alleviate production 
bottlenecks, resulting in significant distortions in the 
economy. These distortions were then exacerbated by natural 
adversities such as drought, as well as the civil war.
5. Finally, forecast chi^ test is used as a prediction test 
or test of parameter constancy over the forecast period. This 
test was carried out along with C h o w (16) test, which is a 
test for the joint stability of regression coefficients and 
standard errors, i.e. a test for predictive power or failure. 
To perform these tests four observations were retained for 
within sample forecast.
Hendry (1983) provides a full discussion of various 
statistical tests, and their role in model evaluation. He
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argues that if these tests are not satisfied, then, the model 
under consideration is inadequate. The solution is to revise 
the model and/or its dynamic structure rather than searching 
for an alternative method of estimation. The*selection of one 
model or another is justified in terms of standard errors of 
the regression rather than the coefficient of determination, 
r2.
All the results in this chapter were estimated by PC-GIVE, 
version 4.1, which has been developed at the University of 
Oxford by Hendry (1986) for dynamic modelling of time series.
The equations of the model were estimated one at a time, 
and with exception to equation (7.8) all the equations were 
estimated by the Two Stage Least Squares method. The results 
and the hypotheses embodied in each of the stochastic 
equations are examined below.
7.4.2 The Financial Sector:
Two behavioural equations in the financial sector have been 
estimated. These are the currency demand function, and the 
average reserves ratio equation. The results obtained from 
the estimates of these equations indicate that the model fits 
the data very well. Almost all the parameter estimates have 
their expected signs, but some of them are not estimated 
precisely. The real currency demand equation is examined 
first.
7.4 Log(C/P)t = -0.6280 + 0.2552 Log(Y/P)t - 0.0492 Ardt
(-0.912) (1.991) (-0.701)
+ 0.1155 D78 + 0.7481 Log(C/P)t_1 
(1.582) (6.470)
EP : 19 62-88 R2=0.979 RSS=0.090 LM(1,21)=0.05
Chi2 (2)=0.481 H (7,14)=2.76 G.Q.=0.517 
Forecast-Chi2(4)/4=1.19 Chow-test(4,18)=0.67
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Where EP is the estimation period and all other tests are 
the same as in the previous subsection, t-ratios are in 
parentheses.
The coefficient of determination, as measured by R^, 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom, suggests that more than 
97% of variations in currency demand are explained. As 
anticipated income is the major determinant of demand for 
currency. While the rate of interest, or profit over relevant 
years, has the expected sign, its coefficient is very small 
and statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, this indicates 
that higher rates of interest would, abysmal, reduce currency 
holdings, perhaps in favour of bank deposits. The coefficient 
of the dummy variable D78 turned out to be positive, 
indicating that the incorporation of Islamic banks had not 
contributed to an increased use of banks1 money as against 
currency. This result reinforces our argument, in chapter 5, 
that the advent of Islamic banks has not altered the trend 
growth rate of overall financial savings. The short-run and 
long-run income elasticities of demand for currency are 
consistent with our a priori expectations; the former was
0.25 and the latter was unity. There is no evidence of 
structural instability, and the prediction power of equation
(7.4) appears to be strong. In fact all the diagnostic tests 
have been easily passed.
The equation explaining banks behaviour in keeping reserves 
was estimated with the use of Ordinary Least Squares method. 
The results of estimation were as follows:
7.8 ARR =0.0433 + 1.4583 RRR + 0.1831 D78 - 0.0010 rl 
(0.991) (2.000) (4.241) (-0.156)
EP=1962-88 R2=0.814 RSS=0.096 D.W.=1.508 Chi2(2)=0.501
237
H(5,17)=0.778 G.Q.=0.78 Frecast-Chi2(4)/4=0.49 
Chow-test(4,21)=0.4 4
The above results show that the average reserves ratio of 
banks is well explained in terms of the required reserves 
ratio, while the opportunity cost of keeping reserves, i.e. 
the loan rate of interest has the right ’sign, but with a 
quite small and statistically insignificant magnitude. In 
fact RRR was expected to explain both the forced reserves 
ratio and the free reserves ratio for reasons already 
mentioned in section (7.3) above. This was expected to hold, 
especially during the period up to 1978. Casual empiricism 
indicates that banks were accustomed to keeping an almost 
constant fraction in the form of free reserves over that 
period. Since then, and probably due to the incorporation of 
Islamic banks, as well as tight credit policies, there have 
been considerable increases in the free reserves ratio, and 
subsequently the average reserves ratio. During the period 
1978-88, Islamic banks gained a substantial share in the 
banking system's assets, and as we mentioned earlier these 
banks tend to have higher reserves-deposits ratio in so far 
as transaction deposits are concerned. This may well be the 
reason for D78 to have a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. It is, however, difficult to 
disentangle the influence of Islamic banks on the average 
reserves ratio from that of central bank credit policy, which 
was becoming increasingly tight during the 1980s. But, it 
should be noted that credit policy was binding only in 
relation to bank advances to certain sectors, and not to 
overall credit. This means that banks were free to lend as 
much as they like to priority or approved sectors.
7.4.3 The Inflation Equation:
The specification of the inflation equation was a
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relatively simple one. Nevertheless, it provides a reasonably 
good explanation of consumer price inflaation in Sudan as 
appears in the following results:
7.9a ALogPt = 0.0523 + 0.421[Log(Y/Pg)-Log(Y/Pg)*] + 0.6887llt 
(1.798) (2.707) (3.923)
EP:1964-88 R2=0.49 RSS=0.143 D.W.=1.578 Chi2 (2)=0.517
H (8,11)=0.521 G.Q.=1.78 Forecast-Chi2(4)/4=0.07 
Chow-test(4,18)=0.07
Where II or expected inflation is estimated as a 
distributed lag of actual inflation; the lag length being 3 
periods. That is:
7.10 n t = p1ALogPt_  ^+ p2ALogPt_2 + p3AL°gpt-3
Substituting for IIt  from equation (7.10) into equation 
(7.9a), and reestimating, without the constant term, we 
obtained the following results:
7.9b ALogPt = 0.3395 [Log(Y/Pg)-Log(Y/Pg)*] + 0.5984ALogPt_x 
(2.369) (2.758)
+ 0.182 6ALogPt_2 + 0.14 68ALogPt_3 
(0.730) (0.646)
R2=0.82 RSS=0.151 D.W.=1.838 Chi2 (2)=0.184 G.Q.=1.056
Forecast-Chi2 (4)/4=3.04 Chow-test(4,17)=2.72
We imposed the restrictions that P3=0, and Px+p2ssl; an(^  
reestimated equation (7.9a) after reparameterization. On the 
basis of the test for the validity of priori restrictions on 
parameters (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, P. 119), which 
has an F-distribution (F=l.ll), we fail to reject the null
239
hypothesis, and accept that the restriction is valid. It may, 
consequently, be assumed that changes in the level of 
inflation would in the long-run depend on the state of excess 
demand in the economy. The latter is 'proxied by the 
difference between actual and potential real output. That is 
a 1% change in excess demand will lead to a 1% change in the 
inflation rate. Moreover, with zero excess demand, actual and 
expected inflation will exactly be the same.
It is interesting to note that Aghevli and Khan (1983) have 
estimated a similar inflation function for 8 developing 
countries, and found the influence of excess demand to be 
positive, but small and insignificant for each of the 
countries considered.
7.4.3 The Expenditure Sector:
We have estimated equations for private consumption and 
investment expenditures, and aggregate import demand. The 
estimated coefficients of the consumption function are all of 
the expected signs; but the wealth variable (M) has been 
omitted from the equation due to a multicolinearity problem. 
The magnitudes of these coefficients also appear to be in 
conformity with empirical studies(17) Qf consumption relation 
in LDCs. The regression results for the consumption function 
were as follows:
7.12a Log(PC/P)t = 0.8729 + 0 . 577Log(Y/Pg)d t
(1.544) (4.719)
+ 0 .0138ALog(L/P) t -0.0054 (rd-II) t + 0 .303Log (PC/P) t_x
(0.0138) (1.118) (2.265)
EP:1962-88 R2=0.907 RSS=0.094 LM(1,21)=0.21
Chi2(2)=0.015 H (8,13)=1.467 G.Q.=0.818 
Forecast-Chi2 (4)/4=0.24 Cow-test)4,18)=0.16
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The coefficient of real consumer disposable income is 
highly significant, and yields a short-run income elasticity 
of consumption of about 0.6, while the long-run elasticity is 
unity. The high long-run income elasticity of consumption 
signifies that increases in current disposable income would 
result in proportional rises in private consumption over the 
long-run, which is consistent with the 'low saving rate in 
Sudan (see chapter 3) . The coefficient of the real rate of 
interest has a negative sign, but quite small and 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that changes in 
interest rates, or perhaps profit rates on deposits, would 
not induce sizeable changes in consumption, and thereby in 
savings. The finding on the interest rate elasticity confirms 
Haque et al (1990) finding of a low interest elasticity of 
consumption for several LDCs. Likewise the flow of bank 
credit to the private sector has a small and insignificant, 
but positive impact on real private consumption expenditure. 
As the above estimated consumption function does not directly 
capture the effect of inflation, which might be an 
appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of consumption, 
equation (7.12a) was reestimated with expected inflation 
replacing the real rate of interest. The following regression 
results were obtained:
7.12b Log(PC/P)t = 0.3112 + 0.566Log(y/Pg)dt
(0.489) (4.818)
+ 0.08lALog(L/P)t - 0.166rit + 0.396Log(PC/P)t_x 
(0.799) (0.891) (2.866)
R2=0.912 RSS=0.095 LM(1,21)=0.01 Chi2(2)=0.04 H(8,14)=0.66
G.Q.=0.94 Forecast-Chi2(4)/4=0.53 Chow-test(4,19)=0.40
The above results are quite similar to those in equation
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(7.12a), except that the opportunity cost in the latter has a 
larger magnitude, but in both cases it was statistically 
insignificant.
The specification of the investment equation in section
(7.2) above has well fitted the data. The regression results 
were as follows:
7.15 ALog (PI/P) t = -0.4-2549 + 1.1329Log (M/P) t
(-2.565) (3.361)
+ 0.5610ALog(L/P)t -0.0439rlt - 0.7460 D78 - 0.5120 DI
(1.847) (-2.212) (-3.285) (3.000)
.+ 4219Log(PI/P)t_x
(-3.133)
EP:1962-88 R2=0.922 RSS=0.84 LM(1,19)=1.41
Chi2(2)=0.405 H (10,9)=2.71 G.Q.=0.1190 
Forecast-Chi2(4)/4=0.86 Chow-test(4,116)=0.75
The basic variables contained in the investment equation 
are fairly standard variables, but exclusion of income is 
rather unusual. The rationale for inclusion of income is that 
as income increases the rate of savings may rise, releasing 
resources for investment. Moreover, rises in income may 
generate demand for new products, or excess demand for 
existing ones. This would stimulate investment required to 
meet such demand changes. While the use of financial assets 
(M) , may account for the effect of income through savings, 
estimating equation (7.15) with both income and M was found 
to raise the residual sum of squares substantially. 
Accordingly, income was deleted from the equation in favour 
of M, which is also necessary in testing the hypothesis of 
complementarity between financial and real capital.
The estimated investment equation has easily passed all the 
diagnostic checks, and all the coefficients turned out with 
their theoretical signs. The flow of bank credit, in real 
terms, to the private sector though only significant at the
242
10% level has a positive and relatively large coefficient. 
Comparing the results in the investment and consumption 
functions, it appears that changes in credit will have a 
greater influence on the former than on “the latter. The 
coefficient of the lending rate of interest, on the other 
hand, is negative and significant, but relatively small in 
size^1 )^. Again this insinuates that interest rate changes 
may have a rather weak direct impact on private expenditure. 
But, interest rate fluctuations may have a compound effect on 
private expenditure in that they also affect credit 
availability.
The above regression results provide evidence that 
financial assets accumulation can be conducive to investment; 
the variable representing financial assets has both a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient. It is 
natural that the dummy variable DI takes on a negative sign 
as it carries the influence of' adverse national developments 
on investment. The coefficient of D78 is also negative and 
significant, indicating, perhaps, the rapid deterioration in 
investment environment and activities in Sudan since 1978. It 
also signifies that the advent of Islamic banks, despite 
their apparent strong investment orientations, has not helped 
to halt the trend of declining real private investment during 
the last decade.
Finally, the import demand equation turned out to be rather 
problematic. This equation was specified in real terms as in 
section (7.2) above. At the empirical level, however, real 
imports were found to be poorly related to the explanatory 
variables. The reason, as often is the case with respect to 
the foreign sector (19), m a y  b e  the use of different price 
deflators. Some of these deflators, namely those of imports 
and exports, are hardly reliable. The estimate of equation
(7.16) in nominal terms seems to produce a theoretically 
consistent and improved fit. Although the use of nominal
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values ought to be avoided on theoretical grounds, it is not 
uncommon in empirical research, precisely for reasons 
relating to the price indices: "Occasionally, researchers
have used the value of imports in current dollars as the 
dependent variable (Learner and Stern, 1970). The results of 
the import equation, thus estimated, were as follows:
7.16 LogIMt = -0.979 + 0.3686LogYt - 0.1616ERt + 0.1879ALogLt 
(-2.355) (2.149) (-2.45) (0.705)
+ 0.7259 IMt_!
(4.40)
EP:1961-88 R2=0.988 RSS=0.56 LM(1,21)=1.23
Chi2 (2)=0.430 H(8,13)=1.348 G.Q.=2.6
Forecast Chi2(4)/4=5.86 Chow-test(4,18)=2.49
The estimated import equation has passed all diagnostic 
checks, except that the tests of parameter constancy over the 
forecast period give conflicting evidence on its prediction 
power. The multiple correlation coefficient is expectedly 
high. The results yield a short-run income elasticity of
0.368, and a near unitary long-run elasticity. Again domestic 
credit expansion seems to have a positive, but insignificant 
influence on expenditure on foreign goods and services.
The coefficient of the nominal exchange rate indicates that. 
Sudanese imports are responsive to exchange rate changes, and 
that a devaluation of the Sudanese pound would lower imports 
demand. Although, such result is theoretically plausible, it 
is at odd with the commonly held believe that Sudanese 
imports are hardly sensitive to exchange rate changes, 
simply, because they are heavily weighed by basic necessity 
goods. The analysis in chapter 3 indicated that both 
investment and consumption in Sudan tend to have a high 
imports content. However, the exchange rate effect is small,
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and whether a devaluation of the Sudanese pound would improve 
the balance of payment can, of course, only be answered when 
the simultaneous effect of devaluation on exports supply is 
known.
7.4.4 The Government Sector:
As expected, real government revenue from taxation appears 
to depend significantly on real income, inflation and on its 
previous levels. The econometric results of the estimated tax 
function are summarized below:
7.17 Log(TR/P)t = -0.4709 + 0.3858Log(Y/P)t
(-0.3596) (2.092)
+ 0.5814 Log(TR/P)t_!
(3.945)
EP:1961-88 R2=0.61 RSS=o.4P LM(1,23)=0.53 Chi2(2)=1.143
H (6, 17)=0.446 G.Q.=1.00
Forecast-Chi2(4)/4=2.61 Chow-test(4,20)=2.24
The multiple coefficient of determination is moderately 
good. There is no evidence of structural instability in the 
tax equation, which has also performed well in terms of 
forecasting. The short-run income-elasticity of tax is 
moderately low, indicating low levels' of per capita income in 
the country. Imposing the restriction that (X3Q+(X32“1=0, re- 
estimating the above equation and testing, the long-run 
income elasticity of unity was confirmed. The inflation 
coefficient indicates a significant and negative influence on 
real tax revenue. This result is in harmony with the fact 
that tax systems in LDCs are less adaptive to changing 
economic conditions, and also supports empirical findings for 
LDCs, by, notably, Dutton (1971) and Aghevli and Khan (1983), 
which suggest that real tax revenue varies inversely with the
- 0.0103APt 
(-2.786)
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rate of inflation. The implication of this is that if 
government expenditure is fairly constant in real terms then 
the budget deficit will widen as inflation rises.
7.4.5 Summary of Empirical Findings:
It is clear from the regression results above that the 
model has fitted the data satisfactorily.. Almost all the 
parameter estimates of the model have their expected signs. 
Moreover, there was no evidence of instability in these 
parameters, and the forecasting performance of the model as 
judged by Forecast-Chi^ and Chow-test is generally good. 
Therefore, the model may be used for simulation and policy 
analysis. Before doing so, we summarize the main findings of 
the estimated model in the following:
1. Demand for currency, which depends mainly on income, has 
not been reduced by the advent of Islamic banks, which was 
expected to boost demand for financial assets in the form of 
bank liabilities and claims. However, real currency demand 
has a negative coefficient with the rate of interest.
2. The average reserves ratio of banks is well explained in 
terms of the required reserves ratio and the lending rate of 
interest, which represents the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves. This means that the required reserves ratio may be 
used to influence the average reserves ratio, and via that 
the credit multiplier, which is a major determinant of credit 
flows to the private sector.
3. The rate of interest, or profit in relevant years, bears 
its anticipated sign in all the relationships in which it was 
a part. But, it was only in the case of real private 
investment that its coefficient was found to be significant. 
This indicates that interest rate policy is likely to be less 
effective. However, in our model, interest rates will, 
besides the direct effects, have indirect effects on the 
expenditure sector. The indirect effects, as we will explain
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further when the model is simulated, work through both the 
credit multiplier and bank reserves as determined by high- 
powered money and currency in circulation.
4. Bank advances to the private sector also seem to have 
positive impacts on real private expenditure and imports 
demand. But, again it was only in the case of investment that 
the coefficient of real credit flow was significant and 
sufficiently large. This suggests that credit policy will 
have a more predictable effect on private investment than on 
consumption and imports.
5. Consumer price inflation varies positively with the level 
of excess demand in the economy and expected inflation. In 
the long-run, however, variations in the rate of inflation 
will be determined by excess demand only.
6. There is evidence in our empirical model that accumulation 
of financial assets can be pivotal to real capital formation. 
Therefore, it may be argued that financial development, in 
the sense of both widening and deepening, can be growth- 
promoting.
7. Real private consumption depends largely on real 
disposable income, while tax revenue relies positively on 
real GDP and negatively on inflation. Hence, inflationary 
finance, which raises both government expenditure and 
inflation, would reduce tax revenue in real terms. In the 
model, the method of financing government expenditure in 
general and budget deficit in specific is particularly 
important in so far as private expenditure is concerned.
7.5 Simulation Analysis of the Model:
This section examines the overall properties of the model 
in terms of dynamic simulation exercises. This involves an 
analysis of the dynamic response of key endogenous variables 
to shocks to certain independent variables.
The model specified earlier can be written in matrix form
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as:
7.19 Ay-j_ + Bxj_ = u^
Where y^ , x^ , and u-j_ are vectors of endogenous variables/ 
predetermined variables and disturbance terms, respectively, 
and A and B are matrices of the respective coefficients of 
endogenous and exogenous variables. If the coefficients of 
all variables in the system are known, then, the model can be 
solved for the values of dependent variables, given values of 
the predetermined variables. Assuming that the matrix A is 
non-singular, we can solve to obtain the reduced form of the 
model. Multiplying both sides of equation (7.19) by the 
matrix A“l, and rearranging, we obtain:
(7.20) yj_ = 5x^ + v^
Where 8 = -A” -^B, and v^=A~lui; the error terms are assumed 
to be uncorrelated, with zero mean and constant variance. 
Using all n observations available for each dependent and 
each independent variable, the model may be rewritten as 
follows:
(7.21) Y = 8x + V
Where Y, X, and V are matrices of endogenous variables, 
independent variables and error terms respectively.
Our approach to simulation analysis involves construction 
of the run base of the model, shocking a certain exogenous 
variable, and recomputing the model to obtain a new solution 
run. Comparing the base and the new solution runs, the impact 
of the shock can then be determined. Provided that the 
independent variable of interest is perturbed by a fixed 
amount, the resulting multiplier can easily be calculated as:
M = (Ysh°ck-Ykase) / (xshock_xbase)
Where M is the multiplier value, and Y and X are the 
respective values of endogenous and exogenous variables. In
248
the case of variables with different dimensions, such as the 
rate of interest and GDP, shock effects are presented as a 
percentage difference from the base run of the dependent 
variable. That is:
= [ (yshock - ybase)/ybasej *]_00
Given the parameter estimates of stochastic equations in 
section (7.4), four sets of simulation experiments were 
conducted with the complete model, including identities. To 
obtain a dynamic solution of the model all variables in the 
system were unfixed, with lagged dependent variables being 
generated by the model. This yields the base run historical 
simulation, which is useful in evaluating the overall 
stability of the model. Moreover, within sample or historical 
simulation is particularly appropriate, since we are 
interested in the sensitivity of key endogenous variables to 
certain policy .regimes. Having constructed the base run, 
certain policy shocks were then introduced, and their impacts 
analysed. Although observed values of endogenous variables 
may be subject to repeated shocks, which may influence the 
properties of the model, when certain exogenous variables are 
disturbed, the stability of the model has always been 
maintained. This indicates that even if repeated shocks were 
entertained, they are of no significant impact, so that the 
way the base run was constructed is a valid one. At the same 
time, the linearity of the model ensures that the simulation 
results are not unduly sensitive to the magnitude of the 
shock, which the system undergoes, or the initial values of 
the exogenous variables. Hence, the simulation experiments 
may enable us to accurately calculate and compare the effects 
of following certain long-run policies on endogenous 
variables of interest.
The base run was constructed under the same assumptions of 
the estimated model, with all relevant variables being
249
measured in 1980 constant prices(20) # This ensures a 
stationary long-run equilibrium. The magnitude of the shock 
to each exogenous variable considered is determined in 
proportion -to its observed value. In our simulation 
experiments, we have examined the effectiveness of both 
monetary and fiscal policies, and considered shocks to the 
system originating from the financial sector as well as the 
expenditure sector. These simulation experiments are:
1. a permanent increase in the required reserves ratio of 
5%, i.e. from an average of 10% to 15%.
2. a permanent 10% rise in the rate of interest.
3. a permanent increase of Ls 100 mn (about 18%) in real 
government expenditure, and
4. a permanent rise in general tax revenue of Ls 50 mn 
(i.e. 11%) on the average.
The starting point of our simulation analysis was to 
calculate the closed and open economy multipliers for 
autonomous expenditure, the knowledge of which may be helpful 
in assessing the impact of various shocks on the economy in 
general. The values of these multipliers were found to be 3.2 
and 2.0 respectively. Thus, as economic theory suggests, the 
open economy multiplier is smaller than the closed economy 
amplifier due to leakage via imports. This means that if 
autonomous expenditure varies by 1%, then GDP will change by 
3.2% in the case of a closed economy, and 2% in the case of 
an open economy. These multipliers were calculated on the 
assumption of cetris paribus. With flexible or endogenous 
prices, however, equation (7.9a) would ensure that the 
multiplier will eventually turn to zero over the long-run, as 
excess demand rises with actual output. The full model 
multiplier and the constant-price open economy multiplier are 
shown in figure (7.1) below. It is clear that the former,
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Figure (7.1) : The Constant-price open economy multiplier
(CPM) and the full model multiplier (FMM)
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which averaged 0.7, declines sharply, approaching zero 
towards the end of the sample period. According to the
results in equation 7.9a (section 7.4), inflation should rise 
by the same rate as excess demand, and, hence, changes in
real variables that result from various shocks would tend to 
vanish over time.
Although this was the case in our simulation experiments, 
it is expected that the inflation effect in our model would 
be moderate. This is so not only because of the relatively 
small inflation coefficients in the estimated model, but also 
because inflation itself was moderate over most of the period 
considered. Throughout the 1960s and up until the late 1970s, 
the Sudanese economy was in a low growth macroeconomic 
equilibrium, with an average annual rate of inflation of 6%.
Since then, however, the inflation rate rose spectacularly,
averaging 22% between 1978 and 1988. Thus, inflation effects 
are expected to be more visible during this sub-period. All
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simulation exercises were carried out with fixed as well as 
flexible prices. For comparison, the fixed price simulation 
results are shown in Appendix 1, while the flexible price 
results are presented and discussed below.
7.5.1 An Increase in the Required Reserves Ratio 
(RRR) :
The RRR plays a central role in our model, and it is, 
indeed, a major instrument of monetary policy in Sudan in 
recent years. An increase in the required reserves ratio
affects banks balance sheets; it raises banks1 reserves, but 
only at the expense of bank advances to the private sector. 
This, in turn, influences private expenditure as well as 
aggregate imports demand during the impact period. As income 
declines, demand for cash balances falls. Moreover, the
reduction in banks' lending implied by the higher required 
reserves ratio will act as a detriment to the growth of their 
deposits, because the multiple expansion of reserves-related 
credits that generates deposits can work in the opposite 
direction.
Figures (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4) below show the nature and
magnitudes of the influence of the required reserves shock on
currency demand, credit flows, absorption and output. All 
these figures display negative effects, indicating that the 
policy of higher RRR is deflationary and effective. As in 
figure (7.2) credit flows and private deposits fell by an 
average of 18% and 13.3% respectively, and the rates of 
decline tend to decrease over time, but become more 
stationary towards the end of the sample period. Currency 
demand does not respond immediately to the increase in RRR, 
but starts to fall from about the third period at an 
increasing rate before it stabilizes towards the end of the 
period; the average rate of decline in real currency demand 
is 5%. The delayed impact of RRR on currency holdings is
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expected as the latter responds to changes in income, which 
come about only when private expenditure decreases as the 
flow of credit falls. The amount by which currency demand 
adjusts is quite small relative to changes in deposits and 
credits. Nevertheless, it suggests that reserve requirements 
policy can alter the composition of financial assets by 
raising the ratio of currency to deposits.-
Deflationary monetary policy in the form of high reserves 
requirements has an immediate and strong impact on private 
investment, which decreases by 19% on the average (Figure 
7.3) . This is far greater than the fall in private 
consumption of 3.0%, although the latter is subject to two 
negative effects: that resulting from decreased credit and 
that caused by lower income. Meanwhile, imports contract at 
the average rate of 5%. The compound effect of the fall in 
private expenditure and imports is a considerable decline in 
income, averaging 3.2% - Figure (7.4) . The effect of the 
required reserves shock on expenditure variables seems to be
Figure (7.4) : Required Reserves Shock Effect on Gross
Domestic Product (GDP)
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clearly permanent only in the case of private investment, and 
this is because of the permanent fall in credit flows, as 
well as the negative effect of a permanent decrease in 
currency demand on the money stock. Change in the latter is 
equal to the sum of variations in currency demand and total 
deposits.
7.5.2 Increases in Interest Rates:
To perform a simulation experiment involving interest 
rates, we increased both the deposit and lending rates by a 
permanent amount of 10%. This pushes the two rates well above 
the rate of inflation over the period up to 1978, but yields 
real rates that are only slightly different from zero from 
then onwards. Having achieved positive and relatively high 
real rates of interest over most of the period under review, 
this experiment can well help us to, once again, evaluate the 
financial development hypothesis. A rise in interest rates, 
in our model, would influence the credit multiplier and via 
that credit flows, which in turn, affect private absorption, 
aggregate imports and income. This is in addition to the 
direct effect of interest rates on private investment and 
consumption.
The permanent rise in interest rates, however, produces 
positive, but steadily vanishing effects. In general, the 
interest rate shock seems to reproduce the required reserves 
shock effects, but in reverse and with different magnitudes. 
Figure (7.5) below demonstrates that credit flows and private 
deposits increased at the average rates of 9% and 10%, 
respectively, over the entire period, while there was no 
change in currency demand on the average. Figure (7.6) shows 
similar, but more steady rises in private expenditure and 
imports demand. Private investment rose by 12%, private 
consumption by 1.3% and aggregate imports by 2%; but changes 
in all three variables approach zero in the long-run.
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The relatively large increase in private investment is not 
astonishing, since the interest rates rise, which raises the 
credit multiplier by reducing the average reserves ratio, 
also causes .credit to increase. Furthermore, as reserve- 
related deposits rise, both credit and money stock increase, 
generating further rises in investment; the direct negative 
impact of the interest rate on investment- is much lower than 
its positive influence through credit and monetary assets 
accumulation. As imports increase, while exports remain at 
their base run level, there is a reduction in foreign 
reserves, which feeds through the reserve money identity to 
reduce banks1 reserves and advances. But, nevertheless there 
is a net increase in credits.
Figure 11.1) : Interest Rates Shock Effect on GDP
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Although the rate of growth of real GDP turns to zero and 
then a negative in the period of high inflation, it averages
2.1% for the whole period (figure 7.7). In both the required
reserves shock and the interest rate shock, there are 
substantial changes in investment, as opposed to consumption, 
but the overall effect of reserve requirements remain
considerable over the long-run, while that of the rate of
interest seems to be insignificant.
7.5.3 A Permanent Increase in Government Expenditure:
In the model, any increase in government expenditure over 
that of the base run will be financed through borrowing from 
the central bank and/or rises in tax revenue, resulting from 
increases in income. Be that as it may, the low-income 
elasticity of taxation indicates that the bulk of the 
increase in government expenditure has to be financed by 
borrowing from the central bank; borrowing from abroad being 
kept at its base run level. The government expenditure shock 
effects on the economy depend, to a large extent, on its 
method of financing. For example, if government expenditure 
increases were exactly matched by rises in tax revenue, 
private disposable income and consumtion will be directly 
affected. Alternatively, if the entire rise in government 
expenditure is financed by money creation, then there is an 
increase in reserve money, as well as bank reserves and 
credit. But, this would lead to high rates of inflation.
Figure (7.8) shows the effect of a permanent rise in 
government expenditure of Ls 100 mn (i.e., 18%) on GDP. As a 
component of aggregate income, government expenditure changes 
affect the economy directly via its impact on GDP. During the 
impact period, GDP grew at the average rate of 2%, and the 
value of the multiplier was 0.7. (The rate of GDP growth was 
5%, and the multiplier was 1.8 when the model was simulated 
with inflation held constant.) The increase in GDP has been
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Figure (7.8):Governrnent Expenditure Shock Effect On
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accompanied by a permanent rise in public sector borrowing 
requirements, which averaged Ls 90 mn. Thus, it appears that, 
in the long-run, government-expenditure-induced rises in GDP 
generate just,enough tax revenue to finance 10% of the entire 
increase in government spending. The rise in the central 
bank's advances to the public sector entails substantial 
decreases in commercial banks1 credits to the private sector 
(Figure 7.9). This is so because rises in expenditure and 
income raise demand for currency, which, in turn, lowers bank 
reserves; although reserve money rises. Moreover, as imports 
increase, and exports remain unchanged, foreign reserves 
decrease, reducing reserve money, and thereby bank reserves 
and credit. The rate of fall in private credit, which 
averages 8%, was generally declining over time as the income 
effect on currency demand decreases.
It is evident that there are two forces operating in 
opposite directions to influence private expenditure and 
imports; there are positive effects originating from rises in 
income, and negative influences resulting from the decline in 
credit flows. The overall impact of all these forces on 
private expenditure and imports was relatively small. Private 
consumption rose by 1.2%, while private investment fell by 
10.7%. Aggregate imports rose by 2.5%.
These changes are shown in Figure (7.10) in the form of
multipliers. The respective multipliers of consumption, 
investment and imports are 0.5, -0.6, and 0.15. It seems from 
the above simulation outcome that fluctuations in income and 
expenditure seem to depend on the level of inflation; it is 
interesting to note that inflation rose by the same average 
rate as government expenditure. In general, the multipliers 
fall in value as inflation rises. Government expenditure has 
a crowding-out effect, particularly with respect to private 
investment. This effect becomes more visible when inflation
is already high, as it was the case in the 1980s. The net
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decline in private investment, which decreases through a fall 
in credits, but increases as total monetary assets rise with 
government expenditure, is considerably high. In the balance, 
however, total absorption remains nearly unchanged as 
variations in private consumption and imports tend to cancel 
out changes in private investment.
In conclusion, fiscal expansion, financed largely by means 
of high-powered money creation, stimulates private 
consumption and lowers investment, with a negligible impact 
on GDP towards the end of the period. It must also be warned 
that such fiscal expansion would accelerate inflation if it 
is not associated with improvements in the productive base of 
the economy.
Figure (7.10): Government Expenditure Shock Effect on Private 
Expenditure and Aggregate Imports
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7.5.4 An Increase in Tax Revenue:
Tax revenue is an endogenous variable in the model, i.e. 
determined within the system. To conduct this simulation 
experiment, w.e have adjusted the constant terms in the tax 
equation by Ls 50 mn, i.e. a permanent rise in tax revenue at 
the average rate of 11%.
Tax revenue changes affect the economy in many, and 
sometimes opposite, directions. Firstly, the increase in 
general taxes lowers disposable income, and thereby private 
consumption. Reduced absorption would constrict, though to a 
limited extent, income and output in subsequent periods. 
Secondly, increased tax revenue improves the position of the 
government, leading to lower rates of expansion of reserve 
money. As bank reserves decrease, so does the flow of credit 
to the private sector, which, in turn, affects private 
expenditure and income. But, if GDP decreases, currency 
demand will follow, raising banks1 reserves and loans. 
Finally, any variation in actual real income relative to 
trend real income will lead to changes in excess demand, as 
well as the rate of inflation.
Figure (7.11) below shows a fall in GDP at the average rate 
of 0.01%, which is quite small. This is so, because as tax 
revenue rises, private consumption in particular decreases 
through lower disposable income, but in the long-run when 
income falls, inflation also decreases, raising consumption. 
The income multiplier with respect to the tax revenue shock 
is about -0.5.
As in figure (7.12) below, currency demand decreases, while 
private deposits and credit flows increase, with the rise in 
general tax revenue. Currency demand decreases at the rate of 
1.7%, as income falls, private deposits rise by 3.4%, and 
credit flows by 3.2%. There are many influences on deposit 
and credit flows operating in opposite directions. On the one 
hand, any increase in general tax revenue, which lowers
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government budget deficit, reduces its borrowing from the 
central bank, and thereby reserve money on which bank 
reserves and credit depend. On the other hand, the fall in 
demand for currency, together with the increase in foreign 
reserves implied by falling imports relative to exports, 
leads to counter changes in high-powered money, as well as 
banks' reserves and credits. On the average, banks' reserves 
and credit rose, and as a result private investment also 
increased.
Figure (7.13) below shows the effect of tax rises on 
expenditure components. As this figure may attest, private 
consumption slipped by a multiple of -1.0, on the average, 
and total imports by -0.1, while private investment rose by a 
multiple of 0.5. In terms of percentages, consumption fell by 
1.8%, and investment increased by 4%; because of the 
overwhelming share of consumption expenditure, total private
Figure (7.13): Tax Revenue Shock Effect On Private 
Expenditure and Aggregate Imports
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expenditure has declined with rises in tax revenue. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the rise in general tax revenue 
is deflationary, because it reduces total private absorption 
in real terms.., as well as aggregate imports and income. One 
important policy implication of this is that, tax policy has 
to be selective.
To sum up, the simulation experiments indicate that private 
investment tends to respond to policy changes in a more sharp 
and permanent manner than private consumption. In the event 
of financial shocks, both consumption and investment moved in 
the same direction over most of the period. But, in the case 
of fiscal shocks the two moved in different directions; 
increases in government expenditure, as opposed to rises in 
tax revenue, induce consumtion and dampen investment. The 
overall results, thus, suggest that both fiscal and monetary 
policies can be used to influence real variables in the 
economy, but in the long-run, inflationary pressures would 
ensure that the effects of fiscal or monetary shocks are 
either moderated, or completely wiped out. This, however, 
seems to depend, to a good extent, on whether or not the rate 
of inflation is already high. In all simulation exercises, 
the resulting change in the inflation rate was moderate until 
1977. Between 1978-88, however, there were conspicuous 
changes in the average inflation rate. It has risen by 18 
percentage points under fiscal expansion, and by 16 
percentage points when interest rates increased. With 
deflationary tax and reserve requirement policies, the 
inflation rate dropped by 6.4 and 14 percentage points, 
respectively.
As fiscal policy tends to have a more immediate impact on 
expenditure and income, it is not surprising that governments 
in LDCs rely on it more than on monetary policy in order to 
regulate their economies. But, it should be noted that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy requires relatively well-
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functioning financial and capital markets. In the light of 
the evidence in our empirical model that monetary and 
financial policy could be used to influence expenditure and 
income, there is a good case for financial and capital 
markets to be developed, as there is also a case for the 
inflation rate to be kept low and stable.
Notes:
1. For example, Thirlwall {1974 and 1983) strongly advocates
inflationary finance as a means of preventing economic stagnation in 
LDCs.
2. Elshibiy (1984), and Dometriz and Elbadawi (1987) .
3. For instance Laidler and O'Shea (1980), and Dalamagas (1990).
4. e,g. Blondal (1986), constructs and estimates a model for the
Icelandic economy, which is credit-constrained.
5. These price deflators are GDP deflator, Consumer Price Index, Import 
Price index and export price index.
6. As mentioned earlier RM=C+R+GD; where GD represents government
deposits. As government deposits represent its working transaction 
balances, they can be fairly stable on the average, and, therefore, 
exert no significant influence on the flow of reserve money.
7. The credit multiplier is derived as follows. From equation (7.5):
TD=R+L-CBLB. But, ARR=R/TD. Therefore, TD=R/ARR, and substituting for TD 
in the above equation we get: L = [{1-ARR)/ARR]*R+CBLB.
8. We specify our model in terms of GDP rather than Gross National 
Product because of incomplete data on the latter.
9. This point has been stressed by Tobin (1978), and Flavin (1981).
10. The investment function is normally specified, following the 
accelerator and multiplier theories of investment, in terms of level and 
change in real income- see Levacic and Rebmann (1982), and C. Harvey 
(1977, PP.109-111) for determinants of various types of investment in 
African Countries in particular.
11. The former year witnessed the immediate impact of nationalization 
policies, and in 1983 the civil war restarted, and drought and famine 
accentuated, with considerable economic, and political unrest.
12. See e.g. Polak and Boissoneult (1959) and Keller (1980)
13. See Dutton (1971) and Aghevli and Khan (1977) .
14. The data used come mainly from: (1) I.M.F, International Finacial 
Statistics; (2) World Bank, World Tables; (3) Bank of Sudan Annual 
Reports; and (4) The Economic Survey of the Ministry of Finance. All 
sources, however, rely on estimates prepared by the department of 
statistics, and the data are subject to a considerable margin of error. 
Though the data were taken at their face value, those used represent the 
latest (amended) figures.
15. As in Pagan and Hall (1983) and Pagan (1984) . This method is exactly 
the opposite of the encompassing principle, which starts with a general 
unrestricted model that includes all variables the researcher wants, and 
tests for restrictions on the model to develop a parsimonious 
representation - See Mizon (1984)
16. See Hendry (1983).
17. For instance, Haque and Montiel (1989).
18. Empirical studies suggest that the interest-elasticity of investment
266
is generally low and insignificant in LDCs - see Aghevli et al (1979) , 
and Wai and Wong (1982) .
19. See Learner and Stern (1970), P.8.
20. The model was simulated with the help of Semafore, which is a 
simulation package developed by the London School of Business (LBS) - 
see LBS (1990).
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ISSUES
8.1 Theory, Empirical Findings and Implications:
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the 
significance of financial development in -the economic growth 
of a developing country. Focusing on the experience of Sudan, 
the study attempted to analyse the determinants of financial 
development, and its contribution to real savings and capital 
formation during the period 1960-1988.
In our theoretical analysis, the economic importance of a 
financial system lies in its ability to enhance the saving- 
investment process. The absence of adequate links between 
surplus and deficit units would thwart this process, as 
direct lending is less likely to satisfy the preferences of 
various lenders and borrowers. Lenders wish to minimize 
default risk, maximize returns, and have liquidity in their 
assets. These considerations require substantial portfolio 
diversification. Borrowers, on the other hand, demand funds 
for certain periods of time, and at lower costs. The basis of 
financial intermediation is that it can create financial 
assets and liabilities to accommodate the requirements of 
both lenders and borrowers, and ensure the smooth operations 
of the economy. Financial instruments of various maturities 
help to reconcile the needs of both savers and investors, 
since short-term instruments, as against long-dated 
instruments, tend to be more liquid, less risky, but normally 
offer lower returns. Furthermore, with maturity 
transformation, it is possible for financial intermediaries 
to hold assets, that are generally less liquid than their 
liabilitiess. Maturity transformation is facilitated by 
relatively large-scale operations of financial 
intermediaries, and this also allows them to pool risks
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associated with individual investors, harness small funds to 
finance large and long-term investments, and meanwhile 
entertain diversified portfolios. Moreover, via scale 
economies information advantages and specialization, 
financial intermediation is likely to increase returns to 
savers, and lower costs to borrowers. Financial institutions 
and instruments may, thus, help raise the. rate, and improve 
the structure, of savings, and since they allow able 
entrepreneurs to undertake investment without a corresponding 
act of savings, they may also lead to improvements in the 
structure and efficiency of investment. In addition, through 
the provision of credit and non-credit services, financial 
intermediaries may also boost the growth of entrepreneurial 
skills, and thereby the rate of economic development.
The extent to which the evolution and growth of a financial 
system may stimulate economic growth seems to depend on 
whether it plays an initiative supply-leading role, or a 
passive demand-following function. The former phenomenon, in 
contrast to the latter, requires that financial institutions 
and instruments expand, generating substantial savings and 
efficiently allocating them among various investments 
necessary to engineer economic development. The empirical 
evidence examined in this study provides no clear conclusion 
concerning the causation between financial and real 
development, as the former appears to lead in some countries 
and follow in other, and the direction of causation seems to 
change over time, and not to be uni-directional in many 
cases. The question, however, remains how the financial 
sector could be made to play an active role in the economic 
development, of LDCs in particular?.
It has been claimed that financial deepening and widening 
in these countries, is constrained by government policy, 
particularly in the form of nominal interest rates control, 
which keeps real interest rates below their market-clearing
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levels. The policy recommendation to developing countries, 
who wish to increase their rate of economic development, 
then, is to liberalize their financial and capital markets, 
by allowing financial variables to respond freely to changes 
in underlying market forces.
The argument for financial development and liberalization 
hinges crucially on the assumption that the resource 
mobilization and allocation mechanism built around financial 
institutions is optimal, in the sense that, left to 
themselves, and if competitive market conditions prevail, 
they would maximize returns to savers and minimize costs to 
borrowers. This would, in turn, positively influence the 
structure as well as the volume of savings. Assuming that 
investment in LDCs is constrained by the lack of savings, and 
since higher interest rates release resources from less 
efficient uses, both the structure and average productivity 
of investment would improve.
This hypothesis, however, does not account for a number of 
endogenous as well as exogenous factors that can seriously 
limit the ability of financial markets to play a leading part 
in economic development in LDCs, even when they are free from 
interest rate and other restrictions. Because of such market 
imperfections as insufficient information, liberal credit 
institutions may tend to ration loans on non-price basis, 
favouring well-established enterprises at the expense of new 
and innovative activities. Market forces may also fail to 
bring about a financial structure that is conducive to real 
development. Developing countries need development or long­
term finance, but, where commercial banks dominate the 
financial structure, with no guarantees of substantial 
maturity transformation, financial markets would have little 
contribution to real development financing. In addition, 
being entirely profit-minded, financial intermediaries may 
not provide technical and other assistance required for the
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growth of entrepreneurship.
Thus, there always appears to be a need for government 
intervention in order to influence banking behaviour, and to 
set up financial institutions and instruments that are more 
geared to providing long-term capital, and non-capital 
services, to the business sector. Again, financial 
intermediaries, which allocate investible- funds according to 
a financial criteria, may not adequately observe the economic 
and social priorities of a developing country, where 
resources are quite scarce, needs are vast, and a highly 
unequal distribution of income is the norm. These 
considerations provide a case for financial regulation, which 
should as far as possible try to avoid repression. But, the 
argument for financial regulation gains support from the 
empirical evidence discussed in chapter 2, which finds 
financial liberalization, especially through full 
deregulation, to be destabilizing.
In the context of Sudan, where intractable macroeconomic 
problems are plenty, the financial sector is limited in 
scope, structure, and strategic functions. The Sudanese 
economy has been on the decline since the late 1970s; the 
real rate of economic growth between 1978 and 1988 was 
negative averaging 0.8%. Infrastructural bottlenecks, 
especially in the sphere of transport, communication and 
energy, presented serious constraints on development 
activity, and the economy remained underdeveloped, with the 
share of industrial output in GDP well under 10% over the 
period 1978-88. The gross domestic investment rate was 15% 
between 1971-88. Nevertheless, successive development plans 
failed to address the issue of structural imbalances, because 
they relied, excessively, on foreign capital, which financed 
about 50% of total investment, but it was either tied to 
projects initiated by donors, or to the purchase of certain 
goods. In effect, the performance of the development
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projects, that were actually implemented, was adversely 
affected by the lack of supporting services, and necessary 
inputs, and they failed to generate enough surplus for 
subsequent debt-servicing. The official foreign debt of Sudan 
amounted to $11 billion in 1988, while there had been 
persistent balance of payments disequilibria throughout the 
last decade.
Civil war, political instability, and overexpansion of 
employment in the public sector have all contributed to 
rising current government expenditure, and deficits. This, 
added to unforthcoming foreign savings, made development 
planning on the part of the government irrelevant, and money 
creation to finance the deficit uncontrollable; the central 
bank Act was amended several times to ensure its effective 
control by the government. The government and most of the 
public enterprises being unable to manage their deficits, 
private initiatives were badly needed to foster economic 
development.
But, monetary and financial policy was largely driven by 
the financing of public deficit and ensuing inflation, 
especially in the 1980s, to the detriment of private economic 
activities and the long-term development of financial and 
capital markets. In particular the pursuit of short-term 
stabilization measures and constraints on bank lending and 
other activities overrode any deliberation of promoting and 
furthering the role of the financial sector in economic 
development. It has been argued in chapter 4 that official 
monetary policy had, since the 1970 nationalization Act and 
despite the denationalization measures, been vague about the 
promotion of financial institutions, and instruments. Various 
policy proposals were preoccupied with the control of banking 
facilities in order to accomodate the requirements of public 
enterprises. The financial system continued to be 
improportionately dominated by commercial banks, and the
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share of non-bank financial intermediaries is not great. The 
saving and credit activities of development banks were modest 
and declining, because they failed to compete with commercial 
banks, and to. cope with the introduction of Islamic methods 
of finance.
It was shown in chapter 4, however, that commercial banks 
had attracted considerable increases in total deposits. But, 
the composition of these deposits was overwhelmingly in 
favour of current deposits. The reasons being low rates of 
interest/profit, and banks own policy under strict credit 
ceilings. The allocation of commercial banks' funds was 
heavily geared towards short-term loans, with medium and 
long-term credit amounting to just 15% of total bank 
advances. This deposit and credit trend continued when banks 
were comprehensively regulated as well as when they were 
relatively free from restrictions, including interest rate 
and foreign exchanges control, during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Accordingly, we argued that if banks were to 
play a more profound role in development financing, well- 
guided banking regulation may be indispensable.
A major change in banking structure, and to some extent 
banking operations, was brought about by the introduction of 
Islamic banking in 1978. The principal departure of Islamic 
banks, and Islamic finance in general, from conventional 
banks is the abolition of fixed interest rates. Consequently, 
Islamic banks have to find financial instruments, on both the 
liabilities and assets sides, that do not depend on interest 
rates. As Islam allows trade and profit-making and encourages 
risk-sharing, returns to the various parties involved in 
financial arrangements are related to the profit/loss 
realized from real investment. Instruments of the Islamic 
profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) system, which calls for 
participation, necessitate extended involvement of banks in 
businesses. This, frequently, entails banks providing non­
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credit services, i.e. technical, managerial, financial ..etc. 
assistance, which may mitigate inefficiencies resulting from 
information imperfection and enhance the development of 
entrepreneurship. It was also argued in this study that the 
principle of participation, which eliminates conflicts in the 
interests of borrowers and lenders, might boost investment 
via equity finance. But, variable return on. savings may raise 
uncertainty, and discourage their growth. This would be the 
case unless the two sources of uncertainty, nominal return 
and inflation, are positively correlated. Moreover, PLS 
instruments may imply higher operational costs to banks, and 
they are less liquid compared to conventional instruments. 
Should Islamic banks, however, exist alongside the 
traditional ones, the definite outcome would be the widening 
of financial markets, with greater degree of competition and 
benefits to the economy as a whole. If, on the other hand, 
the entire financial system is to follow the Islamic 
principles, a securities market needs to be devised for 
Islamic financial institutions to overcome the liquidity, and 
cost problems, by making their instruments of finance 
transferable. In addition, there was also a case for the 
securities market in LDCs in general, and in Sudan in 
particular. This case is based on the limitations of debt 
finance by commercial banks, and on the fact that such market 
may be more equipped to generate funds for longer term or 
development finance, promote entrepreneurial talents through 
competition, and improve income distribution by widening 
access to credit as well as the ownership of economic 
enterprises. A securities market can also enlarge the scope 
of monetary policy and augment its effectiveness.
In the unstable economic and political environment in 
Sudan, however, a securities market can only be perceived as 
part of an overall macroeconomic strategy for economic 
stabilization and growth. But, as we have stressed in chapter
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6, there is no compelling theoretical reason to believe that 
such a market would be inefficient should the idea be rooted 
in strong conviction, and the market promoted by all parties 
concerned, i.e. the government and the private sector.
On the empirical side, Islamic banks have a better 
composition of funds than conventional banks, and so far seem 
to have contributed comparatively more substantially to real 
capital formation - if only for the promotion of the Islamic 
ideals, which they have set for themselves. We concluded 
that the experience of Islamic banks in Sudan is of 
relatively recent origin, and hence the continuity of their 
present strategies can only be properly judged after the 
lapse of a reasonably longer period of practice.
This study has constructed, estimated and simulated a 
macroeconomic model of the Sudanese economy, the aim of which 
was to investigate quantitatively the behavior of key 
financial variables, and their interaction with expenditure 
variables. On the financial side, the model elaborates the 
role of government borrowing in generating high-powered 
money, and examines the behavior of banks in keeping reserves 
and extending credit as well as the behaviour of the non-bank 
private sector in terms of its demand for real cash balances. 
On the expenditure side, there are functions for private 
consumption, private investment, and imports demand. 
Moreover, the model also contained an equation for government 
tax revenue, and a supply side measure represented by the 
behaviour of the consumer price inflation, as determined, 
among others, by the extent of excess demand for output in 
the economy. A major feature of the model is the direct 
transmission of monetary policy, which influences expenditure 
and output via credit availability, and this is implied by 
interest rates control. The main findings of the estimated 
model were:
1. The rate of interest has no significant impact on the
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demand for real cash balances, and private consumption 
expenditure. But, it has a significant negative effect on 
private investment; and this effect is mitigated through the 
negative impact of the rate of interest on the average 
reserves ratio, on which the credit multiplier and credit 
expansion depend. Notwithstanding this, the average reserves 
ratio, and thereby the credit multiplier, are determined 
mainly by the required reserves policy.
2. Increased bank lending raises private expenditure and 
imports, but the coefficient of bank loans is high (0.561) 
and statistically significant only in the case of investment. 
While the inverse relationship between the rate of interest 
and private capital formation negates the repressionist 
hypothesis, there is evidence in the model that the 
accumulation of financial savings (approximated by M2) can 
boost investment. The coefficient of M2 with respect to 
private investment was both significant and large (1.133).
3. Consumer price inflation displays a unitary long-run 
elasticity with respect to excess demand, as measured by the 
difference between actual and trend real output. Inflation 
has a negative influence on real private consumption, as well 
as government revenue from taxation. The latter relationship 
implies that government deficit will widen as inflation 
rises, assuming that government expenditure is fixed in real 
terms.
4. The long-run income elasticity of private consumption 
was found to be about unity, indicating that private 
consumption would increase by the same proportion as 
disposable income in the long-run. The long-run income 
elasticity of demand for imports was also close to unity. The 
short-run income elasticities of consumption and imports were
0.6 and 0.38 respectively. The short-run and long-run income 
elasticities of taxation were similar to those of import 
demand.
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The results of the simulation experiments suggest that both 
monetary and fiscal policies may be used to influence 
expenditure and output; the policy variables considered are 
reserves requirements, interest/profit rates, government 
expenditure, and taxation. Monetary shocks tend to have a 
uniform influence on consumption and investment over most of 
the period under review, while rises in government 
expenditure, as opposed to increases in tax revenue, induce 
consumption with a crowding-out effect on investment. 
Meanwhile, the relatively low rate of income-elasticity of 
tax revenue implies that a substantial proportion of any 
increase in government expenditure would have to be financed 
through borrowing from the central bank. The implications of 
the simulations results, among other things, on monetary and 
financial policy in particular are highlighted below.
8.2 Direction of Monetary and Financial Policy:
In the empirical model, and in view of the structure of the 
Sudanese financial system, instruments of indirect monetary 
control are limited. Meanwhile, the application of the 
instruments of direct monetary control by the authorities had 
been, grossly, inefficient in resolving the conflict between 
economic stabilization and growth. The main instruments of 
indirect monetary control available to the authorities were 
reserve requirements, interest rates and the discount rate. 
Binding credit ceilings make the discount rate redundant, as 
commercial banks suffer from excess liquidity rather than the 
reverse. But, legal reserve requirements have been actively 
used in recent years. The main implications of the analysis 
in this study for the direction of monetary and financial 
policy may be summarized in the following:
1. As the results of our model indicate, changes in legal 
reserves requirements lead to relatively large shifts in 
commercial banks assets, reducing in particular credit to the
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private sector. This policy clearly needs time if it is not 
to be disruptive. By forcing commercial banks to keep 
sizeable funds idle, and if banks are not compensated, high 
reserve requirements would raise the cost o f . financial 
intermediation, and inhibit the development of formal 
financial institutions in favour of curbmarkets and non-bank 
financial intermediaries, which are less amenable to monetary 
control. Therefore, the use of reserves requirements for 
short-term stabilization could disrupt long-term financial 
and real development, and should be avoided or regarded with 
caution
2. The rate of interest had, always, been determined by the 
authorities, but it has become less important with the advent 
of Islamic finance. Interest rates fixing, combined with 
direct quantitative control over bank lending, does not only 
discourage the growth of financial intermediaries, but also 
leads to less efficient composition and uses of financial 
savings. To maximize their profits, commercial banks had, 
often, refused to accept interest-or-profit-bearing deposits, 
although these deposits are more suitable for long-term or 
development finance. This behaviour on the part of banks was 
justifiable, because, within the ceiling, they can rely on 
funds in current accounts only to earn a commission income as 
well as interest or profit from short-term loans. Since 
short-term lending is more inflationary than long-term 
lending, which is thus discouraged, the policy of promoting 
stability and growth through interest rate fixing and credit 
ceiling is, obviously^ self-defeating. Similarly, the 
selective credit policy, which fails to identify profitable 
projects within the priority sectors, can hardly stimulate 
the flow of funds to them. If quantitative credit control is 
necessary, its criteria should also pay special consideration 
to the composition of bank liabilities and assets; long-term 
deposits and finance ought to be fully exempted from the
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ceiling, or the ceiling be progressively widening with their 
increase.
3. It emerges from the discussion that if banking 
regulation is. to be justifiable it should be genuine, and if 
monetary policy is to be successful, it must also aim at the 
long-term widening and deepening of the geographical and 
functional scope of financial and capital markets. The 
promotion of a securities market may be essential for a 
financial system based on Islamic principle, but equity 
institutions and non-credit financial functions should also 
be enhanced. This inevitably requires a central bank with a 
greater degree of autonomy in policy design and 
implementation, and an understanding that adhoc monetary and 
financial policy serves no useful purpose.
4. There are no provisions in the central bank Act to 
regulate and/or promote the activities of Islamic banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries in particular. This has 
been the case although the entire financial system was 
instructed in 1984 to observe the Islamic principles of 
finance. Obviously, there is an urgent need for this Act to 
be amended, and the central bank to be involved in the 
Islamization move if Islamic finance is to be well guided in 
the interest of the national economy.
5. Similarly, as seen in chapter 3, there have been no 
detailed projections of private finance in general, and 
savings and investment in particular, in national development 
plans. Thus, if future economic progress is to be 
contemplated, and planning to be adopted as a means, detailed 
studies of private financial flows ought to be made, possibly 
in the context of flow of funds tables for the whole economy.
6 The monetary authorities have consistently failed to 
confront the problem of massive domestic borrowing by the 
government and public enterprises, some of which have been in 
the red throughout their life time. It is of utmost economic
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importance that failing public enterprises be liquidated if 
they can only survive by means of cheap loans at the expense 
of more competitive firms. Likewise, government borrowing 
from the banking sector should be brought under control, for 
the conflict between public deficit financing, stabilization 
and long-term financial development to be reconciled.
The issue of government deficits needs a fundamental 
restructuring of government finance. On the expenditure side 
fiscal reform is necessary to bring government expenditure in 
line with its real revenues. On the revenue side, although 
the policy of high general taxes is deflationary, there is a 
good point for selective taxation. The rich classes in Sudan 
appear to have high consumption propensities and a quite low 
saving rate. Progressive taxes on certain classes of income, 
given appropriate expenditure control by the government, may 
well raise the rate of national savings. Moreover, with the 
spread of Islamic banks, it may be possible for the 
government to finance a significant proportion of well- 
studied development projects, with identifiable returns, 
through banks' participation.
7. In all the simulation results of the empirical model, 
the impact of policy shocks on real absorption and output 
seems to depend on the level of inflation; when the 
prevailing rate of inflation is considerably high, as it was 
the case during the 1980s, policy effects are rapidly 
neutralized. A major policy implication of this is that, 
measures, financial or otherwise, to increase the rate of 
economic growth should not only aim at stimulating aggregate 
demand, but also attempt to intensify the productive 
capacity, or the supply side, of the economy.
The overall conclusion of this study is that financial 
development may be necessary in the economic development of a 
growing economy. But, in an economy like that of Sudan, the 
role of financial institutions and instruments in the process
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of economic development may only be successfully promoted in 
the context of clear macroeconomic strategies that adequately 
address in particular infrastructural obstacles, and economic 
instability. .
8.3 Suggestions For Further Research:
One of the limitations of the present -study is that it is 
primarily concerned with the development and performance of 
the modern financial sector of Sudan, and its interaction 
with the expenditure sector. However, the Sudanese economy is 
based on traditional agriculture and animal husbandry. The 
exact size of the traditional sector is unknown, and its role 
in the economy as a whole is hardly acknowledged at the level 
of national planning. This has been the case although this 
sector provides employment, income, and basic necessity goods 
for more than half of the population of the country, and 
contributes significantly to aggregate exports as well as the 
input requirements of the modern sector. Meanwhile, the 
traditional sector has very little import requirements in 
terms of both consumption and production.
The traditional methods of production and finance of this 
sector are too backward to engender progress, so that its 
modernization and development require deliberate and well- 
prepared programmes of action involving both the government 
and the private sector, particularly banks. Government action 
in this respect has, so far, been limited to the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan, which was set up to provide credit and non­
credit services to indigenous producers. The bank, with its 
meagre capital and inability to mobilize sufficient savings, 
has provided little support to the rapidly degenerating 
traditional agriculture, while, as this study indicated, 
commercial banks’ credits were consistently and excessively 
in favour of urban and relatively large-scale modern 
enterprises. Adverse conditions of production in the
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traditional sector, coupled with successive waves of drought 
and the civil war, have resulted in tragic famines in 1984 
and 1991, with mass rural-urban migration, which has a 
compound effect on food shortages. The modern sector failed 
to provide jobs to the armies of peasants who deserted their 
villages and farms. Future economic development may only be 
facilitated if these problems are contained, and the 
traditional sector rehabilitated and modernized. And as 
Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith (1991) put it:
"Development is the best antidote to famine, and the 
best of development provides poor people with secure and 
sustainable livelihood" (P.23).
It remains a good area for future research to investigate, 
in detail, the nature and requirements of the traditional 
sector of the Sudanese economy, and the means by which it can 
be reactivated, modernized and integrated into the modern 
network of economic enterprises.
The research would attempt, first, to assess the size and 
importance of the traditional sector in the national economy. 
Second, to underline its financial needs, and explore 
approaches to mobilize funds within and from outside this 
sector. Third, to consider the organization of the 
traditional sector and its incorporation in national 
development plans; with the understanding that the 
development of the entire economy might only be possible when 
the strategic function of this sector is secured. Moreover, 
proper attention to the traditional sector at the level of 
national plans in particular and economic policy in general 
is necessary, because the allocation of development projects 
and credit facilities may well dictate the pattern of income 
distribution. Fourth, the research would also try to examine 
the need for, and the plausibility of, specialized government
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bodies as well as policies to influence formal financial
institutions to provide various credit and non-credit (i.e.
technical, marketing, storage etc) assistance to
traditional producers. Being left to indigenous traders, 
producers in the traditional sector are vulnerable to
exploitation, particularly in terms of low prices, which 
destroys incentives for increased production, or even 
maintenance of existing production capacities. Fifth, and as 
it emerges from the present study, future research would 
attempt to determine how the acclaimed commitment of Islamic 
banks to economic equity and development, and their 
techniques can be utilized to provide a basis for rural
finance. Finally, the research would attempt to examine how 
the process of dynamic economic progress can be boosted via 
entrepreneurial development, and enterprise initiatives in 
connection with rural or traditional economic activities. 
This may be related to the issue of- attracting increased bank 
participation in rural finance.
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Appendix 2:
Questions for Interviews with Bankers
Purpose: The interview questions are designed for Bankers
to describe and explain the major factors that influence the 
operations of their banks with respect to the mobilization 
and allocation of domestic resources.
Interviewee's Background:
Bank : ________________________________
D e p a r t m e n t __________________________
Occupation: ____________________________
Specialty: _______;________________ _____
Date
Questions
Section (A) : Expansion of the Banking Network
(1) How many branches does your bank have ? (besides the 
headquarters)
In Khartoum Province_____ ___________
Other Urban Areas________ ___________
In Rural Areas
(2) On the basis of costs and benefits and potential for 
growth, How do you rate the size of your bank ? (in terms of 
number of branches and customers)
Optimal _______  Reasonable________ Suboptimal_________
(3) Which of the following factors do you think have affected 
the horizontal expansion (i.e. number of branches) of your 
bank ?
In Urban Areas In Rural Areas
Limited demand for banking
Services ______  _____
High costs of providing the
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services
Insufficient information About the 
market ( e.g on Incomes)
Lack of capital
Others--------------------------
Section (B) Growth of bank Liabilities
(4) What is the minimum amount required by your bank for 
opening one of the following accounts ?
Current Account: £s _____
Time and saving deposit Account: £s _________
(5) Leaving income aside, how do you rate the importance of 
the following factors in the growth of deposits in domestic 
currency ?
Answers1 code:
VI : means very important 
I : means important 
M : means moderately important 
U : means unimportant
Levels of interest rates _______  ______
Inflation__________________________  ______
Access to banks _______ ~ _______
Others ---------------------------------------------------
(6) Which factors do you think affect the transfer of 
remittances by Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad through 
banks ?
Low bank rates of exchange relative to black
market rates ______
Inconvenience of banks as channels for
remittances__________________________________ ______
Lack of banking habits on the part of those 
who make the remittances
Current A/c 
deposit
Time and 
Saving Deposit
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Others
(7) Does your bank offer any services or rewards that are 
particularly meant to attract customers ? (e.g Automatic or 
easy overdraft facilities)
Yes ______ No________
If Yes, please explain ------------------------------------
Section (c) : Bank Lending Activities:
(8) What determines the relative size and direction (to broad 
economic sectors) of your Medium and long-term loans ? (Broad 
economic sectors refer to Agriculture, Industry, commerce 
 etc)
Size Direction
Government credit policy (ceilings and
sectoral allocation)_____________________ ____  _____
Bank own policy ____  _____
Profitability or market forces ____  _____
Differential rates of interest ____  ______
Others ---------------------------------------------------
(9) Does your bank have specific lending policy towards real 
capital formation in rural or traditional subsectors versus 
urban subsectors?
Modern or urban Traditional
Agriculture __________  _______
Industry________________________ __________  _______
Transport  ;_ _______
Estate __________  _______
Commerce __________  _______
Others: -------------------------------------------------
(10) What are the major factors that influence lending to 
borrowers in the traditional subsector ? (Use answer codes 
in (5))
Low returns on loans____________________________________
High risk___________________________________ ___________
Lack of marketable collaterals
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Insufficient information about projects ___________
Others :--------------------------------------------------
(11) Do you think that the Loan-deposit ratio of your bank
(say in the last 5 years) is optimal ?
Yes _______  No _______
If No, please answer (12)
(12) Which factors have contributed to your bank's loan- 
deposit ratio being suboptimal ?
Legal reserve requirement policy _________
Credit ceilings policy _________
Low official lending rates of interest _________
Lack of profitable lending opportunities_____ _________
Others ----------- ----------------------------------------
(13) How frequent does your bank use the following documents
in support of an application for each of the two types of
credit facilities ? (i.e. short-t-erm credit vs medium and
long-term credit)
Answers 1 code:
A : means Always
N : Normally
S : Sometimes
R : Rarely
NE: Never
Short-term Medium and long- 
credit term credit
Feasibility studies prepared by
the Borrower ____  _________
Bank's independent assessment
of the project ____  _________
Accounting statements (e.g Income
statement, balance sheet . . etc.) ___  ________
Collaterals offered ____  ________
Information on firm's past
operations (e.g purchases, sales.) ____  _______
Others ---------------------------------------------------
(14) Does your bank have any direct participation in the 
capital of firms in the following sectors ?
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Agriculture
Transport
Commerce
  Industry ______
_ Estate or Construction 
Others:----------------
(15) Does your bank explore lending opportunities, say by 
conducting feasibility studies and advertising projects or 
expressing intentions to provide credit to a certain category 
of investment ?
Yes _____ No______
If yes, please explain ------------------------------------
(16) Does your bank provide technical and/or managerial 
assistance to borrowers ?
Yes  No _____
If Yes, answer (17) and (18)
(17) In which sector ?
Agriculture _______ Industry  Transport____
Estate or construction ______ Commerce ______
Others----------------------------------------------------
(18)Area of assistance:
Technical ( e . g  engineering) _____ Accounting system______
Managerial organization _______  Marketing _________
Others: --------------------------------------------- ;----
Section (D) : Policy issues
(19) What do you believe should be the direction of the 
following policies for banks to play a more profound role in 
the mobilization of domestic resources ?
1. Interest or profit rate policy:
(a) Deposit rates
(b) Lending rates
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2. Legal reserves policy:
3. Credit Policy:
(a) Ceilings
(b) Sectoral allocation
4. Exchange rate and foreign exchanges policy:
5. Profit tax policy
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